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Abstract 
 
 
             Senegalese fishermen have significantly expanded their mobility into the eastern Atlantic 
Ocean since the early 1980s. Fishermen have been crossing international maritime borders and 
organising long sea journeys, in part as a response to the decrease in fishing resources in 
Senegalese waters. From the early 2000s, they began carrying West African migrants on the 
maritime routes from Senegal to Spain, diversifying into irregular maritime migration or ‘people 
smuggling’. Fishermen’s fishing techniques and the migration flows they have facilitated are well 
documented. We have a good understanding, too, of the push-and-pull factors shaping these 
maritime migration patterns. Thus far, the social and political meanings of fishermen’s maritime 
mobility and cross-border movements have been comparatively neglected. This thesis argues that 
these mobility patterns are connected, revealing links between regional fisheries and mobilities and 
international migration flows that create distinctive maritime geographies. 
 
            Drawing on participant observations and narratives collected in 69 in-depth interviews, my 
analysis explores the ways in which power and knowledge shape the at-sea experiences of 
Senegalese fishermen. For them, mobility is more than a response to the decrease in fish resources. 
By deploying their mobility, fishermen seek to recover control over their maritime and social 
environments. To map the maritime geographies this mobility co-creates, I examine three spaces. 
First, I chart the social and political mechanisms of fishermen’s mobility in Senegal, examining the 
gendered and local meanings of their movements. Second, I examine these mechanisms at the 
regional level – at the Senegal–Mauritania border and in the waters off Guinea and Guinea-Bissau. 
Finally, I track fishermen’s routes to the Canary Islands. By attending to fishermen’s accounts, I 
demonstrate the many ways in which they appropriate the ocean space, shape the geographies of 
maritime borderlands and rationalise their navigation. I reveal how their maritime mobility opens 
up multiple opportunities for fishermen to negotiate with – and reshape – the power relations that 
structure their social, political and natural environments. 
 
Key words: Maritime migration, mobility, borders, Atlantic Ocean, Senegal, artisanal fishermen, 
power/knowledge, fishing crisis 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction.  
Power, Mobility and the Sea 
 
1. Introduction 
  
 Overfishing has generated a loss of environmental and economic resources, which has 
tested Senegalese coastal societies. The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations 
(FAO) reports that most of the fish stocks in West African waters are considered over-exploited 
(FAO, 2010: 40). The decrease in fish resources is especially worrying in a context of extreme 
poverty: in Senegal 46.7% of the population3 – including coastal communities (Neiland & Béné, 
2004) – live in poverty. Fishing-related economies are essential to the country as they generate 
around 650,000 jobs in fishing, processing and marketing (FAO, 2008: 15). A recent NOAA4 
fisheries report suggests that around 40% of fish catches in West African waters are extracted 
illegally.5 With huge fishing and processing capacity, industrial vessels have contributed to 
overfishing in West Africa, threatening the food security and economic development of coastal 
communities (Alder & Sumaila, 2004). To a lesser extent, pressure on fish resources also results 
from the intense fishing activities of the many Senegalese artisanal fishers. Nearly 18,916 
Senegalese artisanal canoes6 explore the national and neighbouring waters every day, often 
developing questionable practices. Many other examples point to the over-exploitation of West 
African waters by all sorts of actors and on many scales. How has this situation affected Senegalese 
coastal communities? What reaction might we expect from small-scale fishermen? In the Horn of 
Africa, overfishing is often cited as one of the root causes for the emergence of piracy (Chalk, 
2010). Given the situation in Senegal, could Senegalese fishermen become West Africa’s pirates, 
as recently suggested in the media?7 
                                                     
3
 World Bank, 2014 
4
 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
5
 NOAA, 2014 
6
 Results of the 2012 Senegalese Fisheries Registration Programme – statistics collected during interviews 
with fisheries officials, Interview 69, Dakar, 21st June 2012 
7
 Guardian.co.uk, 2012. John Vidal explains how the fishermen’s bitterness towards foreign industrial 
fishers might lead them to assault foreign fleets in a similar way to what happened in Somalia. 
Nevertheless, Somalia and Senegal are not comparable in terms of political stability or economic and 
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 Senegalese fishermen have not waited for decades before considering alternatives to the 
decrease in fish resources. They have already started crossing borders and fishing or moving 
abroad; their mobility has certainly been a key response to the crisis for many of them. Their 
maritime mobility patterns have intensified since the beginning of the 1980s (Chaboud & Kebe, 
1991). Fishermen now leave their village of origin for longer periods of time. They look for new 
fishing places, organise longer fishing expeditions, settle in remote places or fish in foreign 
countries’ waters (Binet, Failler, & Agossah, 2012). For each mobility trend, the average time 
usually spent at sea – or at least away from the village of origin – has increased, whether for limited 
daily fishing trips or long-distance fishing expeditions. In the last decade, these patterns also 
expanded dramatically as fishermen engaged in people smuggling and maritime migration to 
Europe. Thus far, the connections between these mobility patterns have raised only minor attention. 
Studies on fishermen’s mobility from Senegal have mainly focused on the description of their 
fishing techniques and specialities or areas of migration or on the relation between the decrease in 
resources and the increase in fishermen’s movement at sea (see, for example, Binet & Failler, 2010; 
Failler & Binet, 2010). Henrietta Nyamnjoh has certainly applied strong qualitative methods to 
efficiently examine the role of the Senegalese fishermen in the development of irregular migration 
routes from Senegal to the Canary Islands (2010). Nevertheless, the social and geographical 
mechanisms of these mobility patterns remain partially explored, and less attention is given to the 
connections that exist between these maritime mobility trends. Furthermore, little is known about 
the individual experiences of the fishermen at sea, about the way they apprehend maritime borders 
or about the meaning they give to their mobility.  
 The lack of empirical data on Senegalese fishermen’s mobility and maritime experiences 
has therefore led me to raise the following questions: How can we apprehend the complexity and 
dynamism of fishermen’s mobility at sea and how can this analysis evidence the connections 
between regional fishing mobility trends and irregular maritime migration to Spain? This project 
seeks to offer thorough responses by examining the individual experiences of the fishermen and of 
                                                                                                                                                                
humanitarian background. The issue of piracy in the Horn of Africa raises many more contextual, historic 
and political questions than the fishing crisis alone (Chalk, 2010) 
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the other actors involved in these maritime mobilities. I interrogate the meaning of these 
movements through the narratives I gathered in the field during two visits to Senegal in 2011 and 
2012. By doing so, I will show that fishermen’s mobilities are more than a simple response to the 
decrease in fish resources.  My ethnographic data suggest that these mobilities involve complex 
mechanisms linking sea and land spaces and are shaped by specific power-knowledge relations 
between distinct actors.   
 This project examines the maritime mobility of the Senegalese fishermen in Senegal and 
beyond Senegalese borders. It examines mobility as a whole, as part of coastal communities’ ways 
of life and as part of their local economies and cultural habits. Thus, here, the notion of mobility 
includes fishermen’s everyday sea mobility, cross-border mobility in Mauritania, long-distance 
fishing migration to southern countries such as Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, and irregular maritime 
migration to Europe. What is happening in Senegalese waters, on a very local scale, informs us 
about larger West African sea mobility trends, which are themselves related to global maritime 
migration from Africa to Europe.  
  The ocean is changing, as are fishermen’s movements on it. This research is based on the 
assumption that borders, sea spaces  and mobility are socially constructed (Adey, 2010; Cresswell, 
2006; Mechlinski, 2010; Steinberg, 2001). Fishermen’s mobility would only be partially examined 
were it seen as a simple movement crossing what we might understand as arbitrary lines which are 
drawn on abstract seas. The realities are far more complex: the natural maritime environment is not 
only natural, because borders are not just lines and because fishermen’s mobility carries significant 
meanings and functions. By addressing the power relations at stake in these mobilities, I hope to 
offer a realistic and pragmatic account of the complex way in which fishermen unfold and use their 
mobility across spaces. I will show how fishermen’s maritime geographies are changing depending 
on the way in which they unfold their mobility. Their experiences show how the sea is a space 
where they can take advantage of borders and political constraints and can negotiate with or elude 
border practices. The ocean becomes a whole bordering space when used as a space to reach 
Europe.  
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 My initial research questions certainly entail looking at the causal relationship between the 
decrease in fish resources and fishermen’s expanding mobility trends. However, focusing on these 
aspects alone would keep us away from other essential aspects and reduce mobility to a forced 
response to environmental degradation. There is certainly a direct relationship between 
environmental degradation and mobility. Put simply, there are fewer fish in the sea, so fishermen 
need to go further from the shore to find more. Nevertheless, the patterns of their mobility cannot 
be understood as simply determined by resource scarcity. I show that fishermen’s mobility is 
shaped by the power relationships linking various land- and sea-based actors. What the fishing 
crisis does, in fact, is strengthen these power relations, all of which result in greater mobility based 
on pragmatic knowledge. The fishing crisis has generated a decrease in resources and income for 
the fishermen who have traditionally been earning most of their living from fishing. The economic 
situation of the fishermen has made them unable to fulfil their role of head of the family. I show 
how, by deploying their mobility, fishermen have been seeking to recover the control they have 
been losing over their maritime and social environment. Through their maritime mobility, the 
fishermen have found multiple opportunities to negotiate with the existing power struggles and 
power–knowledge relations that structure their social, political and natural environments. These 
mechanisms apply not only at the level of Senegalese waters and fishermen’s households (chapters 
3, 4, 5 and 9) but also through the analysis of maritime border experiences (chapters 6, 7 and 8). 
Rather than openly contesting traditional “domestic” and social institutions (Chauveau, Jul-Larsen, 
& Chaboud, 2000: 42), or confronting the exercise of local and national state power by border 
agents, fishermen have deployed a pragmatic mobility in order to elude these forms of control. At 
the same time, their mobility asserts power over their social and geographic environment both on 
land and at sea.   
 Looking at the particular dynamics of fishermen’s mobility at sea is therefore vital to 
understand both border regimes and tensions in Senegal and abroad. This research engages in 
larger debates at the crossroads of the geographies of the sea, mobility studies and border studies. 
By focusing on fishing and West African migration, I show that fishermen appropriate the maritime 
environment in a pragmatic way and that this is noticeable through the shape taken by their 
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mobility. In this section, I start by examining the linkages between the notions of maritime 
mobility, networks and power and show how these linkages result in the production of pragmatic 
knowledge for the fishermen. I then move on to the specific issue of borders. My approach suggests 
considering the maritime and socio-political dimensions of the construction of borderlands through 
the mobile experiences of the fishermen.  
 This research is about mobilities. Before I outline the conceptual framework I will use to 
disentangle the object of this research, I would also like to make clear what this research is not 
about. My project is not about Senegal’s polities, fisheries or migration management. Although I 
question Senegalese sea governance and European and African migration policy management, I do 
so in relation to fishermen’s mobility only. This research does not aim to cover the maritime 
knowledge of the fishermen, either. Their knowledge is by definition practical and, as Scott puts it 
(1998), the best way to grasp its complexity would be through repeated practice. Because the 
possibilities for practising were quite limited for me, I mostly look at the fishermen’s mobility from 
the shore, through the accounts of their own mobile experiences. I will certainly give significant 
examples of the fishermen’s knowledge of the sea, but I do not intend to provide a comprehensive 
view of the complexity of their knowledge.  
 
2. Linking maritime mobility, networks, power and knowledge 
  
 Fishermen’s sea mobility relies on networks and articulates around power–knowledge 
relations between various network members. In order to better grasp the meanings of Senegalese 
fishers’ sea mobility, I first situate the conceptual framework of these connections and show how 
these connections are related to the production of maritime geographies. This section seeks to 
demonstrate the limits of the traditional approach to the fishers’ mobility. I highlight the need for a 
practical approach that apprehends the construction of maritime spaces on the individual scale of 
the actors of mobility. 
 In the literature on migration and fishing, leading authors disagree on the reasons for 
migration, although they acknowledge that mobility remains an essential driving force for the 
10 
 
fishermen’s community, whether it spreads at the level of West African waters or from Senegal to 
Europe. Failler and Binet argue that the decrease in fishing resources in West African waters has 
pushed the fishermen to migrate and spread their mobility all over the ocean in order to find new 
resource-rich fishing places (Failler & Binet, 2010). According to Nyamnjoh, Senegalese fishermen 
took part in the organisation of irregular migration journeys to the Canary Islands during the 2000s 
decade mainly because of the decrease in fish stocks in their national waters. Boat migration 
appears to be an opportunity for them to compensate for the decline in their fishing-related income  
(Nyamnjoh, 2010). In turn, Sall and Morand rather bring to the fore that the maritime route to 
Spain fully benefited from the dynamism of Senegalese fisheries and mobility habits, thus 
minimising the impact of the fishing crisis (2008).  
 While these studies focus on the roots of fishermen’s various migration patterns, they do 
not examine the nature of the mobility itself. In fact, the movement of people in West Africa has 
been mostly understood within the scope of migration studies, as the following examples suggest. 
Adepoju notes that African people have always used migration as a habit that is part of their 
everyday life at the social, cultural and economic levels (Adepoju, 2002). The continent is in 
perpetual movement, and its societies and places are shaped by the circulation of people across 
borders. Carling explores the mechanisms of irregular migration from West Africa to Europe as 
movements which are organised around transit towns and adjusted to migration management policy 
(Carling & Hernández-Carretero, 2011; Carling, 2007b).  The literature on African migration has 
considered both territorial and maritime routes leading the migrants to North Africa and Europe, 
highlighting the complex connections between migrants’ individual experiences and the effect of 
border surveillance and migration management policy on their trajectory (Bredeloup & Pliez, 2005; 
Carling, 2007b; De Haas, 2007; Dünnwald, 2011; Pian, 2006). Fouquet understands migration as a 
way for the young people of Senegal to gain access to greater social and individual recognition 
(Fouquet, 2008), while Riccio emphasises the importance of the transnational connections between 
the Senegalese migrants in Italy and their community of origin (Riccio, 2006). Other West African 
migration-related studies focus on the impact of remittances which emigrants regularly send to 
their community (Beauchemin, Kabbanji, Sakho, & Schoumaker, 2013) or on the effect of 
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environmental changes on people’s migration decisions (Henry, Schoumaker, & Beauchemin, 
2004).  
 The limitation of this literature is that it explores fishing mobility patterns in Senegal and 
West Africa and recent migration from Senegal to Spain separately. Failler and Binet have outlined 
the multiple migration patterns of West African migrant fishermen, which they classify by ethnic 
background, fishing techniques and specialities, and maritime routes and habits (Binet et al., 2012; 
Binet & Failler, 2010; Failler & Binet, 2010). Chauveau, an anthropologist, has provided rich 
reflections on West African fisheries and Senegalese fishermen in particular, highlighting the 
historical aspects of today’s fisheries development (1986, 1989). Chauveau et al. demonstrate how 
access to the sea has long been determined by the complex power relations between the fishermen 
and the multiple local and national institutions in West Africa (2000). Other key studies have 
focused on the cultural and economic use of the sea space in Senegal and have provided rich 
insights for further understanding fishermen’s movements at sea (Cormier-Salem, 1995; Sall, 
2007). Though this literature thoroughly addresses the mechanisms of fishing-related mobilities, it 
pays little attention to the connections between the actors involved in maritime mobilities or to the 
fishermen’s strategies for crossing maritime borders. My project seeks to deepen the overall 
knowledge by providing qualitative data on the social and geographical meanings and implications 
of fishermen’s border-crossing experiences. 
 I follow Cresswell in attempting to transcend the limits of migration studies by thinking of 
mobility holistically. For Cresswell, mobility cannot be summarised as “getting from point A to 
point B” (2006: 2). In this sense, migration studies only explore one part of mobility. Classic 
migration studies’ focus results in a compartmentalisation of migration patterns which dismisses 
the linkages that exist between the various shapes and scales of mobility as well as the genuine 
significance of this mobility. Cresswell and Adey have emphasised the way cultural, economic and 
social contexts shape movements (Adey, 2010; Cresswell, 2006). Mobility is not only a practical 
means that joins places; it can carry meanings, reveal power relations between agents or constitute 
a resource for the exercise of power (Adey, 2010; Cresswell, 2006). Because fishermen’s mobilities 
result from complex connections between various actors, they carry meaningful social and political 
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functions. These actors not only make possible these mobilities, but they give them different 
meanings and directions. In this sense, these mobilities not only enable the fishermen to exercise 
power over their maritime and social environment: they are also constructed upon and reflect the 
hierarchal and cultural codes of the socio-economic organisation of coastal communities (Adey, 
2010: 19). For Adey, it is essential to look at the political, economic or social context of mobilities, 
and examine the various meanings which are given to them to the extent that these meanings 
substantively influence these mobilities (2010: 38). Mobilities are not neutral, and their meanings 
“can make a big difference. They can shape social relationships, and they might alter the way we 
think about and act towards them” (Adey, 2010: 38). In this sense, the mobility of the fishermen 
takes distinct meanings not only for themselves, but also for the many actors directly or indirectly 
related to this mobility.  
 Mobility involves multiple scales and physical dimensions as the moving nature of the 
ocean itself generates fishermen’s mobility. Launching a boat or reaching a nearby fishing place 
necessarily implies a mobile action adjusted to a complex moving and liquid environment. For 
these reasons, mobility should be both addressed as a whole, whether it is local, national or 
international, and examined as part – or a producer – of specific maritime geographies. These 
mobilities participate in the “social construction of the ocean” (Steinberg, 2001). Fishermen’s 
mobility is a linking movement between sea and land spaces. This mobility gives the ocean a 
central role in the everyday life of coastal communities, making maritime spaces not only valuable 
surfaces upon which fishermen unfold their trajectories or resource-rich spaces from which they 
earn a living, but also meaningful spaces where social and political structures are challenged. 
 For these reasons, this research gives particular attention to fishermen’s experiences of the 
ocean. Investigating the maritime dimension of the fishers’ mobility and moving the focus to the 
construction of maritime geographies in an African environment help us to properly grasp the 
everyday dynamics of coastal communities in Senegal. Although oceans cover more than 
two-thirds of the world’s surface, it is only recently that they raised the attention of human 
geographers (Steinberg, 2001, 2014). As with other human sciences fields, geography has long 
been a “landlocked” discipline (Lambert, Martins, & Ogborn, 2006; Peters, 2010). Maritime spaces 
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have occupied marginal places of the mental construction of the world, yet they have specific 
functions within societies. Indeed, for Steinberg, what occurs on sea spaces has significant effects 
on societies on land, and vice versa. There is a continuous movement between sea and land, 
according to which both spaces interdependently influence each other, and this movement plays a 
determining role in the creation of social identity (2001: 200). Fishermen’s experiences invite us to 
think of maritime spaces as “more-than-representational spaces” (Jon Anderson & Peters, 2014: 9). 
As Peters and Anderson argue, the sea is not only a symbolic surface or an abstract concept for 
individuals. Senegalese fishermen physically experience the multi-dimensional nature of the sea by 
constantly adjusting their movement to its moving, fluid and changing materiality (Jon Anderson & 
Peters, 2014; Peters, 2010). These maritime experiences influence fishermen’s relationship to the 
ocean and to the political rules that regulate it. Through their maritime mobility, fishermen 
challenge the orders of many structures and institutions. They use the sea as a space in which to 
challenge the conventional organisation of their society and as a space in which to negotiate with 
existing social and political structures – exemplifying Steinberg’s argument (2001: 191). 
Competition between the fishermen over scarcer resources or illegal incursions into protected areas 
are examples of the tensions that are directly or indirectly linked to what is happening on land. In 
turn, before spreading to the sea, small-scale fisheries and fishermen’s mobility are first organised 
on land and result from the interaction of a myriad of more or less powerful actors. Although this 
mobility happens at sea, it is decided on and prepared from the earth and results from complex 
connections of networks.  
  
Networks, power and mobility 
 One of the ways to decipher fishermen’s mobility and grasp the complex power relations 
that give shape to this mobility would be to disentangle the networks at stake in sea mobilities. 
Actors taking part in the organisation of sea mobility are constitutive of networks, within which 
different forms of expressions of power occur. Investigating such networks entails looking at the 
human and non-human actors which form part of these networks and examining their connections 
in terms of resources and power and their mobile or immobile nature. Whether it is used for fishing 
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or migrating to Europe, fishermen’s mobility is based on organised networks of people, financial 
possibilities and material resources. For Latour, non-human and human elements have always been 
mixed together; they are linked by networks and constitute collectives which progress between the 
poles of nature and societies without any kind of interruption or division (Latour, 1993). Nothing is 
essentially human or natural; facts connect humans, natural elements and phenomena into 
networks. ‘Actants’ are ‘hybrid’ actors which progress within a complex system of networks 
interplaying with time, place and spaces, and human and non-human elements (1993).  
 Fishermen are obviously the central actors of their mobility, and their practice of the sea 
involves various time scales, including their ancestors’ knowledge transmission and their own 
experience of navigation. Fishermen’s narratives will demonstrate that the many actors with whom 
they interact significantly influence their trajectories. These actors are either family, community 
members, state agents or members of fisheries organisations who encourage, fund, denounce or 
depend on the fishermen’s mobility. As Urry and Sheller suggest, we should pay particular 
attention to immobile actors and acknowledge the vital role which their immobility plays to making 
mobility happen (2006). These actors can also be rich and influential or dependant and vulnerable. 
Fish species are play a key part in this network of actors (Bear & Eden, 2008): their movement 
attracts the fishermen, who follow their trajectories. Conversely, the lack of fish species also 
influences fishermen’s mobility. Tide movements and currents, the rocks of maritime grounds and 
the wind, but also the technologies and techniques fishermen rely on, are other non-human actors 
which give shape to this mobility.  
 In the field, I quickly noticed that power relations are essential drivers for mobility on 
every scale. The human actors related to fishermen’s mobility exercise power, depending on their 
social and economic resources. Power relations are formed from the interaction between these 
different actors, making possible – or not – this mobility and giving direction to it. In fact, I noticed 
many forms and mechanisms relating to Foucault’s “microphysics” of power operating on many 
scales (1975). For Foucault, power is not only something that has to do with the state and with 
political and economic domination, and it is not the preserve of a public sphere; it is also a matter 
of power on every scale – from the self to the intimate family circle, and from the community to the 
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nation – being exercised, claimed, expressed, hidden or imposed (1975). Power is grasped as a 
human relationship which necessarily involves an interaction between individuals: 
Power’s condition of possibility, or in any case the viewpoint which permits one to 
understand its exercise, even in its more “peripheral” effects, and which also makes it 
possible to use its mechanisms as a grid of intelligibility of the social order, must not 
be sought in the primary existence of a central point, in a unique source of sovereignty 
from which secondary and descendent forms would emanate; it is the moving 
substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender 
states of power, but the latter are always local and unstable. (1978: 93) 
Power is not possessed; it is something “immanent” and would be better seen as an effect of social 
relations rather than as something external and dominating that can be lost or recovered (Allen, 
2011; Bouchard, 1996). This research proposes to “use its mechanisms as a grid of intelligibility of 
the social order” (Foucault, 1978: 93) in the context of fishermen’s mobility. Power relationships 
do not work as a binary system simplistically opposing dominating and dominated actors. Actors 
related to fishermen’s mobility constantly develop strategies and techniques rather than exercise a 
dominating power. They adjust to existing orders and institutional mechanisms to exercise power 
through mobility. In this sense, these ‘microphysics’ enable power to be exercised as a ‘‘conduct of 
conducts, and a management of possibilities’’ (Foucault, 2001: 341). 
 In order to better grasp these invisible power relations, we should also investigate the 
spatial dimension of power, as these networks link both actors and spaces. These actors represent 
mobile nodes through which power is exercised, giving the impression that power circulates from 
point to point throughout this network. Castells stresses the juxtaposition of networks and flows 
which have become a specificity of our contemporary world, suggesting that these flows constitute 
a support helping power to circulate (2009). However, I follow Allen’s argument that since power 
cannot be held by individuals or network nodes, its movement or circulation has to be understood 
more accurately. Rather than enabling a ‘circulation of power’, networks only make possible the 
exercise of a mediated power through the use of different goods, resources, actors, knowledge, 
experience, material belongings, age or mobility, which are constitutive of these networks (Allen, 
16 
 
2011). Through this mediation, power can therefore be exercised through relation at a distance 
(Latour in Allen, 2011: 133). Organised around nodes and lines, networks present a constant 
mobile configuration with a spatial manifestation of powers that “overcomes distances” and which 
causes mobility to happen. In this sense, this thesis provides many examples showing how the 
connecting role of networks in Senegal enables long-distance control of sea activities from land, 
and vice versa. We will see how land-based boat owners sometimes hire captain-fishers and direct 
their trajectories at a distance. Similarly, sea-based or emigrated fishermen seek to mediate power 
at a distance to better control expenses relating to and decisions regarding their land-based 
community. As a resource that mediates power, sea mobility becomes an empowering strategy that 
is made possible thanks to network systems. Mobility enables the mediation of power, knowledge 
and capital throughout Senegalese families and across international borders. The study of such 
connections will bring to light the ways in which these mobility networks influence the shape of 
societies and sea spaces (Calvo, Javaloyas, Albero, & Garcia-rossello, 2011). The use and 
production of knowledge – in a broad sense – play a major role in the making of these connections. 
Fishermen’s mobility is also associated with their practice of the sea space. This practice enables 
them to gain knowledge and experience of a wild and uncontrollable environment. In this sense, 
their mobility is used as a powerful producer of knowledge.  
  
Power, knowledge and mobility 
 
 From the intimacy of the household, to border experiences at sea and encounters with state 
agents, the power relations giving shape to the mobility networks rely on various kinds of power–
knowledge connections. At any scale and for all the actors – human and institutional – involved in 
fishermen’s mobility, the question of knowledge is central. This notion of knowledge is not limited 
to the sea experiences of the fishermen. This idea certainly involves the sort of knowledge which 
fishermen need to navigate, but it also involves the knowledge which is produced by their mobility. 
We will see how valuable this knowledge is for them, as it constitutes a strength that helps them 
legitimate their circulation and illegal movement across the ocean. For Foucault, ‘‘the exercise of 
power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces effects of 
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power’’ (Foucault, 1980: 52). Power and knowledge are intimately linked and work together, yet 
Foucault insists on the necessary distinction that power is not knowledge. In fact, power cannot be 
exercised without knowledge and, conversely, knowledge is necessarily produced through the 
exercise of power (Foucault, 1980). These relationships are examined here in relation to mobility: 
fishermen use knowledge as a resource for the exercise of power. The mechanisms of their mobility 
demonstrate that knowledge can also be produced through, by and for the exercise of power 
through mobility. I will show how the fishermen’s mobility enables them to create knowledge, 
giving them more control of their environment (chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8). 
 More precisely, this thesis gives particular attention to the use and production of a 
pragmatic knowledge through the fishermen’s mobility. Senegalese small-scale fisheries are known 
for their dynamism and quick adaptation potential by constantly adjusting to political, 
technological, social or environmental constraints (Chauveau, 1984). Chauveau speaks of the 
“realism of canoe fishers” (1984: 15). Through their realism, fishermen have adapted their 
techniques and technologies as well as structured and rationalised their activities over time. The 
mobility of the fishermen reflects this dynamism and makes them play a central role in West 
African waters. This realism implies that fishermen constantly adjust their knowledge to the market 
needs – when landing their catches in the most valuable fishing wharves, for instance – or to border 
controls – at the Mauritanian border, among other examples. They have proved to be able to seize 
opportunities and divert the colonial state’s mobility-related interventionist practices by using their 
state-subsidised engines to spread their mobility and escape state control (chapter 4). There are 
many examples – explored in this thesis – which illustrate this dynamism and realism that is based 
on practical knowledge.  
 This pragmatism certainly reminds us of Scott’s Greek notion of “mêtis”, which grasps the 
complexity of practical knowledge and which he opposes to “techne”, or “technical knowledge”:  
Mêtis represents a wide array of practical skills and acquired intelligence in 
responding to a constantly changing natural and human environment. (Scott, 1998: 
313) 
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Technical knowledge, or techne, could be expressed precisely and comprehensively in 
the form of hard-and-fast rules (not rules of thumb), principles, and propositions. At 
its most rigorous, techne is based on logical deduction from self-evident first 
principles. (1998: 319) 
 Scott refers to sailing as one of the most difficult activities to teach in a practical way. 
Precisely because of the weather conditions, the sea’s and fish species’ movements constantly 
change, so knowledge can be acquired mostly through repeated experiences, making secondary the 
use of handbooks (1998: 313). Senegalese fishermen often mention how the sea is their “school”, 
emphasising the value of their practical knowledge. In this sense, their mobility relies on “mêtis”. It 
also seems that because this mobility adjusts to various forms of control and is a way for them to 
exercise power, it is in opposition with “techne” and the “simplification” power of state’s norms 
(1998: 309). Scott argues: 
Mêtis resists simplification into deductive principles which can successfully be 
transmitted through book learning, because the environments in which it is exercised 
are so complex and nonrepeatable that formal procedures of rational decision making 
are impossible to apply. In a sense, mêtis lies in that large space between the realm of 
genius, to which no formula can apply, and the realm of codified knowledge, which 
can be learned by rote. (1998: 310) 
 Fishermen’s realism, or “mêtis”, is pragmatic. In this study, I understand pragmatism as 
being based on practical knowledge and being characterised by providing the fishermen with the 
ability to both negotiate and rationalise. At sea or on land, fishermen have used their practical 
knowledge in a pragmatic way to negotiate with the institutions and existing structures such as sea 
governance, border regulations and community organisation. In this sense, their mobility and 
practical knowledge does not radically exclude “techne” to the extent that fishermen have proved 
that they can adopt, reject, or negotiate with external state structures and regulations that first 
sought to govern their mobility. The notion of pragmatism involves realistic calculations, which 
fishermen develop in order to assess existing constraints, as well as the ability and resources which 
can be used to overcome, cope with or take advantage of these constraints. Mobility constitutes an 
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ability to elude obstacles, while financial resources, knowledge and networks make this mobility 
happen. Precisely because the mobility of the fishermen is by nature flexible, it allows spaces for 
negotiation with existing power struggles. These tactics are similar to the mechanisms explored by 
De Certeau in The Practice of Everyday Life (1984). De Certeau decrypts the way ordinary people 
develop subtle tactics to appropriate spaces. These tactics enable individuals to get around all kinds 
of established orders which are meant to dominate their everyday life, determine their behaviour 
and shape their mobility (1984). These pragmatic tactics result in the production of genuine sea 
geographies and reproduce on the many scales of fishermen’s mobility in Senegal’s waters and 
beyond. 
 
3. Crossing international maritime borders 
 
 Whether fishermen legally or illegally cross maritime borders, encounters with border 
agents almost systematically generate problematic situations. How do they legitimate their illegal 
incursions into forbidden areas? How does maritime border regulation influence fishermen’s 
mobility? I will show how fishermen shape West African oceanic spaces through their everyday 
border experiences. From among the multiple mobility strategies Senegalese fishermen have been 
considering over the last decades, I focus on three meaningful maritime border-crossing scenarios 
(Map 1).  
 Firstly, over the last few decades and with the progressive border-closing process in 
southern Mauritania, different mobility strategies have been developed by the local Saint-Louis 
fishermen (Guet Ndarian8) to avoid border controls and take advantage of the rich neighbouring 
Mauritanian waters (chapter 6).  Secondly,  at the beginning of the 1980s, some Guet Ndarian 
fishermen also started to navigate very long distances and reached Guinea-Bissau, Guinea and 
Sierra Leone’s waters, where they have been organising lucrative fishing expeditions since then 
                                                     
8
 Guet Ndarian fishers come from the famous fishing village of Guet Ndar, which is located in the former 
colonial capital Saint-Louis, in the very north of Senegal 
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(chapter 7) (Failler & Binet, 2010, and field results).9 These maritime movements towards the south 
first increased with the 1991 Mauritania–Senegal border closure and were then reproduced by 
fishermen from other Senegalese communities. In parallel, fishermen started to take part in the 
organisation of illegal migration journeys to the Canary Islands from the end of the 1990s. 
Europe’s migration management policy had the effect of progressively deterring the smugglers who 
were organising departures from Mauritanian beaches. As a response to the border reinforcement 
and in a context of resource scarcity, Senegalese fishermen started to organise these perilous trips 
from their local beaches in Saint-Louis, Dakar, Mbour or Ziguinchor (chapter 8) (Nyamnjoh, 2010; 
Sall & Morand, 2008).  
                                                     
9
 This thesis does not address the mobility of the fishermen across Gambia. Fishermen reach Gambian 
waters every day. The country is landlocked within Senegal and fishermen progress in its territorial waters 
as if they were fishing in Senegal. In fact, in interviews, fishermen never raised particular attention to the 
question of the crossing of Gambia’s common maritime borders with Senegal. The border with Gambia has 
been easily crossed, whether it has been for fishing activities (1982 agreement, revised in 1992, 1994 and 
2003) or transit rights. These reciprocal fishing agreements which were signed by Senegal and Gambia 
guarantee free movement at sea and fishing activities in both countries with no required payment (Pape 
Gora Ndiaye et al., 2007) 
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Map 1: International maritime mobility trends from Senegal examined in this study, 
May 2014. Design: J.H. 
 
 Through their expanding mobility, fishermen have experienced different kinds of border 
practices at sea. The analysis of these experiences entails addressing the contemporary academic 
discussion on the notion of border. In fact, examining these border experiences requires a 
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theoretical frame that will address the maritime dimension of the border and the complex 
mechanisms of fishermen’s mobility.  
 Recent changes in and conceptions of European borders, territories and mobility modes 
have generated a more complex and conceptual theoretical framework for the understanding of the 
way borders work in our contemporary spaces. Globalisation has eased the circulation of flows, 
capital and information, resulting in the development of all kinds of mobility and networks which 
now seem to prevail upon static places and traditional borderlines (Castells, 2009). While global 
networks as well as de-territorialisation processes are brought to light in the making of trans-local 
and transnational identities, the proliferation of flows of information and media facilitates the work 
of imagination and encourages a greater mobility (Appadurai, 1996; Castells, 2009; Conradson & 
McKay, 2007). Migrants can therefore represent and project themselves thanks to the technological 
support introduced by this global system. However, their mobility clashes with the sometimes 
violent material reality of the borders they encounter whose role is to filter the desirable flows from 
the less desirable. 
 Anderson and O’Dowd (1999) show how globalisation-focused studies pointed out the 
progressive weakening process of borders in the 1990s, describing the emergence of a borderless 
world where flows and networks are increasingly questioning the role of territorial borders. 
Contemporary border research stresses that although flows of people, information and capital may 
circulate more easily nowadays, these free movements paradoxically involve the reinforcement of 
national borders, which stops certain kinds of human mobility and materialises in delocalised 
security practices outside traditional territorial border areas (James Anderson & O’Dowd, 1999; 
Bigo, 2010; Van Houtum, Kramsch, & Zierhofer, 2005; Walker, 2000). Balibar stresses the way 
borders take unequal meanings and function by filtering people and things depending on their 
socio-economic or geographic origins (Balibar, 2002: 92). Mobile controls outside Europe’s 
territorial borders embodied by the creation of Frontex10 in 2004 are a type of these new forms of 
mobile border practices (Carrera, 2007). They give another meaning and function to the notion of 
                                                     
10
 European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member 
States of the European Union 
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border. These debates bring valuable elements to the understanding of border practices and their 
related effects. Borders result from social and economic constructions, reproducing and 
strengthening hierarchies by their unequal filtering action (Van Houtum et al., 2005). However, as 
these works address borders from a state perspective and mainly focus on the effects of borders, 
little room is left for the action of everyday border experiences on borderlands.  
 Basing his research on a study of 169 security checkpoints, Mechlinski argues that because 
the cross-border movements of individuals in West Africa participate in the socio-economic and 
cultural formation of borders, the individual experiences of borders should be fully addressed in 
border studies (Mechlinski, 2010). Moreover, instead of looking at borders from a classic state 
viewpoint, Rumford suggests that scholars should rather start seeing “like a border” (Johnson et al., 
2011: 68; Rumford, 2006). Invisible border practices, individual border performers and specific 
border-related effects can then be better identified, therefore giving much more room to everyday 
local actors in the shaping of borderlands. This approach brings valuable insights which highlight 
the inherent paradoxes of border functions. Because this approach entails including non-state 
agents in the creation of borderlands, it shows how borders can be appropriated by actors such as 
the fishermen. In this way, border functions can be turned to the advantage of actors who are 
initially discriminated against. All this can be perceived through fishermen’s experiences of 
borders, whether European or African. This approach enables us to shed light on the great capacity 
fishermen have for diverting originally mobility-restricting border functions into more profitable 
meanings: once organised, mobility becomes a powerful tactic to escape and/or appropriate rigid 
border practices. In the case of Senegalese fishermen, these tactics reveal their dynamism and 
adaptation skills that constitute a significant counter-power to regulating state practices. Because 
fishermen cross maritime borders, this approach enables us to address the specific maritime 
dimension of their border experiences. 
 In Africa, borders were traced according to the colonial elite’s will, following natural 
landmarks and ignoring the existing juxtaposition of ethnic groups from both sides of borders 
(Newman, 2006). Their drawings have generated a number of political and identity struggles since 
the independences, although African borders mostly have not changed since then. For example, 
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despite the 1989 border crisis, Senegal and Mauritania are still separated by the Senegal River, and 
territorial and maritime cross-border movements still occur on an everyday basis. Although African 
borders might have been drawn arbitrarily, Englebert, Tarango and Carter suggest that in most 
cases they have remained permeable and have enabled cross-border movements of people 
(Englebert, Tarango, & Carter, 2002). Adepoju stresses how the lack of police controls at borders 
has made easier African migrants’ border crossings on the continent (Adepoju, 2005). Fishermen 
do not cross maritime borders as smoothly as other West Africans might at the territorial level. 
However, international maritime border regulations are part of their representations of the sea 
space, and their narratives suggest that borders should not be reduced to external abstract structures 
which have been imposed on them (chapters 6, 7 and 8). Fishermen appropriate and shape 
borderlands; they integrate borders as part of their maritime geographical constructions. Through 
fishermen’s practices, borders are either directly or indirectly lived, shaped, avoided, confronted, 
ignored, challenged, imposed, suffered, invisible or visible, useful or irrelevant, or legitimate or 
illegitimate and so forth.  
 Given the complex nature of both the sea and the mobility of the fishermen, and the way 
they experience multiple border practices at sea in many situations, apprehending maritime borders 
as mere dividing lines limiting the movement of the seamen is far from satisfying. Both West 
African and European maritime border practices operate in a mobile style, rather than in a 
sedentary mode that would be attached to territorial limits. This is generated not only by the 
constant growing movement of Senegalese fishermen but also by the fluidity of the sea and the 
potentiality provided by the nature of maritime spaces. The lines which divide sea spaces remain 
abstract political constructions dismissing the complexity of individuals’ mobility and experiences, 
fish and sea movements, and historical and social meanings which constantly shape borderlands. 
As Steinberg remarks, these lines are “divorced from the matter that is experienced by those who 
actually inhabit the environment” (Steinberg, 2013: 162). For this reason, I understand the 
geographical frame of the maritime borderlands which fishermen have been crossing as an unstable 
and changing spatial mechanism combining the mobility of the fishermen, border patrols and the 
sea rather than as a simple, abstract, dividing borderline disconnected from the reality.  
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4. Overview of the structure of the thesis 
 
 The methodological approach I used for this research is detailed in chapter 2. In this 
chapter, I introduce the different actors I chose to interview and explain my methodological 
choices. The chapter also addresses the political and socio-economic background of this research. It 
defines “the institutional dimension” (Chauveau et al., 2000: 14) at stake in fishermen’s mobility 
and disentangles the complex network which makes mobility happen. I then question the weight of 
the domestic institutions and African solidarity in relation to mobility. Given the community 
pressure around active workers in fishing communities, mobility appears to be an efficient way to 
elude a potentially demanding family and social environment.  
 These first considerations provide some elements of a response to the question I raise in 
chapter 3: are fishermen environmental migrants? In this chapter, I explain why addressing 
fishermen’s mobility under the scope of “environmental migration” would be too reductive, based 
on the responses provided by “environmental migration”-related studies (Bates, 1989; Black, 
Kniveton, Schmidt-Verkerk, & Smith, 2008; Gemenne, 2007; Gonin & Lassailly-Jacob, 2002; 
Tacoli, 2009). Reducing migration merely to the environmental reasons for it would not only 
dismiss the complex realities of fishermen’s mobility but would also provide potential responses to 
legitimate the strengthening of security practices (Hartmann, 2010). This chapter certainly points to 
the responsibility of the fishing crisis for mobility patterns, suggesting that mobility is one among 
other strategies which fishermen have chosen in order to cope with the fishing crisis. However, 
“naturalising” the causes of migration and ecological issues (Hartmann, 2010: 235) would tend to 
dismiss the political and social meaning of fishermen’s mobility and reduce the sea space to a mere 
space consisting of natural resources.  
 In fact, the maritime mobility of the fishermen will be better understood first in relation to 
the Senegalese state’s fisheries governance. Chapter 4 explores the way the relationships between 
the political institutions and the fishermen have long shaped the mobility of the latter. This chapter 
examines the historical grounds of today’s fisheries policy, as well as the power struggles which 
have emerged throughout fishermen’s routes. Empirical examples provide material for the analysis 
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of fishermen’s relationships to the state, norms and rules. This chapter emphasises the way “mêtis” 
and “techne” (Scott, 1998) cohabit and are not always mutually exclusive. It sets the bases of 
fishermen’s practical knowledge, which relies on a mix of local, internal and external elements. 
The reflection brings to light the way fishermen’s movement as well as their way of thinking has 
long been realistic.  
 More than a reaction to state control measures, the mobility of the fishermen connects sea 
and land spaces through the creation of networks and a mediation of power. Chapter 5 shows the 
extent to which mobility is an empowering strategy for the fishermen and a resource for the 
mediation of power, knowledge and capital throughout the Senegalese fishing community. Two 
“success stories” based on different kinds of mobility which happened within Senegal exemplify 
the power–knowledge relations at stake in fishermen’s mobility patterns: in the first story, mobility 
is understood as internal migration movements and maritime mobile habits, and has proved to be 
essential for the successful fisherman. The second narrative highlights other success-related 
mobility aspects, suggesting that those sea–land connections might take countless forms in this 
context of maritime activities.  
 Fishermen’s mobility mechanisms also provide information about what is happening 
beyond Senegalese borders. The same dynamics which operate in Senegal (chapters 2 to 4) 
reproduce in distinct border-crossing scenarios. Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9 address a reflection on the 
function of cross-border mobility and its direct consequences on the shape of the ocean space and 
households. In any case, power relations at stake in those mobilities are strengthened by the border 
situation. Chapter 6 examines the local cross-border mobility of Guet Ndarian fishermen at the 
Mauritanian border. It sheds light on the different strategies and tactics which fishermen have used 
to take advantage of the border, thus becoming active border producers. A historical review of the 
origins of the local border issues emphasises the specificity of the local struggles and the genuine 
shape of that cross-border mobility. At the Mauritania–Senegal border, reputed knowledge and 
experience enable the fishermen to justify their illegal practices beyond the border. This legitimacy 
is strengthened by the way fishermen romanticise their own mobility. The chapter raises the 
question of whether fishermen can be compared to Deleuzian nomads given the way they elude 
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state practices and give legitimacy to their illegal movement. Emphasising fishermen’s nomadic 
nature leads to a dismissal of the risks, dangers and instability which they are exposed to.  
 Moreover, this idealisation of fishermen’s mobility is questionable given the level of 
rationalisation of their mobility. Chapter 7 focuses on the way fishermen’s mobility has produced 
specific geographies of maritime spaces beyond borders in Guinea-Bissau, Guinea and Mauritania 
through the rationalisation of their border crossings and the practical knowledge which they created 
beyond borders. This chapter further questions the romanticisation of fishermen’s mobility by 
putting into perspective the rationalisation and individualisation of their practices in foreign waters. 
I compare their practices in Mauritanian waters and Bissau-Guinean and Guinean waters. Although 
in both situations distinct motives legitimate their illegal mobility, fishermen tend to reproduce 
similar appropriation ‘tactics’ (according to De Certeau’s meaning (1984)), such as using a specific 
language, the creation of names and the mental representations of border areas.  
 The fishermen applied the same mechanisms of appropriation to the maritime route to 
Europe that they had been developing over the course of their West African sea expeditions. 
Chapter 8 situates the global context of the emergence of boat migration from Senegal to Europe 
and examines the links between the changes in European border controls, the shift in West African 
migration routes to Europe and the local effects of the fishing crisis in Senegal. It seeks to clarify 
the role taken by the fishermen in these journeys. It then emphasises how these routes changed the 
function of the ocean to a border space. Again, a specific rationalisation of maritime mobility and 
border crossing is observed, turning the fishermen into pragmatic mobile agents who adjust to 
geographic constraints thanks to their skills.  Finally, for the failed migrants, that specific cross-
border mobility, which first looked like a way to recover control over the sea space and their life, 
eventually turned into a physical and moral failure which they had no control over.  
 While this thesis has essentially turned towards maritime experiences, this research moves 
on to look at the specific mechanisms occurring within and developing from fishermen’s 
households. Chapter 9 explores the gendered dimension of mobility in relation to the organisation 
of ocean spaces (Steinberg, 2001). It first investigates the traditional place of men in Senegal’s 
fishing community. This mobility is based on a gendered organisation of spaces, and articulates 
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between an open, unlimited, “masculine” ocean space and a narrow, “feminine” house space. The 
chapter engages with a view that challenges a supposedly weak female immobility and a virile and 
powerful male mobility (Cresswell & Uteng, 1994). It outlines the ambiguities at the core of the 
relationships between men and women. Whether a woman or a man, each actor proves able to 
negotiate a form of power within their own sphere of action which challenges these apparently 
strong gendered constructions. This power of negotiation expresses itself through different forms of 
mobility: for the men, it means sea mobility, migration to Europe and the search for “absence”, 
whereas for the women it is generally reflected through the mediation of male mobility.  
 Finally, chapter 10 draws the conclusion of this research, starting with Sarkozy’s 2007 
Dakar speech and its provocative ethnocentric assertions. The chapter discusses the way fishermen 
have become free mobile subjects through the control of what they know and what they let the 
actors who embody institutional – social and political – structures know. Drawing on Steinberg’s 
discussion (2013), I further question the way in which theoretical metaphors can provide useful 
tools for the understanding of the mechanisms of fishermen’s maritime mobility and at the same 
time can be limited and limiting methods that minimise fishermen’s realities. Finally, I suggest 
alternative pragmatic perspectives to address the management of sea spaces and explore the idea of 
participatory sailing surveillance systems. 
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Chapter 2 – 
Disentangling Networks: 
Approach and Background 
 
  
 There is an important gap between the unpredictability of the field and the rigour and 
discipline that are required by academic research standards. The field researcher must cope with 
many obstacles and s/he is expected to adjust to many unpredictable situations. Because we depend 
on those people we are interested in, we are in an incredibly vulnerable position and should be 
aware of our own limits and expectations. How can we conduct a research project in such a 
context? In order to take reasonable trajectories, it seems that we have to be aware of every single 
detail, focus on what did not look important to us at first and challenge our own mental 
constructions. In fact, qualitative research methods are helpful for the researcher who apprehends a 
specific cultural environment such as Senegalese fishing communities.  
 Narratives provide essential information on the individual experiences of mobility, borders 
and the sea and help grasp the realities lying beyond aggregated data and basic surveys. Participant 
observation, narratives’ analysis and other qualitative research methods have proved to be an 
efficient way to grasp the meanings which individuals give to mobility. The main results of this 
thesis are based on qualitative field research, secondary data from the Internet and a literature 
review. In total, I conducted 69 qualitative interviews with a wide range of actors in Senegal during 
two field sessions in 2011 and 2012.  I had various opportunities to spend time with members of 
fishing communities, such as, for example, during several immersion stays in Kayar and Saint-
Louis and during the fishing trips I was invited on by groups of fishermen. I got in touch with 
people in the field not only during the interviews but also before and afterwards, when we had 
informal conversations which were not directly related to mobility. In other words, I found key 
responses for this research both through the specific answers of my respondents and through my 
personal field experience. The way I approached individuals or how I failed in some interviews or 
had the feeling of being vulnerable, for instance, informs the precise subject of this thesis, as these 
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experiences enabled me to be sensitive to ongoing tensions, emotions and power relations. As 
Rabinow shows in Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco, conducting fieldwork cannot be reduced 
to a simple data-collection activity. It is, rather, a “distinctive type of cultural activity” which fully 
involves the researcher’s experiences in the data-creation process and the search for meanings 
(Rabinow, 1977: 5).   
 The directions in which I took my project certainly changed from the beginning to the end 
of my PhD. However, I attempted to keep my approach coherent, following realistic 
methodological principles. Because my approach adjusted to the realities of the field, in this 
chapter I suggest starting to disentangle the networks which organise fishermen’s mobility and 
identifying the main actors and institutions of this mobility. I first explain my methodological 
choices and the reasons why qualitative research methods are more appropriate for the kind of 
research questions I raise here. The chapter describes the fieldwork approach and clarifies different 
categories of interviewees, methods of analysis and the empirical limits of this particular field. I 
then move on to examine the “institutional dimension” (Chauveau et al., 2000) around which 
fishermen organise their mobility. I shed light on the way fisheries are managed in Senegal and on 
the complexity of the fishing unit’s organisation, providing general background information on 
Senegal.  
 
1. Approach: looking for appropriate qualitative methods 
 Unlike quantitative research, qualitative studies result from an inductive process involving 
a constant progression and an adjustment to the material which is obtained throughout the research 
project (Schutt, 2011). This process entails that the interpretation of qualitative data starts at the 
moment of data collection rather than afterwards (Schutt, 2011). For example, the respondents’ 
answers may determine the interviewer’s next questions; or the researcher may identify new actors 
who might bring valuable information or interpretation and thus give new orientations to his/her 
project. My research certainly started from a main hypothesis to which I expected the fieldwork 
study to offer responses. At first, I aimed to investigate the causal relationship that exists between 
the collapse of fisheries in Senegal and fishermen’s migration to Europe, examining the European 
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policy responses to this migration. Nevertheless, field studies and further readings have highlighted 
the need for a less ethnocentric research question that would not have assumed that all migration 
flows are directed to Europe and that Europe is solely responsible for the fisheries’ collapse. In 
fact, the complexity and multiplicity of fishermen’s maritime trajectories call for a broader 
perspective of inquiry (as I show in chapter 1). Therefore, I have progressively oriented this 
research towards something slightly different from what was initially envisaged: new connections 
and areas of interest raised my attention in the field, leading me to move the focus of my research. 
In this sense, this project articulates as a “progressive focusing” (Parlett & Hamilton, 1976, cited in 
Schutt, 2011: 322), which is a common process in qualitative research.  
 There are many reasons which encouraged me to make the choice of conducting qualitative 
interviews and participant observations. For Silverman, qualitative research methods give access to 
a higher level of analysis when researchers examine individual experiences (2010). In fact, it 
seemed more appropriate to tackle the way individuals unfold their mobility at sea, experience 
cross-border movements or mentally shape sea spaces through their own accounts of everyday 
practices rather than through spreadsheets, tables or graphs. As qualitative analysis enables a 
“focus on meanings rather than on quantifiable phenomena” (Schutt, 2011: 324), it constantly looks 
at the influence of contextual facts and background on the behaviours and interpretations of 
individuals. Using qualitative research methods led me not only to examine what my respondents 
were saying about mobility as such, but also to grasp the way their own cultural, political and 
social background had influenced their mobility and their relationships to other actors, for example. 
I did not explicitly speak about mobility with the respondents, and my question was not “what does 
mobility mean for you” but rather addressed a range of general questions in which the meanings of 
mobility could be grasped through my own interpretation. If I were to classify my approach into a 
specific category, I would certainly call it an “ethno-methodological” approach (Schutt, 2011: 336). 
My field research involves participant observation and narratives’ analysis and looks at the actors’ 
interpretations of the world, starting from the assumption that they construct and create reality 
through these interpretations. In fact, this research results from an interpretation (mine) of 
interpretations (the narratives of my interviewees). I am aware that my analysis of the respondents’ 
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narratives is influenced by my own experiences, feelings and academic and social background as 
well as my expectations of what field observations should reveal. However, those biases would also 
apply in relation to any quantitative methods – that is, in the choice of variables, data collection 
methods, orientation of research questions or hypotheses, for example. Furthermore, there are 
atmospheres, specific relationships, informal, brief conversations, silences and emotions or tensions 
which are not tangible solely in the interviews I transcribed in this thesis. This entire context I 
learnt to be sensitive to has influenced my own perceptions, research questions and interpretations. 
I attempt to give room to these emotions and perceptions throughout this thesis.  
 This qualitative approach specifically focuses on networks. Given the difference in the 
nature of the actors involved in this project and the way they are interconnected, I focused the 
fieldwork methodology on the existence and identification of networks, stressing the relations 
between human and non-human elements (B. Latour, 2005; Ruming, 2009). As Ruming states, 
rather than being a strict theoretical framework, “Actor-Network Theory” (ANT), used as a 
methodology, might help “translate” facts produced by visible or invisible networks (Ruming, 
2009: 454). The Actor-Network-Theory suggests that networks should be “translated” so that 
research becomes a mediator which occupies a place in the studied network itself and which in 
return influences the actors of this same network by this translation work (B. Latour, 2005; 
Ruming, 2009). The relevant aspect of this methodology is that the same importance is given to 
human and non-human actors and that the “tracing” (Ruming, 2009: 353) of their interrelations 
provides key information. For example, field study attempts to “trace” human and non-human 
network actors and understand their interaction and creation. 
 Other reasons deterred me from conducting surveys. I noticed that these methods tend to 
provide very impersonal and poor responses for this kind of case study. In 2007, when I first 
conducted fieldwork in Senegal for a Master’s thesis, I noticed that fishermen all tended to provide 
similar answers when my questions were too specific and precise. This can be explained by their 
general distrust of and reluctance towards what they associate with administrative procedures and 
scientific knowledge and so forth. It was therefore more helpful for me, and less intimidating for 
the respondents, to use my old notebook and mentally prepare my questions rather than to have a 
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properly typed questionnaire in my hands. Nevertheless, sea mobility patterns are certainly 
quantifiable phenomena, and it is of interest for this research to assess them. In the field, I gathered 
quantitative data related to the mobility patterns studied in this research. Also, results are mainly 
based on the 2005 official fisheries census, which appeared to be one of the most reliable, complete 
and recent data sources (ISRA, 2006). Unfortunately, few data are available on irregular migration 
to Spain or on cross-border movements throughout West African waters. Access to more recent and 
reliable quantitative information on fishing migration to Mauritania, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau 
was impossible at the time of the fieldwork. In 2012, I had access to a series of scientific reports 
meant to assess fishermen’s migration patterns at the sub-regional level and for which research had 
been conducted by a recognised international organisation. Unfortunately, I was informed that 
those statistics had been manipulated for political interests and were thus unsuitable for further 
scientific use.   
 As this research involves human participants, I sought approval from Keele University’s 
ethics committee. My project was approved by Keele University’s Ethics Review Panel on two 
occasions, in April 2011 and January 2012, before the two field sessions I conducted in Senegal.11 
Before starting any interview, I informed the respondents about the objectives and implications of 
my research, the confidentiality of the research, asked them if they wanted to remain anonymous 
and gave them details about my own background. In accordance with the ethical requirements, we 
started the interview only after they had formally given consent. Depending on their personal 
wishes and professional requirements, institutional respondents have not been systematically 
anonymised. Also, I changed the names of most of the fishermen I interviewed in order to protect 
their identity.  
Organisation of fieldwork 
 I first conducted a two-month fieldwork session in 2011, in order to identify the main 
actors and immerse myself in the field. I carried out 28 in-depth interviews among a wide group of 
actors, including state agents from the Ministry for Fisheries (monitoring and control sections of 
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small-scale and industrial fisheries), civil society members (ADEPA, CNPS, FENAGIE), 
fishermen, fishermen’s leaders and returned migrants from Europe (failed migrants).12 It was very 
common for these actors to fulfil several of these roles. For example, in this panel, professional 
organisations’ representatives could be retired fishermen; similarly, interviewed failed migrants 
were always former or active fishermen.13 However, I chose to orientate the interview depending 
on their present status at the time of the research, personal migration or fishing-related history. 
Broad questions were raised at this stage and directions were given for further field analysis.  
 The choice of the fishing villages was made according to their specificity in terms of 
mobility. Indeed, in order to gather fishermen’s experiences, I first selected three fishery sites in the 
Dakar area from which different types of fishermen’s mobility can be observed. The first one, 
Ouakam (Map 2), specialises in small-scale demersal fishing: fishermen stay in the coastal area and 
generally fish around Ouakam with small canoes. The second place, Hann, is more focused on 
large-scale mobility, with departures to Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania and Guinea (Conackry) and a 
small number of local net and line fishermen as well. The third site, Kayar, presents cases of both 
large-scale and small-scale mobility, and has been one of the most common departure points for 
fishermen’s migration to Europe over the last decade. In Kayar, failed migrants have created an 
organisation through which they could be reached. In total in 2011, fourteen of the respondents 
were fishermen (including two leaders of professional organisations). They were failed migrants, 
local net and line fishermen, fishermen’s leaders or international fishermen who agreed to talk 
about their migration decisions and sea experiences. On the national scale, representatives of 
institutions and organisations specialising in fisheries were mainly targeted. More than primary 
data, these interviews mainly generated essential material for discourse analysis and an 
understanding of mobility patterns in Senegal. Categories of respondents for this first fieldwork 
stage are listed in Appendix 2. 
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according to their main function, status, professional activities or personal migration history 
  This panel helped get an overview of the fishing sector in Senegal and a general idea of the 
local sea geography Senegalese fishermen have constructed over time. In 2012, I conducted a 
second and longer field study
The following description of the field approach not only gives information on the way interviews 
were conducted, but also on the way networks are organised among fishermen. In fact, in order to 
disentangle the networks organising fi
no choice other than integrating
field actors and making connection
creation (Ruming, 2009)
 Over the course of the 2011
contacts of potential respondents from various fishing wharves in the Dakar 
known as local leaders. I got to know the relationships which tied these different key network 
actors together, and was
session, I had a broader understanding of the field and it was easier to recognise the leaders and 
understand the hierarchical connections between them
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Map 2: Dakar peninsula, May 2014. Design: J.H.
 
, mostly among fishing communities in Hann
sheries and mobility patterns in Senegal, as a researcher I had 
 these networks. Besides, the simple action of interviewing these 
s between them can be considered as an action of network 
.   
 session, representatives of professional organisations gave me 
 also introduced to potential respondents. By the end of this first field 
. The way they were introduced, talked to or 
 
 
, Saint-Louis and Joal. 
peninsula who were 
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welcomed by the members of the community were indications and cultural codes helping me to 
grasp the structure of the local networks’ organisations.  
 In order to meet fishermen, I always started working from the local fishery services where 
my informants were generally based. My informants then used to walk me either through the 
narrow, dusty streets of the fishing village or to the noisy fishing wharf. Because of the high level 
of their mobility, the fishermen – and especially the cross-border migrants – I first interviewed in 
2011 were not interviewed again in 2012. They were either not available, were fishing in Guinea-
Bissau or had moved to another village. Nevertheless, I interviewed some of the respondents I first 
met in 2012 several times over the course of this second field session.  
 Everything, including my own person, as a researcher, was involved in the power relations. 
This was unavoidable as it was one of the conditions needed to reach a proper comprehension of 
fishermen’s mobility. For instance, the only effective way to meet with key respondents and gain 
their trust was to be properly introduced to them by influential members of the community. I first 
identified actors according to their functions in the organisation of mobility: those people who were 
physically taking part in maritime migrations, those people funding sea journeys, those people in 
charge of stopping illegal movements at sea and those people indirectly encouraging departures and 
so forth.   
 Although respondents varied from one year to the other, key informants remained the 
same. For this research, key informants are defined as those field actors who are fully integrated 
into the network studied and who agreed to guide me and put me in contact with would-be 
respondents. I first interviewed these actors in an isolated way, and as soon as I perceived their 
recognised leading function among their community, I proposed that they introduce me to other 
members of the network. They were more than a simple interface between the interviewees and me. 
I noticed that I was “treated” in the same way they were and I was given the “same” social function 
they were; and respondents agreed to answer my questions in the same way they would for my 
informants. Being aware of this specific social hierarchy between network actors undoubtedly 
helped to gain the trust of the respondents as well as to get deeper answers in interviews. For 
example, in 2011, I attempted to conduct a couple of interviews in a fishing village, but because I 
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was helped by an informant who was not very influential – or who was perhaps not willing to help 
me properly – I either had very common and impersonalised responses or fishermen were not very 
keen to take part in my study. The choice of field informants needs experience, as being aware of 
social codes and the cultural hierarchy in such environments is absolutely not an easy task for a 
Western researcher.  
 For these key informants, coming back a year later, as I promised I would do in 2011, was 
seen as a sign of intellectual honesty, which meant that they finally opened their doors in a wider 
way than they did in 2011. Therefore, the time I spent in their company in the time before I got to 
know new potential interviewees was more fruitful every time. They had a lot of information about 
fisheries, their social and professional organisation and power relations between actors and 
mobility patterns – the kind of information which fishermen themselves were not always willing or 
able to provide me with, with any precision, during interviews. These key informants acted as 
translators of cultural codes I was not able to understand or even perceive in the field, so that lots of 
responses I found for this research came out of discussions with them. In 2012, my field study 
lasted six months, during which I conducted 41 interviews with representatives of fishery-related 
public institutions (Ministry for Fisheries) and professional organisations (FENAGIE, CNPS) and 
with fishermen, fish traders and fishermen’s community members14 in Dakar (Hann and Ouakam), 
Saint-Louis, Mbour and Joal (Map 1). I identified different categories of fishermen: local or 
international, dermersal or pelagic fishermen, fishermen who attempted to go to Europe by sea and 
fishermen who mainly fish in Guinea or Mauritania and so forth. I mainly targeted cross-border 
fishermen as well as their relatives for this field session and conducted in-depth qualitative 
interviews among specific actors in the field. The narratives of the fishermen’s relatives are 
essential to this study as they explicitly put forward the value of the mobility experience on the 
intimate and social scales. They also enable this project to introduce a gender dimension for the 
analysis of mobility patterns from Senegal and become a valuable link between the different forms 
of mobility I propose to explore. 
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 Details of life stories, border experiences and migration and fishing narratives were given 
in these interviews. In 2012, I met actors several times and conducted interviews in a freer way 
than in 2011. When possible, mental maps were drawn, although this was seen as a very difficult 
task for the fishermen. They are not used to drawing – still less drawing maps – and most of them 
are poorly educated. They were sometimes reluctant to hold a pen and draw the local geography of 
their fishing places. Also, lots of time was needed to gain their trust, so I had very few 
opportunities to ask them to do this exercise.  
Translation issues  
 It is very difficult to evaluate the number of fishermen who were able to speak French 
properly as some of them were happy to answer my questions in a mix of French and Wolof, while 
others who could speak perfect French chose to reply in Wolof. In 2011, I was helped by a 
Senegalese research assistant who translated the interviews with the fishermen – I am able to 
understand a bit of Wolof, but this was not enough to conduct the whole interview in this language. 
This research assistant was external to the fishing environment and had no personal link with the 
network of fishermen I was attempting to mentally disentangle. However, I soon realised that 
respondents were actually more distant and less talkative in the presence of a translator, despite 
them his native: I had more common and impersonalised responses than in much less structured 
interviews with “pure” Wolof-speaking fishermen. Also, I perceived that the presence of this 
translator as well as the key informant were in fact intimidating for the interviewees – needless to 
say, the fact that the interviewer was a European woman inquiring into a purely masculine and 
native environment also made the situation even more delicate. In 2012, I decided to conduct the 
interviews in the presence of a respected and well-known key informant only, although I was aware 
I would get less precise translations. This method proved to be much more fruitful, and although I 
did not have the best translations, I could get insightful responses that I would never have been able 
to hear otherwise. Also, the transcription process of the interviews involved another translation 
movement from French to English. When doing this, I attempted to keep as respectful to the 
original respondents’ way of speaking as possible.  
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 Finally, because fishermen’s mobility first depends on their fishing speciality, techniques 
and habits, it is important to outline the categories I used for this research. They can be either 
demersal or pelagic fishers, local or international fishermen or failed migrants and so forth. It is 
also worthwhile highlighting the connections between these functions as a starting point for this 
research.  
Categories of respondents: who are the fishermen? 
 In Senegal, fishing activities spread all along the coastline from Saint-Louis, at the 
northern border area next to Mauritania, to Casamance, near the southern border of Senegal, next to 
Guinea-Bissau. The local economies of Saint-Louis, Kayar, Dakar, Mbour, Joal and Ziguinchor are 
greatly influenced by important fishing centres from where pelagic and demersal fishermen, 
whether local or migrant, go back and forth and organise their maritime trajectories (ISRA, 2006). 
The 2005 national census estimates that Senegal has at least 57,000 active maritime fishermen who 
are either captain-owners, simple crew members or apprentice fishers who are all men from various 
ethnic backgrounds (Wolof, Lebous or Serers Niominkas) (ISRA, 2006). The social status of the 
fishers depends on their age and their relationship to the boat owners: young fishermen are single, 
with less responsibility on board, whereas captains are slightly older (30 to 35 years old) and 
generally are close relatives of the boat owners – when these boat owners are not captains 
themselves (30% of them are captains) (ISRA, 2006). Finally, most of the fishermen had a limited 
education as a majority of them only went to primary school (84.6%) and/or Koranic school 
(56.5%). Also, it is very common that 15 to 20 family members live together, composing extended 
households which financially depend on a couple of fishermen. The economic situation of the 
fishing communities is difficult to assess as the incomes of the fishers vary from one day to another 
throughout the year. A simple hand-line fisherman might earn XOF 50,000 (£63) a month and, with 
other male workers, pay for the expenses of up to 15 family members. Coastal communities 
generally live in a modest economic situation; more than 55% of Senegalese households earn less 
than two $2 a day.15  
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 For this research, I identified six categories of fishermen: the outlines of these categories 
are flexible as fishermen might shift from one category to another over the course of their career, 
depending on their resources, their family’s traditions and preferences and their individual wishes 
or opportunities. In fact, it is unlikely that a captain fisherman whose family owns boats and gear 
for line fishing, for example, will eventually decide to convert to being a pelagic fisherman. By 
contrast, when fishermen do not own boats and gear and are unskilled (in terms of fishing), they 
might get hired by either demersal or pelagic fishing crews. Also, a local fisherman might become 
a cross-border fisherman, depending on the opportunities he gets, and vice versa. I will explore the 
reasons for these shifts in different scenarios, as personal choices and professional orientations 
certainly give meaning to mobility. Table 1 summarises the distinct categories and fishing places 
on which this project is based:  
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Table 1: Categories of fishermen respondents and their fishing destinations16 
Categories of 
fishermen 
 / fishing areas 
Cross-border fishermen Local fishermen 
Demersal 
fishermen 
 
Small 
fishing 
units, 
4 to 5 crew 
members, 
based in 
Saint-
Louis 
(hand line, 
drift nets, 
set nets) 
Long-
distance 
demersal 
fishermen 
 
Ice-box 
20-metre-
long boats,  
13 to 20 
 crew 
members, 
based in 
Saint-
Louis 
(hand line, 
drift nets, 
set nets) 
Pelagic 
fishermen   
Up to 30 
crew 
members, 
based in 
Saint-Louis  
(purse 
seine/sur-
rounding 
nets) 
Long-
distance 
demersal 
fishermen 
 
Ice-box 20-
metre-long 
boats, 
13 to 20 
crew 
members, 
based in 
Dakar 
peninsula, 
Mbour, Joal, 
Casamance 
(hand line, 
drift nets, set 
nets) 
Local 
demersal 
fishermen  
Based in 
Dakar 
peninsula, 
Mbour, Joal, 
Sine Saloum 
Casamance, 
4 to 5 crew 
members 
(hand line, 
drift nets, set 
nets) 
Local 
pelagic 
fishermen  
Based in 
Dakar 
peninsula, 
Mbour, Joal, 
Casamance, 
Sine Saloum 
–up to 25 
crew 
members 
(purse seine, 
sur-rounding 
nets) 
F 
I 
S 
H 
I 
N 
G 
 
A 
R 
E 
A 
S 
 
Beyond the 
Mauritanian 
border, 
coastal 
waters (max. 
24-hr trip) 
X 
 
X 
   
Senegalese 
coastal 
waters 
X 
 
X 
 
X X 
Few hundred 
km off 
Mauritania, 
sometimes 
up to 
Morocco  
 
X 
    
Guinea-
Bissau, 
Conakry, in 
some cases 
Sierra Leone 
   
X 
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i. “Failed” or returned migrants 
 Fishermen are either local fishermen or cross-border fishermen used to fishing outside 
Senegal in West Africa. Among these two categories of fishermen were also those who had tried to 
reach Europe by sea, sometimes several times, and who failed and returned to Senegal either 
voluntarily – when they had to interrupt their sea voyage because of a storm, for example – or 
involuntarily – when they got arrested at sea, or arrived in the Canary Islands but were repatriated 
to Senegal17. For convenience, I chose to call them “failed” or “returned” migrants. These migrants 
failed as they aimed to reach Europe but for some reason they did not manage to make it, and 
considered these attempts as failures, as did their families and communities (see Dünnwald, 2011; 
Pian, 2006). 
 
ii. Demersal and pelagic fishermen 
 Pelagic fishermen work on large 20-metre-long boats, with 15- to 30-member crews 
(Photographs 1 and 2). They generally fish in coastal areas using “purse seine” (surrounding nets). 
These are immense and heavy fishing nets used to catch pelagic species and can measure up to 500 
metres long. Pelagic species move in shoals under the surface of the water, contrary to demersal 
species, which are deep-water species. Sardinella and mackerels are common pelagic species that 
Senegalese fishermen usually catch. Fish shoals follow specific seasonal migration patterns all 
along West Africa, from Guinea-Bissau to Morocco. These fish migrations generate a very mobile 
way of fishing, sometimes leading fishermen to illegally cross international maritime borders, as in 
the case of the Senegal–Mauritania border and Saint-Louis fishermen. Fishermen adjust to these 
seasonal movements and migrate all along the Senegalese coast at different times of the year, 
looking for sardinella, mackerels, horse mackerels or false scads, depending on the season. They 
then sojourn in camps or relatives’ houses for the fishing season, usually living with the other crew 
members, far away from their wives and children. Whereas fishermen generally organise 24-hour 
fishing trips in order to keep the fish as fresh as possible, their regional migrations can last several 
days, weeks or even months (Binet et al., 2012). They sell their catches on the local market, as 
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pelagic species are mostly directed towards local consumption and have a low-value market in 
comparison with the demersal species.  
 Furthermore, the upwelling system off Senegal and Mauritania influences the movement of 
fish shoals on a seasonal basis. The upwelling results from strong seasonal winds which, by 
blowing on warm surface waters, generate a movement of deep, cold waters up to the surface. 
These cold waters attract many fish species as they favour the proliferation of phytoplankton and 
seaweed, which encourage the development of marine ecosystems by providing food for fish 
(Boely, Chabanne, & Fréon, 1979; Cury & Roy, 1988). For example, sardinellas migrate from 
Guinea-Bissau to Mauritania, generally from February to September: from April to the beginning 
of July is the best time of the year for pelagic fishermen to catch them in great quantities in 
Senegalese waters, as sardinellas are attracted by the rich waters brought up to the surface by the 
upwelling (Boely et al., 1979). Similarly, white groupers – which fishers catch with hand lines – 
migrate each year from Mauritania to Senegal at the beginning of the cold season, and near Dakar, 
fishermen start catching them in February to March (Cury & Roy, 1988).18 
  Demersal species live in deep waters and are directed for export to Europe, Africa and 
Asia. Sea bream, white groupers or barracuda are demersal species which in Senegal are also 
known as the “noble species” and which are mainly sold on the international market. Fishermen 
either catch demersal species in local coastal areas (Photograph 3), looking for rocks where deep-
water species usually live, or they navigate long distances, crossing international borders and 
fishing in the waters off Guinea-Bissau, Conakry, Sierra Leone or Mauritania (Photograph 4). They 
use many fishing techniques, such as hand lines, set nets and drift nets, depending on the species 
they target. Demersal fishermen do not follow shoals as pelagic fishermen do; they go directly to 
these richer, remote fishing places, sometimes navigating for days before they can reach them.  
iii. Cross-border fishermen 
 In this study, cross-border fishermen are fishermen who have been crossing the maritime 
borders of one or more West African countries. Crews of long-distance international demersal 
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fishermen are made up of around 13 to 20 members, and they spend up to two weeks on board 
large 20-metre-long boats: these boats are called “ice-box canoes” (pirogues glacières) as they 
carry important ice stocks so that fish is kept frozen until its sale once back on Senegalese shores. 
These fishing expeditions are very specific since crews remain at sea when abroad. Crews stock up 
on ice, fuel and food supplies in Senegal so that they remain autonomous at sea during the 
expedition. In fact, with their significant carrying capacities, both ice-box and purse seine boats 
were used to carrying West-African migrants up to the Canary Islands. 
 The category of cross-border fishermen also includes demersal and pelagic fishermen who 
are used to crossing the Mauritanian border in order to fish either legally or illegally there. They do 
not consider themselves as migrants as they do not organise long-distance fishing journeys: rather, 
they leave for 12- to 24-hour trips, contrary to the line fishermen, who navigate up to Moroccan 
waters or down to southern countries’ waters, or even to those who temporarily settle in 
Mauritanian camps (chapter 6). However, their everyday experiences of the Mauritanian border and 
daily migration movements, as well as the way they justify their illegal border crossings, make 
their situation comparable to long-distance fishermen.  
 Furthermore, the cross-border fishermen I am studying in this thesis are all based in 
Senegal and always come back home after the fishing season. This project does not deal with the 
Senegalese fishermen who permanently settled with their family in neighbouring countries’ fishing 
villages (Binet et al., 2012) as fieldwork was conducted in Senegal only. Also, for reasons of time, 
migration on board large-scale fishing boats – called bateaux ramasseurs – will only be briefly 
mentioned in this research. From the end of the 1970s, Asian industrial boat owners started hiring 
local line-fishers for a couple of weeks or months (Sall, 1999). These boats carry around 40 small 
line canoes and 200 to 250 fishermen, departing from Senegalese fishing villages and navigating to 
rich, remote waters (Sierra Leone, Mauritania and Guinea, for example). The small boats are then 
released in these remote waters, and crews fish and bring their catches to the ship-owner every day 
during the season. In exchange, they are hosted (aboard) and are paid at the end of the season. 
These fishing methods were more or less legally developed and are now disappearing. Although 
ship-owners hold valid licences, they generally hire these fishing crews in very extreme conditions. 
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These practices were reported by NGOs for violating human rights (Sall, 1999). Some of my 
respondents, especially the migrant fishermen, reported that they had experienced this kind of 
fishing migration, once in a while, during their professional career. However, lack of information 
on these specific fishing migration patterns means that this project cannot examine them in depth.  
  Whereas pelagic fishermen are very mobile at sea, following shoals and stopping only 
while throwing their nets into the water, line-fishers rather look for fixed fishing places where 
slightly less mobile deep-water species are likely to dwell. Drift-net fishers let their nets drift in 
order to trap demersal fish species, which move along with sea currents. These ways of fishing 
influence fishermen’s geographies of the sea space. Pelagic fishermen mentally construct the 
seascape according to moving marks, whereas demersal fishermen progress between fixed points in 
the sea (chapter 7). Also, these categories bring to light different kinds of human and non-human 
interconnections. First, the movements of demersal and pelagic fish species in the sea are 
interconnected: through the oceanic food web, demersal species depend on pelagic species to 
survive – the former eating the latter. Second, demersal migrant fishermen use sardinellas and other 
pelagic species as bait: the mobility of these fishers and the way they organise their fishing trips 
thus highly depend on the availability of pelagic species and purse seine fishermen’s catches and 
mobility.  
 These categories simplify the complex organisation of the fishermen’s mobility as well as 
their traditional techniques and preferences. They provide a first-hand clear frame for further 
analysis, and, as this mobility not only depends on environmental elements, I now move on to 
introduce the institutional and political background of fishermen’s mobility. 
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 Photograph 1: Purse seine boat off Dakar coasts, April 
2012, J.H. 
Photograph 2: Crew members of purse seine boat 
on a fishing trip off Dakar coasts, April 2012, 
J.H. 
 
 
 
Photograph 3: Local demersal-fishing boats, Mbour, May 2012, J.H. 
 
 
 
 
Photograph 4: Demersal fishers back from Guinea-Bissau, July 2012, Hann, J.H. 
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2. Institutions and mobility 
 In Senegal, domestic and political institutions have a significant impact on people’s 
mobility and behaviours. For small-scale fisheries, these institutions can be perceived at many 
levels through professional organisations, traditional rules for the use of sea resources, state 
representatives, the law and its agents, religious leaders, a traditional distribution of the workforce 
and resources or capital. Chauveau, Chaboud and Jul-Larsen emphasise how access to the sea is 
determined by the complex power relations between the fishermen and the multiple local and 
national institutions in West Africa (2000). They define these mechanisms as follows: 
Through institutional dimension, we understand all the rules, norms, conventions, 
institutional arrangements, forms of coordination and information and decision 
making processes from which the distinct social actors, both individuals and 
collectives, interact together in order to organise access to resources, assert their 
control over these resources and find room for manoeuvre [marges de manoeuvre] 
according to their position, to the stakes they conceive of as vital for them and to the 
particular background in which they progress”. ... “It [the institutional dimension] not 
only involves the - formal or informal- regulation to material, environmental and 
economic resources’ access, but also the political, social, identity and symbolic 
resources and constraints which condition this access. (2000: 14) 19 
 These authors understand this “institutional dimension” as a series of mechanisms for the 
exercise of social and political powers which West African small-scale fisheries take into account 
in the organisation of their access to sea resources. The authors emphasise the way the “distinct 
social actors, both individuals and collectives” negotiate with these institutions to “assert their 
control” according to their own possibilities and specific positions. In other words, access to 
resources is shaped by the power relations linking the specific actors of the small-scale fisheries 
and the domestic, local or national institutions. For Jul-Larsen, these relations not only give shape 
to competition for access to resources but also determine the economic development of fisheries in 
                                                     
19
 My translation 
48 
 
the case of Congolese migrant fishermen (Jul-Larsen, 2000: 168). In Senegal, these institutions take 
multiple shapes around which fishermen unfold and organise their mobility. 
 It is certain that national state structures and local institutions exercise power separately in 
terms of access to the sea. The state institutions aim to control sea activities, the exploitation and 
preservation of fishing resources and the development of both small- and large-scale fisheries. 
These institutions are embodied by the Ministry for Fisheries (DPM, Direction des Pêches 
Maritimes), which is divided into different sections that include small-scale fisheries and industrial 
fisheries management, scientific research and maritime surveillance. At the end of the 1990s, the 
Senegalese state started a decentralisation policy which aimed to give more strength to state control 
at the local level along Senegalese coasts. State agents are certainly more visible in the field but 
still lack legitimacy for the local fishermen (chapter 4). Border agents of neighbouring countries 
also embody external institutions which fishermen must deal with. In parallel, fishermen are 
represented by several national professional organisations such as FENAGIE20, CONIPAS21 or 
CNPS.22 In theory, these organisations defend the fishermen’s interests, providing financial and 
political support to fishing activities. Local fishing-related private actors elect representatives of 
local GIEs (Groupe d’Interêt Economique - Economic Interest Groups). GIEs generally organise 
the fishing wharves and operate in collaboration with local state representatives, and in practice 
they often have a mediating function between the state and individuals. Fisheries-related actors are 
the women processing the fish (drying, salting and local sales), fish traders (who can be either 
women or men – though mostly men) and local workers carrying fish boxes and selling fishing-
related items (ice, fuel, gear) and so forth. 
 Fishermen interact with these institutions every day. Their international fishing-related 
mobility involves a higher geographical scale which the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission23 
covers. This Dakar-based intergovernmental commission covers seven West African countries, 
including Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Senegal and Sierra Leone. The 
                                                     
20
 Fédération Nationale des GIE de Pêches 
21
 Conseil National Interprofessionnel de la Pêche Artisanale au Sénégal  
22
 Collectif National des Pêcheurs Artisans du Sénégal  
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organisation aims to strengthen cooperation and fishing resources management policy among these 
state members through common policy programmes, research and surveillance structures. Among 
other functions, the organisation gives a political frame to the implementation of international 
fishing agreements linking the member states. The SRCF website provides the official material and 
policy texts that I used in this thesis. Fishermen never mention the work of this intergovernmental 
organisation in their narratives. 
 These institutional “arrangements” also cover the religious dimension, which is essential to 
the organisation of Senegalese communities (Gemmeke, 2011) and fisheries in particular. 
marabouts, who are spiritual leaders who preach Islam and ward off fate with animist rituals, play a 
decisive role in the mobility of the fishers as they take part in the blessing of the canoes before the 
fishing seasons. The longer the sea trip, the more expensive the marabout’s consultation. In fact, 
the financial dimension of small-scale fisheries is also very complex. While private banks and 
cooperatives provide loans to the fishermen, interest rates are generally very high (up to 14%) due 
to the unstable economic situation of the fishermen (who are often not even able to provide enough 
guarantees to the funders) (Sall & Diallo, 2001). Fishermen tend instead to seek funding at the 
informal level of the community from their relatives, fish traders or boat owners.  
 Traditional fishing communities are methodically organised, following strong values and 
principles based on the community system, task sharing and social hierarchies. The institutional 
dimension is especially strong at the domestic level. A lot of pressure is put on the fishermen, who 
fulfil the role of livelihood providers. A strong solidarity system works as a form of “informal 
social security”, as in many West African countries (Calvès & Marcoux, 2007: 8), and somehow 
fulfils the role of the state. In the name of this solidarity system, active workers often have to feed 
many more mouths than expected. This solidarity system might take negative shapes when it 
generates strong dependent relationships and constitute obstacles to self-realisation by preventing 
individuals from saving a share of their income and projecting themselves into future sustainable 
plans (Marie, 2007). As we will see, in many situations, mobility is a response to this solidarity 
system to the extent that migrating or being absent enables the fishermen to escape social pressure 
(chapter 9). Finally, these hierarchies and the rationalisation of community members’ tasks and 
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roles remind us of Janin’s observations about agricultural communities in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Janin emphasises how these communities organise themselves according to “micro-geopolitics of 
resources” (Janin, 2008: 1). Each individual fulfils specific functions and carries out specific tasks 
according to his or her age, gender, experiences and skills. For Janin, this rational task-sharing 
system is a guarantee of cohesion and a reliable response to risks.  
 For the fishermen, these “micro-geopolitics” are noticeable on many levels, including on 
the scale of the fishing unit. Each fishing unit – no matter whether it is demersal or pelagic oriented 
– is based on a complex hierarchical and traditional system which determines the way the earnings 
generated by the fishing activities are distributed among the crew as well as the distribution of 
specific tasks and responsibilities on the boat. Each fishing unit always includes a captain, a second 
captain, a boat owner, an engine, a net, a cooker and distinct crew members. Each of these specific 
agents earns a share of the profits gathered at the end of the fishing trip. This organisation implies 
that a boat owner who can be both a captain and an engine owner, for example, will earn a share for 
each of these specific functions. The proportions of the share vary according to the fishing units: 
sometimes the share of the boat owner corresponds to a third of the total and sometimes it can be 
half of it. Also, a boat owner’s share can represent ten crew members’ shares. Similarly, crew 
members’ shares vary according to their level of experience and skills: for instance, a 15-year-old 
fisherman may earn half of a share, whereas his more experienced father, also in the crew, earns a 
full share.  In theory, this system enables the crew to properly manage and cover the expenses 
involved in the fishing trip: fuel, ice and supplies for the crew and so forth. These shares are 
methodically calculated and distributed by the crew captain. Crews are considered as a proper 
family for these fishermen: the trip funder (often the boat owner and/or captain) is responsible for 
his crew members. He is supposed to cover all the food and accommodation expenses during the 
fishing season, and sometimes even supports his crew members by helping them financially in 
difficult times, somehow working as personal insurance. This organisation makes the fishing units 
work like a balanced system, methodically mixing human and non-human agents.  
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 In conclusion, I have broadly introduced the methodological and field background of this 
research, outlining the way I approached the respondents and the limits I was confronted with. This 
qualitative approach has enabled me to identify the main actors of mobility and be aware of the 
dynamics of fishermen’s mobility. The institutional dimension of their mobility is essential: these 
complex institutional mechanisms manifest at the public or domestic level, on the international, 
national or local scale, and aim to secure the communities’ stability. These mechanisms give shape 
to the fishermen’s mobility to the extent that they structure the way coastal communities work and 
play a decisive role in the access to sea resources and in the sharing of economic resources. We 
will see that although sea mobility – or rather access to the sea – depends on, and is possibly thanks 
to, these institutional mechanisms, mobility paradoxically also enables the fishers to negotiate with 
these arrangements by providing them with opportunities to exercise power in a pragmatic way 
over their physical, socio-economic and political environments. 
 For the analysis of fishermen’s mobility patterns, I first interrogate the nature of 
fishermen’s mobility. Is their increased mobility merely environmentally induced? If fishermen are 
environmental migrants, what are the political and economic implications of their mobility? The 
next chapter explores the limits of such assumptions. 
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Chapter 3 – 
Are Senegalese Fishermen  
Environmental Migrants? 
 
 
 Climate change may significantly affect vulnerable populations of many nations in the near 
future. The rise of the sea level will have a major impact on coastal communities in Guyana, the 
Bahamas and Bengladesh by 2100 (Dasgupta, Laplante, Meisner, Wheeler, & Yan, 2007), whereas 
drought and a decrease in rainfall are more likely to affect West African countries – causing an 
emergency situation for millions of people, as happened in March 2012.24 As a response to these 
environmental changes, the people affected may consider migration strategies and become 
“environmental migrants” or “refugees”.  If in Senegal the decrease in fish stocks influences the 
maritime mobility of the fishermen, shall we call the fishermen environmental migrants? In a 
recent study called “Migrant fishermen: climate and ecological refugees”25, Failler and Binet 
suggest that the analysis of Senegalese fishing migration patterns should form part of the wider 
debate on environmental migration (Failler & Binet, 2010). They argue that the decrease in fishing 
resources in West African waters has pushed the fishermen to migrate and spread their mobility all 
over the ocean. What is the interest in classifying the fishermen as belonging to such a category? 
 This chapter explores the relation between the fishing crisis and the mobility of the 
fishermen through the concept of environmental migration. I question the relevance of this 
emerging concept, which has been discussed in the security-oriented literature (Dalby, 2009; 
Deudney, 1991) and anthropologic and geographic studies (For example Black, 2001; Gemenne, 
2007; Hartmann, 2010). The narratives of Senegalese respondents certainly evidence the linkages 
between the environmental crisis and sea mobility. However, reducing their mobility to a mere 
response to resource scarcity does not inform us about the social, political and geographic meaning 
of – and causes for – their mobility. In fact, the creation of the category of “environmental 
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migrants” tends to move the focus to the natural aspect of the crisis and dismisses the political 
dimension of the fishing crisis. 
 The first section examines the notion of environmental migration. I interrogate the way this 
environmental crisis is linked to the fishermen’s mobility in Senegal and finally the shape of 
maritime mobility patterns.  The reflection brings to the fore many connections other than those 
pointed out in the environment–migration nexus. 
 
1. Environment and migration: what linkages? 
 The “environmental refugee” concept was first formulated in a United Nations’ report in 
1985 (Gemenne 2007). This concept suggests a new interpretation of migration trends by 
describing migratory movements as a response to changes in migrants’ sending environments. This 
category of environmental refugee emerges in the context of public awareness about climate 
change after the 1972 Stockholm Summit (Gemenne, 2007). Myers, an environmentalist, 
designates environmental refugees as every population located in vulnerable areas that might suffer 
in the future from natural events. Myers predicts flows of 200 million environmental refugees 
fleeing the consequences of climate change in the next few decades (Myers, 2005). These 
assertions have encouraged policymakers to assimilate climate-change-induced migration as a 
potential political threat to the security of national states. A 2008 European Commission paper 
foresees a significant increase in climate-change-induced human migration, considering these 
potential migrants as a threat to the political stability of receiving countries (Solana Madariaga, 
2008). For environmental security academic research, it is clear that resource scarcity causes 
“environmental migrants” or “refugees” who will threaten the security of many countries, 
potentially producing conflicts and tensions (Dalby, 1996, 2009; Homer-Dixon & Boutwell, 1993). 
However, geographer Richard Black denounces the oversimplification of the Malthusian approach 
to the environmental refugee concept and instead suggests the use of the notion of “environmental 
migration”:  
This notion of “environmental refugees” hardly tallies with arguments about recent 
destruction of the ecological balance by modern society; rather, migration is again 
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perhaps better seen as a customary coping strategy. In this sense, movement of people 
is a response to spatio-temporal variations in climatic and other conditions, rather than 
a new phenomenon resulting from a physical limit having been reached. (Black, 1998: 
28) 
 Whereas Myers predicts huge waves of forced refugees, Black characterises migration as a 
chosen strategy to cope with climatic crisis and resource degradation rather than as an unprepared 
response (Black, 1998). Findley observes that during and after drought periods in Mali in the 
1980s, population movements from rural to urban areas were circular and temporary rather than 
definitive (Findley, 1994). In other words, rural Malian communities adopted temporary migration 
strategies in order to cope with environmental change and did not flee drought as they would flee a 
violent conflict – that is, in an immediate and forced way. In fact, contrary to the security-oriented 
studies, some academics do not take for granted the link between environmental degradation and 
migration, suggesting that this link is not so evident and may lack consistency (Black, 2001; 
Gemenne, 2007; Tacoli, 2009). Tacoli conducted several local-scale case studies in Senegal, 
Bolivia and Tanzania. Her results corroborate the idea that the systematic causal environment–
migration relationship should not be taken for granted and clearly shows that long-term 
environmental degradation does not necessarily engender large-scale migration movements (Tacoli, 
2011). Furthermore, the characteristics of environment-induced population movements might also 
be determined by the nature of the ecological change (Black, 1998, 2001; Findley, 1994; Henry et 
al., 2004; Tacoli, 2009). A sudden natural disaster might not have the same impact on a local 
population as a long-term drought, for instance. Similarly, a population affected by rising sea levels 
will not necessarily produce similar migration responses to a population facing a serious crisis in 
fish stocks. What these studies show, in fact, is that although environmental changes may induce 
human migration movement, we cannot predict the shape of the resulting mobility patterns, their 
quantity or direction.  
 Moreover, migration can be deeply influenced by environmental factors, although it would 
be too simplistic to “naturalize” its causes (Hartmann, 2010: 235). For Hartmann, the 
“environmental refugee” concept is an invention which tends to minimise the responsibility of the 
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state in the management of the phenomenon and “depoliticise the causes of displacement” 
(Kibreab, 1997 : 21, cited in Hartmann, 2010). Kibreab believes that receiving states would not 
have the obligation to take care of refugees were the cause of their displacement acknowledged as 
merely environmental (1997: 21). This “depoliticisation” results in reducing the responsibilities of 
states for this displacement as it is natural and environmental rather than political. According to 
Hartmann, “in addition to unreliable statistics, the ‘environmental refugee’ concept has a number of 
shortcomings. It naturalises the economic and political causes of environmental degradation and 
masks the role of institutional responses to it” (2010: 235). 
 It seems that by disconnecting the notion of “environmental migration” from the network 
to which it is linked, its political and social substance is being extracted. Paradoxically, 
environmental migration is being changed into a political object at the same time precisely because 
it is becoming a security preoccupation. Reducing migration to its environmental aspects might 
lead to the negation of its political dimension: 
The degradation narrative has proved particularly popular in Western policy circles 
because it kills a number of birds with one stone: it blames poverty on population 
pressure, and not, for example, on lack of land reform or off-farm employment 
opportunities; it blames peasants for land degradation, obscuring the role of 
commercial agriculture and extractive industries and it targets migration both as an 
environmental and security threat. (Hartmann, 2010: 234)  
 Thus, according to Hartman, considering Senegalese fishermen as environmental refugees 
would make them responsible for Senegalese marine grounds’ overfishing and underestimate the 
role of foreign industrial fisheries in Senegalese waters. At the same time, fishermen’s mobility 
would be pointed out “both as an environmental and security threat”. It is certain that a cautious use 
of the notion of environmental migration is needed. The mobility of the fishermen might not only 
be considered to be a direct result of a natural crisis and the fishermen themselves as the cause of 
resource scarcity. Following Latour’s interpretation of modernity, Kibreab’s and Hartmann’s 
analyses would evidence the nature–culture separation. Here, nature is seen as an object 
disconnected from any kind of political reality. For Latour, an ecological crisis such as the ozone 
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hole is not purely natural but “simultaneously naturalized, sociologized and deconstructed” (B. 
Latour, 1993: 6). Hybrids such as global warming or deforestation are “human because they are our 
work” and “natural because they are not our doing” (B. Latour, 1993: 50). The notion of 
“environmental migration” suggests an association between natural elements and human facts. The 
concept implies that natural events have an impact on social behaviours and that social behaviours 
may be the direct result of ecological changes. As we will see, in Senegal, the fishing crisis is a 
natural manifestation of political choices and strategies involving a myriad of actors – including 
industrial foreign fishers, small-scale fishermen and the Senegalese government. Once species are 
endangered, they progress exponentially towards extinction and, as soon as a certain limit is 
reached, the extinction becomes irreversible (Meadows, Randers, & Meadows, 2005). In Senegal, 
marine ecosystems are endangered, because the intensity of maritime activities is increasing as well 
as the number of fishermen using these ecosystems to extract resources.  This biological 
phenomenon has a great impact on the organisation and mobility of coastal communities and 
cannot be analysed in isolation as the causes of the fishing crisis as well as its consequences 
involve other actors of the chain-reaction process.26 
 In order to address these complex mechanisms, there have been several attempts to theorise 
the interactions between natural marine elements and their human exploitation. Corlay applies the 
concept of the “geosystem” to the study of small-scale fisheries; it combines an “ecosystem” (the 
fish resource) and a “socio-system” that involves the fishers’ techniques, as well as their social and 
cultural habits (Corlay, 2004, cited in Le Roux & Noël, 2007). This definition echoes Cormier-
Salem’s description of the fishing resource, which is that the construction of marine and fishing 
spaces should not be reduced to the fish, as they are instead based on an association of biological, 
cultural, political and environmental elements (Cormier-Salem, 2000). Similarly, Chauveau applies 
the notion of “technotopes” to the distinct maritime areas around which the fishermen circulate at 
sea (1991: 26). These “technotopes” form part of a “spatial system” of networks which fishermen 
exploit according to a “combination of bio-ecological, economic and political factors” (1991: 26). 
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practices and overfishing. 
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Fishermen choose to go to these “technotopes” depending on their knowledge, specialisation and 
fishing techniques. The balance of these “geosystems” or “technotopes” is threatened when fish 
stocks diminish because of some forbidden techniques and practices, overfishing and inadequate 
marine governance. These concepts address the spatial organisation of mobility into networks as 
well as the practical dimension of the distinct knowledges implied by the exploitation of these 
marine areas. These notions evidence specific relationships between the seamen and their marine 
environments and take into account fishermen’s particular local knowledge.  
 
 In conclusion, because it is not easy to put the notion of environmental migration into 
practice, because this notion simplifies the mechanisms of human mobility and because it might 
encourage the development of state security responses to the detriment of vulnerable communities, 
the use of this concept seems inappropriate to address Senegalese fishermen’s mobility. 
Nevertheless, what is certain is that there is a link between fishermen’s mobility and the fishing 
crisis: although fishermen are not “environmental migrants” as such, their movement is led by fish 
species’ movement and stock evolution.  
 
2. Fishing crisis and mobility responses 
 Fishermen’s mobility seems to be both a clear expression of resource scarcity and its cause. 
In Senegal, fishing has become an outlet activity whose future is greatly jeopardised by a negative 
feedback loop involving increased competition, which is itself encouraged by a greater use of 
technologies and new fishing techniques, and an expanding mobility, all of which threaten marine 
ecosystems. These connections are not noticeable at first glance.  There are many ways to look at 
national reports assessing Senegalese fisheries and fish stocks. On one hand, these reports may 
reveal a sectoral dynamism, while on the other hand, they may also produce signals indicating that 
the situation is critical. In fact, the decrease in fish species’ stocks is not correlated with the 
fishermen’s catches as, according to 2013’s official statistics, this sector has significantly 
contributed to the growth of the national economy (Direction des Pêches Maritimes, 2014). 
However, ecosystems are greatly threatened today, as many species are fully, even over-exploited 
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(FAO, 2010). Fish resources in Senegalese waters, especially demersal species, are considered to 
be in a serious condition  (Alder & Sumaila, 2004; FAO, 2010; Gascuel, Laurans, Sidibé, & Barry, 
2002; SSNC, 2009). One of the most threatened species in Senegal is the grouper27, and it is now 
facing extinction because it is over-exploited (FAO, 2010). Scarce catches of white grouper are 
destined for export as local communities cannot afford to buy it, although it used to be a central 
element of Senegalese everyday food habits. 
 The critical situation of fish stocks in Senegal was formally acknowledged at the level of 
the government in the 2007 policy sectoral letter.28 For the Senegalese government, these changes 
are the consequences of unsustainable fishing practices and the over-exploitation of coastal 
demersal species. However, for the researchers Sall and Morand, official statistics do not show a 
decrease in catches for the small-scale fishing sector at the national level but rather indicate a 
stagnation (Sall & Morand, 2008). In fact, the total number of catches greatly varies from 1997 to 
2008, indicating an alternation between a decrease and an increase in catches (Table 2). 
Furthermore, the most recent information on artisanal catches reports that small-scale fisheries 
today contribute 4.8% to Senegal’s national GDP (Direction des Pêches Maritimes, 2014), whereas 
in 2007, this proportion was only 1.9% (Sector Policy Letter, 2007).  
 
Table 2: Catches of small-scale Senegalese fishermen in and out Senegal’s Economic Exclusive 
Zone (EEZ) from 1997 to 2008 (Source: Direction Maritime des Peches and FAO, 2008: 10) 
 
  
Artisanal fisheries 
catches (thousands 
of tonnes) 
1997 345.6 
1998 317.1 
1999 302.3 
2000 328.8 
2001 320.4 
                                                     
27
 Thioff in Wolof  
28
 After a series of dialogue and negotiation processes on the management of Senegalese fisheries, 
Senegal’s Ministry for Fisheries compiled the main objectives and policy of the fisheries sector into “The 
Aquaculture and Fisheries Policy Sectoral Letter” (Lettre Politique Sectorielle des Pêches et de 
l’Aquaculture) (Sector Policy Letter, 2007) 
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2002 292.9 
2003 385.8 
2004 395 
2005 406.9 
2006  – 
2007 368.1 
2008 383.6 
 
 
 Yet, field observations suggest that this stagnation or increase in catches is not significant 
for the evolution of Senegalese fishing activities nor for fish stocks. National statistics do not 
include fish species which are caught in foreign waters and sold in the national market (this is 
specified in Direction des Pêches Maritimes, 2014). These assessment methods are especially 
ambiguous because we know that a growing number of fishermen have been organising long 
fishing trips beyond Senegalese borders since the 1980s (Binet & Failler, 2012 and chapter 5). 
Furthermore, the demersal species which are caught abroad have a higher market value than the 
Senegal-caught demersal species. Therefore, the higher financial benefits provided by the sale of 
these valuable catches in the Senegalese market also make more complex the assessment of the 
actual condition of fish stocks in Senegal. In this context, how should we interpret national 
statistics on fisheries? What they certainly do reflect is the dynamism of the artisanal fishing sector. 
Unfortunately, they tend to hide the critical situation of both marine ecosystems and local 
fishermen who keep fishing in coastal areas. In 2012, there were around 3.8 more artisanal fishing 
boats than in 1984 and 1.5 more than in 2006.29  Despite the decrease in fish stocks, the total 
number of boats has quadrupled in the past 30 years, suggesting the immense pressure over marine 
resources. Although we observe a stagnation or slight increase in artisanal production, this 
evolution of the national production is not proportional to the significant expansion of the number 
of boats. Furthermore, this increase in boat numbers also suggests deeper and more general 
economic issues as it reflects how the fishing sector has been a last-chance sector for a number of 
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 Considering that there were 4,968 boats in 1982; 12,619 in 2006 (FAO, 2008: 8) and 18,916 fishing boats 
in 2012 (Results of the 2012 Senegalese Fisheries Registration Programme – statistics collected during 
interviews with fisheries officials, Interview 69, Dakar, 21st June 2012) 
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young people seeking employment in Senegal. In this context, it is more uncertain that we should 
still speak about the dynamism of Senegal’s fisheries sector. As a response to the resulting decrease 
in resources, artisanal fishermen have spread their mobility over the ocean. 
 
Mobility and fishing crisis: evidencing linkages 
 The consequences of fish-resource scarcity on the fishermen’s mobility have taken 
multiple shapes. Their everyday mobility is a subjective indicator giving valuable insights which 
reveal the fishing resource’s current condition. First, local and regional mobility have increased: for 
their daily fishing trips, pelagic and demersal fishermen must go farther from the shore in order to 
find fish.  Second, seasonal migration patterns have become more permanent and require higher 
financial investment. Thirdly, although the aim of a third maritime mobility pattern is not fishing, it 
is worth making connections with the first two mobility trends. Some fishermen turned to 
smuggling and economic migration to Europe at the beginning of the 2000s. These strategies – 
especially the first two – are reminiscent of Jorion’s remarks on the recent changes in West African 
fisheries: 
Once access to land has been severed, diversification of occupations becomes 
impossible and risk-minimization strategies need to take an altogether different 
direction: mobility in following the fish wherever they go. There are two distinct 
qualitative ways of doing this. Follow the fish over a stretch of coast centred on one’s 
beach settlement, an outpost of the ancestral village, which I have called seasonal 
moves, or, via what I have called migration, turning to the more drastic solution of 
exiling oneself for a time under more favourable skies, where fish are plenty and 
buyers rich. (Jorion, 1988: 152; cited in Jul-Larsen, 1992)  
 
 Furthermore, the specific maritime movement of the Senegalese – demersal and pelagic – 
fishermen has been theorised by Marie-Christine Cormier-Salem. Fishermen progress according to 
two kinds of principles determined by the geographical organisation of fishing resources (Cormier-
Salem, 1995). The maritime space can be characterised by two different areas: the first one is a 
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territorialised space which is dominated and organised by the “paysans-pêcheurs” (1995: 53) or 
“peasant-fishermen”. It corresponds to coastal, estuary and closed areas and is opposed to the open 
oceanic spaces, which cannot be controlled as they are “spaces to be conquered and whose limits 
are always pushed away but never fixed yet” (Cormier-Salem, 1995: 53). “Sailor-fishermen” or 
“marins-pêcheurs” progress in this second kind of space. Thus, Cormier-Salem suggests the notion 
of “parcours” or “route” to characterise the mobility of the “sailor-fishermen”, which would be 
opposed to the notion of “terroir” or “territory” used to describe the activity of the “peasant-
fishermen”. The idea of a “route” both efficiently captures the unpredictability of the sailor-
fishermen’s movement, which is adjusted to the mobility of the fish resources, and characterises 
their will to discover new horizons. When local fishermen choose to become migrant fishermen, 
they become “sailor-fishermen” and exclusively live on, from and with the sea.  
 
 In their observations, fishermen associate the increase in their mobility with the decrease in 
the natural resource. This implies that on the local scale, they are forced to spend more time at sea 
every day and for a smaller income. Although they still exploit their traditional fishing places, they 
now have to increase the places they go to. Most of the time, when I ask the fishermen about their 
catches, they first say something very vague like, “It was better before, catches were bigger.” 
From fishermen’s responses, it was difficult to distinguish what relates to a lower condition of fish 
stocks regularly occurring at some point during the year from what relates to the general evolution 
of the fishing resource. Local fishermen do not have organised timetables for their working year; 
they plan their everyday sea trips according to fish movements just the day before or a couple of 
hours before they go fishing.  
 Alioune30 is a retired fisherman and one of the respected leaders of his local community. 
He is general secretary of Ouakam’s local fishing committee (CLP31), leading some of the state 
projects for the protection of local fish resources – although he is not a civil servant. Ouakam’s 
fishing wharf is a reasonably small fishery structure where around 450 fishermen work every day. 
                                                     
30
 Interview 17 
31
 Comité Local de la Pêche 
62 
 
As a local leader, he agreed to share his experiences on the decline of fish stocks and the issues the 
community has been facing over the last few decades. His statement reflects what I have generally 
heard about the fishing crisis: 
It has diminished ... catches have started to diminish. We’re going fishing farther and 
farther away. We spend more time in the sea and with our “pirogues de marées” 
[long- distance canoes]. Instead of spending two days at sea, we stay four days and we 
go farther and farther. Before, we used to fill the canoe with catches within a half day. 
In the 1970s, when I learned to fish, the canoe was full, with the Thiof, all these 
species, the noble species. They have a high market value, but now it is diminishing. 32 
 
 Similarly, Lamine33, a fisherman from Hann, explains that before, fishing canoes did not go 
that far and that one could see them from the beach, fishing along the horizon line all year long. 
Today they have to navigate for two or three additional hours except during a couple of months 
each year – during the rainy season, they stay near the coastline and are not visible from the beach 
anymore.  In Kayar, the statement of a CRODT technician who has been working in the area for the 
last 20 years gives other visible indicators of the decline of the fishing resource:  
Fish shoals were closer to the village. Fishing places were less distant. But for 
demersal resources, fishing places remain the same. We have fishing places opposite 
the village and with the motorised canoes they are located from five minutes away to 
one or two hours from places like Mboro. The pelagic species have changed and their 
fishing places vary. In 1991, the purse seines had the opportunity to go fishing three 
times in 24 hours. This means somehow that fish shoals were not that distant from the 
village which made fishing trips easier than today.34 
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 Interview 1, Center for Oceanic Research of Dakar Thiaroye, Centre de Recherche Océanique de Dakar 
Thiaroye 
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 Modou is a fisherman from Kayar who had tried to go to Europe twice in 2006 and had 
been deported back to Senegal that same year. As do most of the Kayar fishermen, he fishes 
demersal species such as grouper, octopus or sea bream. He had to discover new fishing places as 
fish were not as plentiful in traditional places as they used to be, although he keeps going to the old 
fishing places.  
 
I felt I had to go further to fish. At the beginning, I needed around 20 minutes before 
getting to the fishing places. Now you can navigate for almost 3 hours. But it depends; 
it varies according to the species. Sometimes, 30 minutes away you can find fish and 
sometimes you have to go on looking for fish and navigate for 3 hours.35 
 
 With his friend Abdu, they explain that they do not necessarily go farther out to the sea. 
They rather multiply and diversify the fishing places they go to. The president of Kayar fishery’s 
local committee confirms that “there used to be one fishing place per canoe, now there are 
hundreds”36. However, the way they name the places has changed and has become more 
personalised (see chapter 5). Thus, on the local scale, the idea of the fisherman going “further and 
further out to the sea” because of resource scarcity might be more exactly formulated as an 
intensified mobility between old – and not necessarily remote – new fishing places rather than as a 
constant movement towards new and increasingly distant places. In fact, fishermen speak about 
their fishing trips and everyday mobility more in terms of length than of distance. Distances are 
calculated according to time references, which means that they perceive the amount of time now 
spent in the sea as a sort of distance although they do not physically navigate farther than before. In 
this sense, “from 20 minutes to 3 hours” can be seen as an indicator of resource scarcity. The effect 
remains the same whether going farther or spending more time navigating – even next to the shore: 
time and money spent in this mobility represent a higher investment in the fishing activity than 
before.  
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 Fishermen unanimously describe great changes in their everyday fishing habits, although 
they are, most of the time, unable to give a precise account of their yearly activity. As the quote 
above shows, words such as “it depends”, “it varies” or “it changes every day” are very commonly 
used during interviews. They reflect the unpredictable nature of the fishing resource and the way 
fishermen adjust their mobility to it. So, at the very local level of daily fishing places and areas, 
fishermen’s mobility has intensified. In order to cope with the higher costs related to this increased 
local mobility, some of the local fishermen who used to migrate on a seasonal basis to other 
Senegalese places started migrating more permanently.  
 
From seasonal mobility to longer migration patterns 
 Fishermen have based their way of life on mobility patterns. These mobility habits were 
intensified only lately, as a result of a combination of aspects. Chauveau reports that in the 
eighteenth century the sailing technologies mainly used by the Guet Ndarian fishermen spread 
among the other fishing communities in Senegal. For example, the Lebu from other regions 
developed Guet Ndarian sailing techniques by adjusting them to their own habits:  
Technological contacts multiplied as Guet Ndarian and Lebu sailors needed to stock 
up on processed wood pieces and canoes further and further in the south, in the area of 
Joal in the middle of the nineteenth century, and in Casamance later on. At the end of 
the century, the Northern fishermen started undertaking migrations down to 
Casamance during the dry season. (Chauveau, 1984: 3)37 
 Two centuries ago, mobility patterns were remarkable, especially in the northern regions of 
Senegal. Mobility enabled the spread of efficient navigation techniques as contacts between distinct 
fishing communities increased. These migrations were encouraged by the seasonal movements of 
fish species and the need for wood which wet forests of the southern regions could provide for the 
canoe constructions. The alternation of dry and wet seasons temporally marked fishing migrations 
as well, and, as long as land was available, fishermen could either fish or cultivate – except in the 
case of Guet Ndar, where fishermen have had no access to arable land. In the 1970s, the high 
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demand for fish inside Senegal, a severe drought and soil salinisation are the reasons which 
indirectly contributed to the development of artisanal fisheries. Instead of diversifying their 
economic activities, coastal ethnic groups started specialising in fishing. The Niominka from the 
Petite Côte and the Wolof from Guet Ndar (or Guet Ndarians) became the first main actors of the 
Senegalese fishing economy, and, later on, the Lebu from Dakar, especially from the Hann Bay and 
Petite Côte  (Chauveau, 1984). The organisation of fishing migration beyond Senegal’s borders 
started in parallel with this national specialisation in fishing in the 1970s (Chaboud & Kebe, 1991; 
Chauveau, 1984). In fact, the development of these fishing routes results from a double movement. 
According to Chaboud, internal fishing migrations intensified in the 1980s and were mostly 
organised by the Guet Ndarians, who became the first ethnic group to spread their maritime routes. 
In 1983, half of the internal migrant fishermen in Senegal came from Saint-Louis (Chaboud & 
Kebe, 1991). In 1990, Chaboud observed a noticeable move of fishing units to southern fishing 
wharves. Many Guet Ndarians left Saint-Louis and settled in Dakar, Mbour and Casamance. These 
migrations were initially temporary, as the fishermen used to come back to their region of origin 
after their fishing expeditions. They soon became definitive as some of them started to settle all 
along the Senegalese coastline. The wide spread of Guet Ndarians in Senegal, and their reputed 
know-how, navigation skills and fishing techniques undoubtedly influenced the habits of the 
autochthon population with whom they came across en route over the course of their migration.  
 Chaboud and Kebe interpret this internal move as a direct consequence of the events of 
1989 and the closing of the Mauritanian border (1991). Indeed, fishing migrations increased 
because of the reinforcement of the northern border, so migrant fishermen directed their trajectories 
to the south. Some Guet Ndarian fishermen found that it was more advantageous for them to invest 
in fishing trips to southern countries’ waters rather than to Mauritania’s despite the great proximity 
of the border. The narrative of El Hadj, a fisherman I met in Hann in 2012, summarises this 
situation: in the same response, he associates the lack of fish resource, the reasons why he thinks 
there are fewer fish now, Mauritanian fishing regulations and controls, and the resulting new 
fishing routes he is taking now:  
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It was easier before. Before, the fish were closer and we always stayed in Senegal. 
Now we go to Guinea because there are no fish anymore. ... In Mauritania, we are not 
allowed to fish. I am from Saint-Louis, I used to go there but I no longer go because it 
is forbidden. Controls are tight. … The fish... Where I used to fish before in Senegal, 
there is no fish anymore. It’s because of the big boats [the trawlers]. We are forced to 
go fishing elsewhere.38 
 It has, then, appeared to be more profitable to invest in large-scale sea trips and more 
sophisticated gear in order to maintain this activity among fishers’ communities. Also, settling in 
Dakar, la Petite Côte and Casamance considerably reduced the distances between the departure 
places and the remote fishing places abroad. Moreover, long-distance fishing migration strategies 
were already developed by the Guet Ndarian fishermen who, in order to avoid Mauritanian border 
patrols, used to – and still do – head to the west by navigating in international waters and head 
further north to reach the Nouhadibou area (chapter 6).  
 Thus, organising southern fishing trips from Dakar was a solution for many of the northern 
fishermen who had not made the choice of struggling with the Mauritanian border agents and 
instead started to take southern routes.  Also, the circulation of the fishermen on the ocean was less 
constrained by fishing and border regulations than today – thus making their trajectories shorter 
and easier. Over time, navigation times have increased, as have political constraints. However, 
these new obstacles do not prevent the fishermen getting organised and adjusting their mobility. A 
retired fisherman and local leader whom I met in Hann gives a few details about his former 
mobility habits around the Saint-Louis area: 
The Maures had other activities; they didn’t care about their sea. ... I was one of the 
first fishermen who took some Maures with me to sea. We started at 4 am and came 
back at 3 pm. We used to have a lot of fish there. But now, what we used  to do in 11 
hours […] today […] we go to Guinea and do it in 13, 15 or 17 days. The last time I 
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went to Guinea, it lasted 4 days ... 96 hours to reach the fishing place. I had a very 
good canoe at that time. Some canoes do it in 5 to 6 days.39 
  
 In addition to these local and regional circumstances, the emergence of international 
fishing migration beyond Senegalese borders is also related to economic and political events. Guet 
Ndarian fishermen originally developed these large-scale mobility habits from Saint-Louis, and the 
Nyominkas and Lebou imitated them later on (Chaboud & Kebe, 1991: 59).  Failler and Binet show 
how the search for demersal species became a valuable activity following the Lomé Convention in 
1974 (Binet et al., 2012). Since 1974, a series of agreements was signed according to the ideas set 
out in the convention. The Lomé Convention aimed to support the development of ACP40 countries 
through cooperation with the European Community (Dahou et al., 2007). The convention also 
sought to encourage a rational management of fisheries. Hence, African countries got access to the 
European market and started to export high-value fish species thanks to this convention. In 1990, 
Lomé IV provided privileged treatment for African exports directed to the European market 
(Dahou et al., 2007). Because of their potentially high commercial value, demersal species started 
to become very attractive. This economic context consequently added pressure over Senegalese 
fishing grounds. Navigating to remote, unexplored waters naturally appeared to be a valuable 
solution for many fishermen. The 1994 devaluation of the West African (CFA) franc also seems to 
have had an impact on fishing migrations as Senegalese exports became more valuable – and 
imports as well, with the rise of fuel prices, for example (Binet & Failler, 2012).  Failler and Binet 
stress that 60% of exports of high-value fish catches from Senegal to Europe come from these 
fishing migrations, and represent 80,000 tonnes of fish per year (2012: 105). Running in parallel to 
this international economic background, the advent of new technologies made longer sea 
expeditions possible. With engines and GPS, the mobility of the fishermen has taken new shapes. 
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Adjusting fishing and navigation techniques to resource scarcity and increased competition 
 Fishing and navigation techniques have changed over time, and these changes reflect the 
evolution of fish species’ abundance in Senegalese waters. Indeed, coastal communities were used 
to catching fish shoals directly from the beach in front of their house with beach seines. These large 
nets are thrown out straight from the shore and dozens of fishermen pull them up while the tide is 
going out. Nowadays, fishermen are progressively abandoning this technique as fish species are 
keeping away from the shore. For example, in Hann, fewer than four beach seines are now 
registered, far less than a few years ago, when there were a dozen41. Furthermore, from the 
beginning of the 1950s, sails were progressively replaced by engines. Today, each canoe has an 
engine on board and sails have become synonymous with archaic and inefficient techniques. 
Canoes got bigger and stronger and navigators started to use GPS devices when they got further out 
to sea. With GPS devices, fishermen no longer needed to follow the coastline to orientate 
themselves. These steps are significant as they reflect the evolution of the fishing activity in 
Senegal and take part in the shaping of the littoral landscape. They reveal how fishermen’s 
adaptation skills and fishing techniques adjusted to mobility.  
 The following photographs show distinct stages of artisanal fishing in Senegal. Photograph 
5 is a painting from 1830 by François-Edmond Pâris which shows a typical ancient sailing boat 
from Gorée Island (in the Cap-Vert area). The canoe is much thinner and smaller than today’s 
traditional fishing canoes as it was adjusted to the fishermen’s reduced mobility. Photographs 6 and 
7 show Saint-Louis canoes being launched directly from the beach before 1960. Engines were not 
widespread yet and fishermen used to paddle to drive their canoes. Again, these techniques were 
adjusted to their mobility habits. Photograph 8 shows a similar scene 50 years later, in 2012:  Saint-
Louis fishermen are launching a boat before a fishing trip to Mauritania. The photograph was also 
taken from Guet Ndar’s spit of land. The photograph’s composition is very similar, although the 
boat has neither sail nor paddles as it is motorised; it is slightly longer and stronger, and painted 
with colourful markings. In photograph 9, we see fishermen back from a fishing trip in Guinea-
Bissau. Fish catches are stocked in the ice-boxes. The crew is waiting for their captain, who is 
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negotiating the price of his catches with the fish trader on the beach. What these photographs 
demonstrate is the way fishermen have adapted their techniques according to the availability of the 
fishing resource and their growing mobility. Apart from this, nothing has truly changed. In Saint-
Louis, no Western-style modernised fishing wharf has been built despite the growing number of 
fishermen, the high level of specialisation in fishing and the liberalisation of the fishing economy.   
 
     
 
Photograph 5: “Canoe of Gorée”, watercolour by 
François-Edmond Pâris, 1830 (in Rieth, 2010: 165) 
Photograph 6: Boat launching, with Guet Ndarian 
fishermen paddling. Saint-Louis’ spit of land, taken 
before 1960 by anonymous photographer (in Rieth, 
2010: 169) 
 
     
Photograph 7: Boat launching in Saint-Louis’ spit 
of land. taken before 1960 by anonymous 
photographer (in Rieth, 2010:168) 
Photograph 8: Boat launching for fishing trip in 
Mauritania, Saint-Louis’ spit of land, July 2012, J.H. 
 
 
Photograph 9: Ice-box canoe about to land the catches,  
Hann Bay, July 2012, J.H. 
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 The mobility story of the Hann elder leader summarises well these developments in the 
fisheries and their connections to local, national and international backgrounds. He describes the 
changes he had been observing in Senegal’s fishing economy: 
I was born in 1952; I was a line fisherman from Mbour. I grew up on the beach there, 
and also in Saint-Louis. Today I am a retired sailor and neighbourhood 
representative. In the past, I used to sail and fish. I was a fisherman from 1952 till 
1998 ... I grew up in Saint-Louis until 1964 [...] I left in 1964 to Hann. I came here 
after a fishing trip we made around here. I used to have a wife and a house in Saint-
Louis, but now my family is in Hann. I used to go fishing from Saint-Louis to Joal for 
three or four months. When we fished in Joal, we were living there, for around four 
months, and then we went back to Saint-Louis. We also used to go to Gambia, 
sometimes for three or four months, but this was after the fishing trips in Joal.  Then, 
after, when we got engines, we used to go to Guinea-Bissau and Freetown. With two 
18-horsepower engines [...] the Evinrude and Johnson, and after, it was Yamaha [...] 
from 1959, people started to use engines in Senegal [...] 
In 1966, Evinrude spread in Senegal and the cheapest engines were sold for 140,000 
francs ... I had a canoe, and with the machine, we went to Gambia. But here in 
Senegal, the industrial ships [...] they made the sea get difficult [...] they drove the fish 
away. For this reason, we started going to Gambia in 1982 to 1983, from Joal. In 
1982, I had an ice-box motorised canoe. I bought it gradually. At that time, sailing 
canoes were worth 50,000 francs, and today it is worth 1 million. With the currency 
devaluation, the cost of life, you have nothing. At that time, there was no fishing 
licence, everyone got along well. And you could land your fish anywhere.42 
 This narrative reflects the connections between the condition of fish stocks in Senegal, the 
advent of new technologies, the economic and political background of Senegal’s fishing economy 
and the expansion of fishermen’s mobility. Finally, the third and final mobility trend is connected 
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to the first two observed patterns: over time, fishermen have gained in-depth knowledge and 
navigation skills, which became essential for the organisation of illegal migration to Europe.   
  
When fishermen became illegal migrants heading to Europe 
 Some fishermen found out at the beginning of the 2000s that this would be a profitable 
enterprise and a useful response to the stronger constraints they were facing at sea. Large canoe 
owners, powerful fishermen or simple would-be migrant fishermen soon calculated that 
investments in these trips would be the best strategy to counter the decline in their income from 
fishing. Willing migrants embarking were mostly either small daily fish workers or Senegalese 
non-fishermen who were young to middle-aged men (Mbow & Bodian, 2008). Nyamjohh usefully 
explores the role of the fishermen in the emergence of maritime migration routes to Europe. She 
emphasises the combination of the lack of fish resources in Senegal, weaknesses of the 
government’s political involvement in fisheries management and young people’s aspirations for 
independence and autonomy as the reasons for migration to Europe. Her work provides a precise 
description of the relationships between the conveyors of boat migration, local and skilled 
fishermen and would-be migrants and their families, bringing to the fore complex power relations 
linking these different actors (Nyamnjoh, 2010). Irregular maritime migration from Senegal to 
Europe is connected to regional- and international-scale backgrounds: European migration policy 
and border controls and the movement of regional migration routes in West Africa have deeply 
influenced the emergence of this maritime route (see chapter 8). For Alioune43 – Ouakam’s local 
leader – there are obvious linkages between fishermen’s fishing migration habits and maritime 
migration to the Canary Islands: 
Fishermen... they search… they look for fish, and they are looking for something when 
going to the Canary Islands. Maybe it is better there, and that’s it, it’s not 
complicated! ... They go there and see what happens; some succeed, they were luckier 
than the others, and some are still there wandering...it’s not working, it’s not good, so 
the fisherman will still be looking for something, he will not stop – it’s me saying it! 
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Because we know the Canary Islands, we’ll do something else... either going to the 
UK, to the United States, everywhere! Yes, this is possible! With our canoes, we can! 
We could go everywhere, everywhere! With the GPS it’s easy! You just need to 
manage it.44  
Through this narrative, we understand how fishermen’s movement adjusted to constraints and is 
characterised by either the search for fish or for a better life that would bring the fishermen the 
same benefits as a successful fishing expedition. Navigation techniques and technologies make 
these mobilities possible and lead the fishermen wherever they wish.  
  
 Conclusion 
 In conclusion, there is not just one direct connection between the mobility of the fishermen 
and the decrease in fish resources. In fact, these first observations have shown how maritime 
mobilities in Senegal are complex and take multiple trajectories which adjust to a series of 
economic, political and environmental constraints. There is certainly a link between the fishing 
crisis and mobility. However, it is inappropriate to use the category of “environmental refugees” 
given that fishermen’s mobility is not only a response to environmental changes. The elements 
outlined here provide a background to the Senegalese fishing crisis. Mobility, which was at first a 
forced response to this crisis, has become a real strategy to cope with it. In fact, the decrease in 
resources has strengthened the power relations between the actors involved in fishermen’s mobility 
through growing competition for resources with other actors at sea or with state agents in charge of 
sector regulation.  
 Fishermen want to secure their livelihoods and increase their mobility, while the 
Senegalese state now attempts to concentrate its efforts on the securitisation of the natural 
resources. This crisis has shaped socio-political tensions and constructed new seascapes. In each of 
these mobility scenarios, this increased mobility has led fishermen to experience various forms of 
state regulation at the national or international level. In fact, in chapter 4, a deeper analysis of the 
relationship between the fishermen and the Senegalese state informs us about these emerging 
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power struggles. The working space of the fishermen is getting narrower as they knock against new 
and stronger obstacles. I will show how the sector has grown exponentially over the last 40 years, 
making its management increasingly difficult for the government. Beyond the environmental crisis, 
the relationship between the Senegalese fishermen and the state has shaped maritime mobilities. 
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Chapter 4 -  
Senegalese Fishermen and the State 
 
 
Industrial and – to a lesser extent – small-scale fishers’ overfishing practices generated 
today’s decrease in fish stocks in Senegal. What these fishing practices bring to the fore are the 
contradictory resource access and regulation policies which Senegal’s state has implemented since 
the independence. In fact, while Senegalese governments significantly fostered the development of 
national fisheries, this development policy was not combined with the application of a surveillance 
and access restriction policy efficient enough to regulate artisanal and industrial catches. The 
successive state practices have produced ambiguous relationships between Senegalese fishers and 
the state since the 1960s (Chauveau and Samba 1990). In fact, while Senegal’s state has 
increasingly opened access to the sea to foreign industrial trawlers since the 1980s (Alder & 
Sumaila, 2004), in parallel the same governments have made intensive efforts to regulate small-
scale fishers’ movements. As a result of the fishing crisis, the sea has become a space of interaction 
shaped by power struggles between individuals and institutions, bringing to light the inadequacy 
that exists between a rapidly evolving artisanal fishing sector and a postcolonial African state. 
Rather than reducing the role of the environmental crisis to a single cause for mobility, the decrease 
in fish stocks has accelerated the emergence of these power struggles between fisheries actors at 
the national level.  
I argue that these relationships between the fishers and the state have shaped fishermen’s 
mobility through the fisheries’ development policy, inappropriate sea resources’ regulation 
measures and fishermen’s mobility management. I will show that while the dynamism of the 
mobile fishers first expressed a positive strength which the postcolonial state wanted for Senegal’s 
economy, this dynamism has become a threat to marine resources’ sustainability, which the state 
has failed to regulate. These failures certainly involve a lack of coherence and surveillance means 
in the application of fisheries’ policies, but mainly reflect a poor consideration of fishermen’s 
75 
 
practical knowledge or “mêtis” (Scott, 1998). As a result, fishermen’s mobility has increasingly 
become dynamic and uncontrollable and has conveyed negative meanings to the regulators. 
This chapter first examines the development policies of small-scale and industrial fisheries in 
Senegal since the 1950s and explores the limits of Senegal’s recent participatory turn in small-scale 
fishing policy. I then show how state efforts have failed to regulate Senegalese fishers by 
dismissing their practical knowledge or “mêtis” and developing incoherent fishing regulation 
practices. I will show where transgression becomes legitimate (according to the fishermen) and 
where local cultural norm systems bypass state rules.  
 
1. Fostering fishing activities in Senegal 
The growth of the artisanal fishing sector  
 From colonial and postcolonial interventionist policy to recent participatory policy, the 
artisanal fishing sector has progressed independently from governmental measures, although these 
measures have had indirect and unexpected effects on the fisheries’ evolution. The causes for the 
expansion of the small-scale fishing sector lie in the reinterpretation and re-appropriation fishermen 
made of state intervention rather than in the potentially successful implementation of 
interventionist fishing policy. However, though the state encouraged the growth of local fisheries, 
this growth is now considered problematic as expanding numbers of fishermen clearly escape state 
control and participate in the decrease in fish resources.  
 Until the 1980s, the small-scale sector was considered to be an obstacle to the development 
of a modern system of fishery exploitation (Chauveau & Samba, 1989; Kebe & Deme, 2000). The 
French colonial administration and the successive postcolonial governments followed 
interventionist policies towards the small-scale fishing sector, assuming that fishermen’s traditional 
nature would slow the development of Senegalese fisheries. The state first encouraged the spread 
of new technologies at the beginning of the 1960s, and from 1980 onwards, it significantly 
subsidised artisanal and industrial fishing activities (Kebe & Deme, 2000). In fact, the fishermen 
pragmatically adopted some of the state’s modernising measures while rejecting others, depending 
on their needs, habits and practices. Two main technological development measures marked 
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Senegalese fisheries: the advent of motors and the development of purse seine technologies (Kebe 
& Deme, 2000). Fishermen willingly adopted these technologies, which enabled them to spend 
more time at sea and bring in bigger catches. The “motor-generalisation” policy among artisanal 
fishers was successful from 1952 onwards because it very quickly started to spread the use of 
motors among coastal communities. Whereas the government’s initial objective was to develop 
local fisheries and sedentarise the fishers, motorising boats had the opposite effect. Rather than 
developing sedentary fishing, motors finally encouraged fishermen to become more mobile at sea 
and around Senegal. Chauveau and Samba observe, 
we must look for the cause of the dynamic growth of artisanal fisheries during recent 
decades not within the administrative framework but in the processes that have 
diverted state measures. (Chauveau & Samba, 1989: 609) 
 Fishermen’s adaptation and ‘modernisation’ occurred, but in a diverted way that made use 
of state support without, paradoxically, following the initially desired directions. In this sense, this 
independent nature of fishing communities in response to successive administrations has been 
essential for the development of the small-scale sector. Apart from these technological advances, 
state measures to modernise artisanal fisheries mostly failed to seduce the fishermen mainly 
because they dismissed fishermen’s practices and specific knowledge. Since 1950, several 
measures aimed to strengthen the traditional wooden boats’ structures with new technologies such 
as glass fibre, polyester and metal in order to make navigation safer. The high costs implied by 
these modifications – despite state financial support – deterred the fishermen from adopting them 
(Kebe & Deme, 2000). Similarly, in 1959 the “Cordier” project aimed to ease the transition from 
small-scale fisheries to semi-industrial fishing by introducing bigger, stronger and longer fishing 
boats (Kebe & Deme, 2000). Again, fishermen preferred their wooden boats as they were adjusted 
to their needs, navigation skills and experience.  
 In parallel to these technological advents, the state has provided financial assistance to the 
fishermen for their gear. Fishermen have always benefited from state grants for their production 
costs: fuel prices are much lower than on the open market, and gear such as motors, fishing nets 
and canoes are tax-free (Kebe & Deme, 2000). The small-scale fishing sector has always been state 
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funded, not only in order to encourage wealth and employment creation for the sector but also to 
maintain fair prices for the population so that everybody in Senegal can afford to eat fish on a daily 
basis. However, Deme and Kebe (2000) argue that, again, this interventionist policy has had 
unintended effects on the local economy. Deme and Kebe (2000) suggest that subsidies have led to 
growing competition over resources and to a devaluation of fish prices with the reduction of 
production costs. Fishermen, as a consequence, need to produce more for a better income as fish 
stocks decrease, because of greater fishing pressure. Coastal communities experience the 
consequences of such a policy: scarce fish and restrictions on their abilities to fish them. 
 These policies reflect Senegal’s state interests in developing maritime fisheries as a 
strategic sector in order to balance the lack of development in the other economic sectors. Unable 
to propose sustainable solutions to overcome the agricultural crisis, the government considered the 
exploitation of marine resources to be a great potential for national economic growth. In fact, since 
the 1970s and as a response to the drought affecting Senegalese rural areas, many peasants have 
migrated to coastal areas, where they have been hired as workers by fishermen crews (Nguyen-
Van-Chi-Bonnardel, 1980). Fishing became an immediate, simple solution for these peasants, as 
they did not need to have specific fishing skills to be hired. As fishermen needed help to get their 
heavy nets out of the water, drought-fleeing migrants became a useful workforce. Peasants who 
turned into fishermen were used to physical tasks, although they were unskilled for fishing. 
Drought-fleeing migrants progressively learnt more about fishing processes and became more 
qualified, which enabled them to buy their own boats and develop their own fishing activities45. A 
representative of the ADEPA organisation adds the following: 
We have to say that fishing has always been a very interesting and lucrative activity 
for coastal areas. The economic crisis which has been aggravated by drought and 
unemployment has encouraged people who were not “naturally” fishermen to make 
do with fishing.46 
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 Moreover, the lack of infrastructure and the state’s financial involvement in fish processing 
has indirectly encouraged overfishing practices. For Alioune, it is the lack of communication 
between fishermen that prevents them from self-regulating their daily catches: 
Sometimes, the purse seine fishers all land their catches in the same fishing wharf. In 
Hann, for example, all the pirogues, you know... these very deep 18-metre boats, filled 
with tonnes of fish. Well, they don’t phone each other and say. “I’ve got fish, do you 
have some in your area?” Instead, they all land their catches at the same time and of 
course, they don’t find any buyers. What do they do? They throw everything back into 
the sea, and the fish goes rotten. They have been doing so for years! [...] We share a 
big responsibility, you see… If we don’t get organised, we’re on a slippery slope, it’ll 
somehow go rotten.47 
 
 Unstable electricity supplies and a lack of infrastructures and freezing equipment in 
Senegalese artisanal fishing wharves do not allow the fish workers to store their catches and better 
plan their activities. In addition to the high number of fishers, contestable fishing techniques and 
overfishing practices in Senegal, the weaknesses of infrastructures are a tangible hindrance to the 
sustainable development of Senegalese marine grounds. Thus, the growth of the artisanal fishing 
sector and the resulting fishing crisis have resulted from a number of spatio-temporal 
circumstances. These circumstances involve a development-oriented policy, combined with an 
inherent dynamism of the fishermen and an environmental and economic crisis which brought 
many new fishers into the fishing sector. In parallel to these developments, the Senegalese 
government has opened the national maritime spaces to various foreign fleets, mainly since the 
beginning of the 1980s.  
 
Encouraging the  large-scale exploitation of marine resources 
 Senegal has been party to a number of fishing agreements signed by the European 
Commission and African countries, which increased in the 1980s (Catanzano & Rey Valette, 
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2002). These agreements have enabled the West African countries whose fishing capacities and 
financial means are limited to take advantage of their marine grounds and benefit from a financial 
counterpart. These agreements have been largely criticised as European fish catches constitute a 
considerable loss of resources for local fisheries. Scientists have documented a serious fishing 
crisis (Gascuel et al., 2002) for which European fleets have been mentioned as sharing 
responsibility in West African waters (Kohnert, 2007). These formal agreements were not renewed 
with Senegal in 2006 because of the serious condition of the fish resource (SSNC, 2009). However, 
since 2006 a number of European-based companies have settled in Senegal in joint ventures. They 
are officially Senegalese and count as Senegalese fishing companies, but at the same time, this is an 
opportunity for foreign fleets to informally fish in Senegalese waters and direct their catches for 
export to the international market (Baché 2011).  
 By ratifying the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Senegal reinforced its 
sovereignty over the 200 nautical miles of its national Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Through 
this convention, the Senegalese fishing area was divided into two parts, which extend between the 
coastline and 12 nautical miles offshore. The first 6 nautical miles are exclusively dedicated to 
small-scale fisheries, whereas most of the industrial fishing boats can only fish beyond the 12-mile 
limit depending on their size, fishing capacity and targets48 (Decree no 90/970, 1990) (Map 3). 
Local fishermen are also allowed to fish beyond the 6-mile limit, where they increasingly compete 
with national and foreign trawlers.  
 There is a lack of transparency regarding the legal framework of industrial fishing licences’ 
sales. The Senegalese Minister for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs, Haïdar el-Ali, estimates that 
around 40 Chinese, Russian or Ukrainian vessels – among other nationalities – circulate across 
West African waters and fish illegally in Senegal.49 On the 5 January 2014, the Senegalese 
authorities seized the Russian ship Oleg Naydenov while it was fishing illegally off Senegalese 
shores. For being a “repeat offender”, the ship-owner was sentenced to a XOF 600 million 
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(£763,900) fine.50 With a processing capacity of 250 tonnes of fish per day,51 illegal fishing 
operations have remained a lucrative activity for the Russian trawler. Fines seem to have a poor 
deterrent effect and do not stop the trawlers from continuing to make illegal incursions into 
Senegalese waters. The former government may be complicit as, in 2011, the Senegalese fisheries 
organisations denounced the signature of 22 illicit agreements in 2010 allowing foreign trawlers to 
fish extensively in national waters.52 The NGO “Pêche et Développement” reports that the 
Senegalese government sold questionable pelagic fishing licences to the joint venture companies 
Senemer and Société Atlantique de Pêche in 2010 (Niasse & Seck, 2011). Among other Russian 
ships, the Oleg Naydenov vessel has actually been operating under the name of Senemer. Despite 
the lack of transparency of official data regarding these joint venture companies, Niasse and Seck 
provide the following estimation: 
  
 Table 3:  Industrial fishing joint ventures in Senegal (Source: Niasse & Seck, 2011: 5) 
Nationality Joint venture 
companies 
Ships/trawlers 
Senegal/Spain 11 29 
Senegal/China 1 26 
Senegal/France 3 24 
Senegal/Italy 2 7 
Senegal/Greece 1 2 
Senegal/Russia 2 4 
 
 
 
 Although these ships must land their catches in Dakar, they rarely do so as they can freeze 
up to 1,500 tonnes of fish for 12 days at sea. These ships can also process 40 to 50 tonnes of 
fishmeal per day (Niasse & Seck, 2011: 5). The huge capacity for freezing and fish processing of 
the many industrial vessels not only enables the ships to fish in great quantities but also prevents 
the Senegalese communities from economically benefiting from these activities. Indeed, Niasse and 
Seck estimate that only 15% of the joint venture companies’ industrial catches are processed and 
sold in the Senegalese market (Niasse & Seck, 2011: 7).  
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 In fact, both small- and large-scale fisheries are responsible for the decrease in resources in 
West Africa’s seas. The Senegalese state has failed to develop an efficient management of its seas 
by encouraging the exponential growth of the national fisheries. Despite the government’s desire to 
regulate access to the sea through multiple laws and decrees, the lack of surveillance means has 
prevented a proper and sustainable regulation of marine resources’ exploitation. Fishermen 
experience state regulation efforts as a constraint that obstructs their free movement at sea. 
  
2. Regulating sea mobility and fishing activities: the reasons for the state’s failures    
 Today, as a result of resource scarcity, the fishing sector, natural resources and fishermen’s 
mobility have reached their physical and geographic limits. As a response to successive failures 
and the resulting fishing crisis, state regulation is now proceeding with the implementation of 
participative measures and co-management programmes in local fisheries. This new policy seems 
to be a unique solution in that it is attempting to acknowledge the traditional, independent nature of 
the fishermen. Indeed, according to Trouillet et al. (2011), the main obstacles that prevent the 
appropriate governance of West African waters are a poor knowledge of small-scale fisheries and 
weaknesses in participatory processes. In this context, is the “participatory turn” a significant 
advance for sea regulation? The application of such a participative policy still remains problematic 
because of the government’s incoherence in regulating and managing the sea space, and a lack of 
surveillance means and consideration for fishermen’s practical knowledge. Although in some local 
fisheries this participative system seems to have started working (Ouakam), in the majority of 
fisheries, fishermen are reluctant to acknowledge state authority, afraid that doing so will see their 
freedom of movement constantly threatened.  
 
The limits of the application of the law 
 Senegal adopted its first Fishery Code in 1976 to address the problem of an 
over-exploitation of the sea and to regulate industrial fishing activities (Bernard Camara, 2005). 
The version that was modified in 1987 regulates small-scale fishermen’s access to the resource, 
requiring them to hold a fishing licence in theory. Before that, anyone could become a fisherman at 
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any time. In 1998, a more constraining law came into force which included a new fishery code. It 
clearly established the responsibilities of the state and of the small-scale fisheries’ actors in the 
management of fisheries. Through this policy, both the national government and fishing villages 
are required to take part in this management through the creation of local committees for fisheries 
(CLP53). At the head of these participative committees, a civil servant represents the state at the 
local level. The rest of the committee is democratically elected by local fishermen and constitutes 
an intermediary between the national administration and the local fishers (Code for Maritime 
Fisheries, 1998). In addition, this new policy reinforces the existing licence system and clearly 
forbids numerous unsustainable fishing techniques. Nevertheless, it was only in 2005 that the 
Senegalese state formally started imposing mandatory fishing permits for artisanal fishers (Decree 
no 5916, 2005). As a response to the fishing crisis, the then Senegalese Ministry for Maritime 
Economy54 elaborated a sector policy letter in 2007 that aims to reinforce the entire national 
fisheries reform programme launched in 2000 (Sector Policy Letter, 2007). In order to maintain the 
sector’s international competitive advantage and to create more employment and generate 
sustainable wealth and growth, the ministry has chosen several directions for the development of 
the small-scale fishing sector. This policy letter mostly targets the preservation of the resource 
through the creation of protected marine areas (PMA), artificial reefs for species reproduction and 
aquaculture development, in parallel with strengthening restrictions on fishermen’s access to the 
sea (Sector Policy Letter, 2007). While local fishermen are increasingly included in the 
management of their local fishing areas, they are also supposed to start paying for an annual fishing 
permit. Sixty percent of the total funds generated by these permits have been collected at the 
national level in order to fund the co-management system and the new local fishery committees in 
Senegal. However, due to administrative delays, this funding system is still not in place. That the 
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system does not work causes great frustration among the fishermen, who have the feeling that the 
state has not complied with its commitments.55 Access to the sea is undoubtedly more limited 
because of this new policy whose principal aim is to protect oceanic resources without jeopardising 
the traditional Senegalese fishing activities. The effective application of this participative 
management still leaves the fishing community very sceptical, so it has been very difficult for the 
state to impose its norms and rules for the conservation of resources. A Joal-based state agent 
complains about fishermen’s arrogance; they have been refusing to respect biological recovery in 
the local PMA. He translates these two famous Wolof sentences he says he has often heard from 
these migrant fishermen56: “Guedje amoul thiabi, bagnou koye tethie” which literally means: “the 
sea has no key and cannot be locked”. The second one is slightly ruder, though very explicit: 
“Bayou Kene sawoule pour guedje am”. It means: “nobody’s father pissed so that there is the sea.” 
 These two famous Wolof sentences reflect migrant fishermen’s vision of the sea: a space 
without limits or borders which does not belong to anybody. In this context, applying the law 
remains challenging for the regulators. Furthermore, the lack of efficient application of the law has 
led to increasing competition over fish resources and over the development of contested fishing 
techniques. Despite the restrictions imposed by the 1998 Code of Maritime Fishing (Code for 
Maritime Fisheries, 1998), fishermen keep using dynamite and poison, spear fishing, reducing net 
sizes and using monofilament nets (PNUE, 2004). The use of monofilament nets has remained very 
common. One can still find many of these green plastic nets drying on the ground on many wharves 
and beaches (Photograph 10). 
 
Photograph 10: Monofilament net drying on the beach, Ouakam fishing wharf, June 2011, J.H. 
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 Despite their prohibition, these nets are imported freely and are far less expensive than the 
traditional nets. When fishermen lose them at sea, fishermen say that these nets “keep fishing”, as 
they are not readily biodegradable and threaten marine ecosystems.57 Also, the introduction of these 
measures has had some impacts on fishermen’s mobility as fishermen adjust their fishing trips’ 
trajectories to avoid possible state controls at sea while using these techniques. Moreover, the lack 
of application of the law has led to conflicts between fishermen’s communities. Fishermen who 
work in their local area have to share resources with fishermen from other communities. It seems 
that this marine cohabitation is not problematic as long as the fishing techniques used by the 
different fishers are compatible and tolerated by the local community.58 Fishermen seem to express 
a certain feeling of belonging according to their local area, although they do not explicitly claim an 
absolute control and proprietary right over their traditional fishing area. They identify themselves 
according to their fishing techniques, and friction can occur sometimes between users of different 
techniques.  
 At Ouakam’s fishing wharf, Alioune argues that the development of these forbidden 
practices has had important impacts on fish species’ reproduction. The fishery structure of Ouakam 
has been selected for a World Bank-funded environmental project (GIRMAC). In this context, the 
fishing in the local area has been restricted in order to restore the coastline’s ecosystem and 
encourage the reproduction of endangered species. In the framework of the co-management fishery 
policy, the community has chosen its own monitoring and surveillance agents, under the ministry in 
charge of fisheries’ supervision. Ouakam’s local fishing area has been divided into two sub-areas 
delimited by buoys. Fishing is strictly forbidden in the first area (ZIP), and restricted in the other 
(ZER). A map has been designed for the programme by local actors, based on fishermen’s local 
knowledge. This map shows the traditional Wolof names of the fishing places59 and their depth and 
geographical coordinates. However, Alioune is a bit sceptical regarding the effectiveness of this 
system: 
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You can see over there, there is a GIRMAC canoe; they gave us a canoe and a motor, 
and him, he is the president of the surveillance [he indicates one of the fishermen]. But 
we do what we can. We’ve inspected people who were using monofilament drift nets. ... 
When they come to our fishing area here, in the Ouakam area for example, they spread 
their nets and when the nets drift with the current, they hang upon the buoys [of our 
dormant nets] and instead of disentangling them, they [the fishermen] cut our nets. So 
we go with him, the president; sometimes we organise a unit – we pick them up, we 
bring them here like the local police, but we don’t have the right to do that. We are told, 
“You can’t do that” but we do it sometimes, because we are tired. We know that, 
sometimes, we know that the fisherman will have his dormant net cut and he won’t be 
able to buy a new one. He is going to be poor for the rest of his life, I tell you, because 
the small amount he was earning, he doesn’t have it anymore. These are things that 
happen between us, so sometimes, we just do it ourselves. We give them a beating, we 
fight before the state comes60 [they laugh]61. 
 It is not that clear how the role of the surveillance agent who has been designated by the 
fishermen can be effective. Local fishermen are aware they are responsible for the management of 
their local fishing area and that they have some legitimate control over the irregular fishing 
activities occurring there. However, they do not see themselves as representatives of state power, 
being aware that they cannot arrest people who are illegally fishing along the coastline. They find 
the legitimacy for their actions and for their occasional violence in their disillusion, tiredness and 
frustration towards both the state and the other fishermen’s behaviour. However, Alioune attributes 
a role to the state, although in his story it comes up after the conflict has occurred. The state’s role 
is not clearly identified, but it seems that it has some authority at some point. Alioune then adds the 
following about the direction of surveillance and protection for fisheries (DPSP)62: 
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The DPSP, we call for their action, they know that, but sometimes they say they don’t 
have enough resources, not enough fuel, they say they can’t patrol and that their units 
are reduced [...] but sometimes, they actually do these controls, they patrol in the sea 
and sometimes perhaps they increase awareness of the trawlers that fish in certain 
areas.
63
 
 Alioune acknowledges that the local fishing sector needs state action for the management 
of conflicts and fishing resources, although he does not seem to give much credibility to its action, 
because of the lack of financial resources. As a compromise, he recognises that “they actually do 
these controls”, although he is not quite sure about the reality of the DPSP’s actions. Also, he 
seems to believe more in the traditional fishermen’s regulation: 
We say that the fisherman, when he fishes in an area, maybe when he was the first to 
go to this area, we don’t say that he is the owner of the place, but if someone else then 
comes, he has to pay attention to the one who has already settled there. Here it is, this 
is a natural fishing regulation.64 
 The legitimacy of fish resources and fishermen’s mobility regulation relies more in 
traditional oral agreements that tie fishermen together than in an external state authority. The state 
seems to struggle to impose its official and formal rules because of an apparent lack of financial 
resources. To fishermen, these oral regulations appear to be “natural” and in opposition to the 
obscure external state rules.  These regulations mark spaces, places and fishermen’s identity, and 
when they are effective, they enable a fluid regulation of the mobility. When these regulations are 
questioned, boundaries emerge through violent confrontations. State regulation seems to have no 
authority on this very local scale, although it is expected by fishermen. In 2005, migrant fishermen 
from Saint-Louis angered local Kayar fishermen while fishing in their traditional fishing places 
with nylon nets. Fishermen from Kayar mostly hand line and use fixed nets, whereas Guet 
Ndarians use monofilament nets that drift along with the currents, obstructing the local fishermen’s 
activities and mobility. Kayar fishermen reacted strongly against Saint-Louis fishermen’s lack of 
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concern regarding their traditional fishing organisation, techniques and places. The two 
communities engaged in an armed clash for a couple of hours on Kayar’s wharves. There was a 
death and 20 fishermen were injured after some Kayar fishermen assaulted some Saint-Louis 
fishermen and ended up fighting against local police agents who tried to stop the conflict (Le Roux 
& Noël, 2007). Although this event has marked local memories, the local and migrant communities 
still cohabit during the fishing seasons. 
 Also, despite the state’s efforts to regulate fishermen’s mobility and practices in a 
participatory way, fishermen still give little consideration to fishing norms when they fish outside 
their local fishing areas. Ahmet and Alassane,65 who are 27 and 23 years old respectively, are two 
pirogue captains I was introduced to by the owner of the boat they navigate on every day. When I 
interviewed them in March 2012, they had just come out of jail, where they had been imprisoned 
with their colleagues for one week for having illegally fished in Dakar’s port (fishing in Dakar’s 
port is forbidden mainly for security reasons). This purse seine fishing crew openly bypassed the 
official fishing rules. The experience of these fishermen shows a gap between their expectation of 
the state’s actions and the flexible and – to them – incoherent application of the law. I meet with 
them in a very small and dark bedroom whose unique door gives direct access to the street. They 
share this narrow space with the other members of the crew. Comfort and hygiene are very basic: 
there is a mattress and a carpet on the floor, and there are a couple of shelves full of religious 
objects.  Since they have no responsibility for their children and wives, they eat, live, sleep and go 
fishing together.  
 Ahmet and Alassane explain that they went fishing in the port area because they were 
coming back from an unfruitful fishing day. It had been three months since they had caught a 
“good shot” or literally got a “jackpot”,66 and they assumed they would have this opportunity in the 
port. “Good shots” generally happen when fishermen catch the whole of a big pelagic fish shoal at 
once. When there are “good shots”, they call the other fishermen who are around to help them store 
all the fish on the boat. In This way, they can fill up to 10 pirogues, sell the equivalent of 300 boxes 
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on the local market and earn millions of francs. That day, Ahmet and Alassane and their crew had 
been following a fish shoal into the port and were arrested while emptying their net into the 
pirogue. As there were no other pirogues around to help them get everything out, they were not 
able to manage the whole quantity of fish trapped in their net and could not escape the police:  
We knew we didn’t have the right to fish in the port, but we didn’t want to go home 
empty-handed. Because, spending the whole day at sea and coming back with nothing, 
it’s very hard. ... It wasn’t the first time we went fishing there, but yes, it was the first 
time we got caught. But, we can say, it’s not the first time, because sometimes, when 
we got caught, we negotiated it [...] well [...] But you see, here, it was overflowing.67 
Their reaction when they were arrested shows the different strategies they use to find a way out: 
The policemen lectured us; we did everything to try to negotiate but they refused. We 
tried to calm down the situation; we asked for their forgiveness. They refused. We said, 
that, well, we didn’t know we couldn’t fish there. ... Then, they made us get off the 
boat. The policemen kept the fish catches and sold them.68 
 For the trial, they agreed to say the same thing for their defence: basically, that they were 
ignorant of the law, and that they were apologising. They were finally released, without any penalty 
or fine to pay. My local informant explains that he had helped them get out of jail with some 
courtesy visits he made to powerful state officials in Dakar. Although they had no fine to pay, crew 
members complain because while they were all in jail, they were not fishing and thus could not 
send money to their families. They all express their discontent towards the policemen who 
“arbitrarily” arrested them and “stole” their fish with impunity, though they seem to make a clear 
distinction between the policemen and the state:  
We can say it isn’t normal; they sent us to jail. They brought us to jail and then they 
stole our fish, which was worth 1,200 million francs. They shouldn’t have done this. 
The state has done nothing ... I wished the state did justice to us, because it is not 
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normal. They kept us in jail 11 days, without working, and then they took our fish, 
1,200 million francs.69 
 
To the questions, What does the role of the state mean for you, in your everyday life at sea? and 
Are the state and policemen the same thing?, Ahmet replies: 
No, it is not the same thing: sometimes, policemen want what is not in the law. And the 
state must control this, it must control that we respect the norms and charters. ... It is 
important to have norms at sea [...] Sometimes they ask for money. Because, when 
they arrest us, they say, “If you want, if you have such amount of money, we can free 
you.” Without having done something illegal, or for example if we don’t have life 
jackets on board, they ask for money and let us leave. They don’t apply the law.70 
 
 This statement reflects the ambiguous relationships that exist between the fishermen and 
the state. First, Ahmet criticises the fact that he could not negotiate with the policemen in the same 
way he did previously, several times, while fishing in the port. This time, the crew had no choice 
other than accepting the arrest and going to jail. Secondly, Ahmet considers that the policemen did 
not respect the law and abusively arrested them, although he is aware they were illegally fishing in 
the port. For him, a more appropriate role for the state – which seems to be represented here by the 
court that judged them – would be to regulate these policemen’s abuses, enable an efficient 
application of the law and be more tolerant towards the fishermen. This behaviour reminds us of 
what has been said previously about fishermen and state regulation: they skilfully divert the law 
according to their own interest. They do not ignore the law; on the contrary, they try to find and test 
its limits and take advantage of its weaknesses. Their ignorance seems to be used as a helpful 
excuse to legitimate their faults and ask for more tolerance from the state. Negotiation with the 
policemen appears to be the last determinant step before getting arrested. Fishermen count on this 
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flexibility of the application of the law. Moreover, the intervention of the external actor – my local 
informant – who apparently influenced the judgement shows an additional level of flexibility.  
 “Mundane arrangements” such as the application of the law produce the effect of an 
external structure that gives order to social practices (Mitchell, 2006: 180). The expressions of 
these “arrangements” lead people to identify the state as something apart from their lives that 
directs and shapes their movements and activities. In this case study, the state is perceived through 
fishermen’s discourses in their daily fishing activities.  Paradoxically, fishermen do not consider 
the policemen as the state agents and would rather see the state as a superior, unclear, powerful 
frame that should control policemen’s actions. The fishermen community conceives of the 
Senegalese state as an external structure set apart from their lives whose effect is weak as its action 
is criticised yet expected.  
 These experiences demonstrate great ambiguities. Fishermen not only denounce the lack of 
state regulation and weak application of the law but also the lack of legitimacy of state agents who 
act in the name of the law’s application. The participatory policy has attempted to involve 
fishermen in the regulation of Senegal’s fishing resources. Nevertheless, because fishermen give 
little legitimacy to state practices in general, this policy has not proved successful yet. Personal and 
community interests as well as traditional regulation systems remain superior to state norms, 
although fishermen, paradoxically, expect an efficient state action for the protection of fish 
resources. Moreover, fishermen’s relationships to Senegal’s state have become increasingly 
ambiguous as a result of weak maritime governance and the surveillance of industrial fishing 
activities. 
 
Weak maritime surveillance and state regulation’s legitimacy 
 Senegalese fishermen have expressed their discontent about Senegal’s industrial fishing 
governance. On one hand, Senegal’s governments have attempted to limit fishermen’s access to the 
sea since the end of the 1990s, while on the other hand, these same governments have increasingly 
allowed foreign companies to exploit Senegalese waters’ threatened resources (Le Roux & Noël, 
2007) – at least until 2012. The ambiguity of Senegal’s maritime governance has generated 
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frustration among the fishermen, who got organised through a number of national professional 
corporations (such as Fenagie, Conipas or CNPS). These organisations call for more coherence, 
transparency and attention and often protest when they hear a rumour about obscure new 
agreements signed with foreign fishing companies.71 Fishermen denounce the sales of illegitimate 
fishing licences, the lack of surveillance of industrial ships’ practices and regular incursions into 
small-scale fishing areas. 
 The Direction of the Protection and Surveillance for Fisheries (DPSP)72 is one of the 
branches of the Ministry for Maritime Economy and is in charge of monitoring sea activities. A 
plane, five 12-metre-long and two 20-metre-long patrol boats watch the whole Senegalese marine 
area and must monitor both the small-scale fishers and industrial boats.73 The French navy provides 
the DPSP with 5 flight-hours a month and helps the DPSP arrest illegal industrial foreign trawlers 
or rescue artisanal fishers. DPSP’s officials record industrial ships’ routes, detect pirate fishers and 
keep track of vessels’ movements on a 24-hour basis. Each licence-holder trawler carries a beacon 
connected to satellite systems, which enables the DPSP agents to follow their movement at sea. By 
recording ships’ speed and geographical position, DPSP’s agents know if ships are fishing in 
unauthorised waters or are simply navigating between two points. When ships’ speed is between 2 
and 5 knots for more than an hour, it is very likely that these ships are fishing. However, these 
surveillance resources seem to be very weak when one knows that more than 18,000 canoes and at 
least 143 industrial trawlers (FAO, 2010) operate in Senegalese waters along a 718 km-long 
coastline.  
 In fact, foreign industrial trawlers operating for joint venture companies often use illegal 
practices. When trawlers do not have freezing capacities aboard, they illegally trans-ship their 
catches at sea to bigger vessels, and the catches are then sold in markets outside Senegal (Niasse & 
Seck, 2011). Furthermore, Niasse and Seck report the bribes that ship-owners are willing to pay to 
Senegalese officials to avoid formal sanctions. Also, according to the code for maritime fishing, 
professional observers must embark in the ships. Again, this is rarely observed in practice  (Niasse 
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& Seck, 2011). Although industrial ships have been openly developing illegal practices, they were 
still sold licences until 2012, although since his election that year, President Macky Sall has sought 
to put an end to these practices. The arrest of the Oleg Naydenov’s crew in early 2014 demonstrates 
that the Senegalese navy is in fact able to detect illegal fishing in national waters and truly apply 
the law despite weak material resources.74  
 
 Regarding the management of small-scale fisheries’ activities at sea, the DPSP official 
acknowledges that the Senegalese sea surveillance system is clearly inefficient, because of a lack of 
financial means and the involvement of local small-scale fisheries’ actors. According to this 
official, the participative turn which fishing policy practices have recently taken also works for sea 
surveillance and needs to be generalised: 
Top-down practices [said in English] are not working; we’d rather practice bottom up 
practices: we must further develop the participative surveillance strategy in place. 
Actors are greatly involved in the implementation of such practices; they plan each 
day of surveillance. They themselves take part in the surveillance effort. Why is it 
interesting? We can’t place an agent behind each fisherman; also, if fishermen do this, 
it reduces surveillance costs. We must take advantage of the sociologic power of 
surveillance.75  
 
 In practice, this participative management seems inappropriate regarding the management 
of industrial trawlers’ movements at sea and their problematic interaction with small-scale fishers. 
Indeed, there have been an increasing number of fishing nets damaged by trawlers (Map 3). 
Fishermen leave their dormant nets overnight around the 6-mile limit and come back in the 
morning to get their catches out. They often cannot find their nets because they have been pulled 
out by trawlers. Conflicts between industrial and small-scale fishermen regularly occur and cause 
significant material damage for the fishermen (Dubois & Zografos, 2012). Although such conflicts 
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are reported to the DPSP, which is in charge of resolving them, this institution’s mediation role is 
rarely efficient (Dubois & Zografos, 2012). Destruction of fish nets by trawlers happens on an 
everyday basis either in the first 6 nautical miles or in the 6–12 nautical mile area. Between 2000 
and 2005, the Senegalese authorities registered 983 nets that were destroyed by trawlers and 139 
collisions between artisanal canoes and trawlers (ISRA, 2006: 112).  
 
Map 3: Nets damaged by industrial trawlers (by department, and between 2000 and 2005), 
 May 2014. Design: J.H. 
 
 Through the analysis of these conflicts, one finds contradictory responses from fishermen 
and government officials. Fishermen hold the state responsible for these conflicts as they denounce 
the industrial fishing agreements which have made possible the large number of trawlers in their 
fishing areas. Furthermore, fishermen perceive the state as being absent in the resolution of the 
conflicts caused by a supposed trawler’s negligence. The comments of Modou reflect these 
feelings. This returned migrant discusses the reasons why Kayar fishermen decided to go to Europe 
in 2006. This statement shows how fishermen’s movements are now confronted with tangible 
geographical boundaries; from the contact with the trawlers emerge the limits of Kayar’s fishing 
area: 
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We didn’t like fishing anymore. The youth were fed up with fishing; what they earned 
wasn’t enough. Fuel prices were increasingly rising. And still, the fishing agreements, 
with the trawlers, it bothers us a lot. You know, here in Africa, there is bad 
governance.  With the Minister of Fisheries, last March [...] there were problems all 
the time with the trawlers. There had been big trawlers that came 3 kilometres away 
from the coastline and they were fishing in big quantities; they damaged the fishing 
nets. We started to respond. We organised a protest. There were media, television. The 
big trawlers, it’s part of the fishing crisis issue.76 
 Modou’s comments reflect a general frustration, or feeling, that has pushed a number of 
fishermen to choose to take the migration route to Europe. Modou’s inability to fish in decent 
conditions is associated with the African “bad governance”. He considers that this state failure 
pushed him to go to Europe illegally in 2006. This frustration has also resulted in protests 
organised by fishery leaders. These considerations contrast with the discourses of two officials of 
the Ministry of Maritime Economy. These officials confirm in interviews that these conflicts 
between fishermen and trawlers have increased over the last decade. They understand the conflicts 
as a sign of a growing competition over a scarcer resource. Fish species reproduce in these areas so 
they attract industrial fishers. The DPSP’s director reported that on average there are 20 illegal 
intrusions detected per year. However, both of these officials consider fishermen to be responsible 
for these conflicts. Fishermen’s ability to modernise and adjust to fishing regulation norms is in 
question. According to the Director of Maritime Fisheries (DPM77): 
We realise that, despite our delimitation system, we still cannot solve the conflicts 
because, and we have to acknowledge this, it is often the small-scale fishery with its 
very fast development and dynamism that moves offshore towards industrial fishing 
areas. There are often these kinds of conflicts and damage because the small-scale 
fishery does not respect navigation and fishing practice norms in general. For 
example, the nets: they generally let out their fishing nets without indication. Then, 
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when the industrial trawlers pass, they can’t see the nets, they are not visible to the 
naked eye, so they tear the nets up, which then causes all kinds of conflicts.78 
 
For this official, lack of attention towards state norms combined with an uncontrollable dynamism 
characterise fishermen’s behaviour and generate unavoidable conflicts. For the DPSP’s director, 
this lack of education and maturity seems to be the main reason why the regulation of the system 
has been made more complex:  
It is hard to regulate this sector for several reasons: the small-scale fishery has 
always been an informal sector. ... Then, because most of the people working in the 
sector are illiterate and haven’t been to school, they haven’t learnt navigation and 
fishing rules and they often ignore everything. For this reason, and in order to 
regulate the sector, we are going slowly; we try to increase their awareness, to train 
them in order to avoid certain practices and the use of some fishing gear such as the 
monofilament, which is forbidden, and the use of some forbidden methods in Senegal. 
They don’t know, so we approach them; we organise seminars, meetings, and also 
maritime controls. At the beginning, we didn’t arrest these people, we tried to explain 
to them, “This is not good, the law forbids it”.79 
  
 In both discourses, there is a gap that separates the officials from the fishermen’s 
community. By pointing to fishermen as mainly responsible for the conflicts, the DPM’s official 
questions the legitimacy of fishermen’s rights to cross the 6-mile limit and go fishing in these 
areas. He suggests that fishermen could have avoided trouble by not crossing this limit. Although 
the DPSP director articulates a similar distance (“these people”), we can perceive a certain form of 
paternalism and affection towards the fishermen when he insists on showing goodwill by taking 
care of them and being indulgent towards their “ignorance”. These officials consider fishermen to 
be part of an informal underdeveloped community that is unable to follow state rules and 
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regulations. Fishermen’s mobility carries a negative meaning and is held responsible for these 
conflicts. Being unpredictable and invisible, mobility then becomes a problem: fishermen are 
moving in an irregular way, becoming increasingly “placeless” and detached from fixed points 
(Adey, 2010). Both their “fast development” and “dynamism” are obstacles for state regulation 
efforts, although these dynamics have paradoxically resulted from state action. Fishermen are 
expected to respect standard practices in order to make their routes and fishing places visible. 
Failure to adopt these practices keeps them invisible and outside the regulation system. The state’s 
norms are both a way to make fishermen traceable and controllable and a way of providing them 
with some legitimacy – from the viewpoint of the state. In fact, the state reinforces its power over 
the small-scale fishermen by developing “techne” (Scott, 1998) and by ignoring fishermen’s 
practical knowledge. Fishermen leave visible marks such as floating plastic bottles to spot their 
underwater nets. Although these marks are not easy to distinguish for trawlers’ skippers, fishermen 
pay attention to these signs when navigating and fishing. For the state, making fishermen’s 
mobility visible – in a more appropriate way – would make it more recognisable, stable and 
rationalised. These expectations of the state reflect the “simplification” process performed by the 
state while it deals with the complexity of the movements of the fishermen (Scott, 1998). By 
staying invisible, fishermen therefore affirm their resistance to the state’s attempt at domination. 
 Although fishermen’s ability to comply with state rules and regulations is questioned, we 
notice through Alioune’s previous comments that he has a certain level of understanding of fishing 
regulations as, for example, he is able to confirm the kind of gear which is forbidden. As a leader, 
Alioune seems to be more concerned about the way these rules cannot be integrated by other 
fishermen and systematically applied by state agents. The distance he puts between himself and the 
state is due to the lack of credibility he gives to it. He seems to believe in the regulation, although 
he questions its application.  
 Fishermen’s reactions to the state’s action – or lack of action – reflect their independence 
and reluctance to obey any external and superior authority. Their responses are more than a simple 
sign of cultural, social and economic ‘immaturity’ – as understood by the government. It seems that 
the state failed to manage Senegalese fisheries more because of its negligence of fishermen’s local 
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knowledge than because of fishermen’s supposed immaturity. Although fishermen would agree 
with the aim of the state’s policy to protect fish resources, they distrust state intervention. Two 
examples further exemplify the state practices’ lack of pragmatism regarding the management of 
fishermen’s mobility and security at sea. 
 
Are mobility and security-related measures compatible with practical knowledge? 
 What arises from the study of fishermen’s reactions to imposed new norms, are two 
examples of fishing regulation that exemplify Scott’s notion of state “simplification” practices 
(Scott, 1998). Firstly, fishermen must wear a life jacket while at sea, and the quantity of life jackets 
aboard must correspond to the number of crew members. Although fishermen benefit from an 
important state grant to buy those life jackets, they do not respect this requirement. Fishermen 
observe that these life jackets limit their mobility on board because of their size and bulk. Because 
they need to be very reactive and mobile, especially for net fishing, they consider that the jackets 
make them lose time and the physical ability for the tasks they have to undertake on board. Fishers 
also consider that this requirement questions their ability to navigate safely and that wearing life 
jackets would also mean that they are interfering with God’s will (Sall, 2007). Talismans, prayers 
and sacrifices are the safety practices that tradition allows fishermen to use in order to ward off fate 
and bad spirits at sea. Furthermore, on a fishing trip I undertook in April 2012, with a crew of 16 
purse seine fishermen, I was the only one wearing a life jacket despite the swell’s strength 
(Photographs 11 and 12). When I asked the crew why none of them were wearing one, they 
proudly replied that they did not need one because “they were experienced fishermen”. On our 
route, we met 10 to 15 other boats full of fishermen who were all going in the same direction. I did 
not see any of them wearing a life jacket. Crews interact with each other while at sea; they 
recognise the boats of their fellow fishermen, teasing each other and engaging in competition. In 
these conditions, if wearing a life jacket is indeed seen as degrading, it can be understood why 
social pressure and control becomes superior to the official fishing norm. These life jackets are 
worth XOF 25,000 (£31): they are sold at XOF 5,000 to the fishermen, while the state funds the 
other XOF 20,000.  It is commonly acknowledged that most of the time captain fishermen buy life 
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jackets for crew members, but as soon as fishing gets bad, they sell them back on the informal 
market and use the refund to pay for the fuel spent for the unfruitful fishing day.80  
 
 
Photograph 11: Looking for fish shoals,  
off Dakar coasts, April 2012, J.H. 
Photograph 12: Crew members dragging the net, off 
Dakar coasts, April 2012, J.H. 
 
 
 Secondly, an anonymous respondent in the DPM explains why it has been so difficult for 
the Ministry for Maritime Economy to efficiently implement the national canoes registration 
programme. A wide programme to register Senegalese artisanal canoes was launched in 2008 by 
the ministry. In July 2012, this programme was still running, and the definitive number of canoes in 
Senegal still remained unknown.81 Each boat owner must register his canoe(s) with the 
administration through local fisheries services. The ministry’s officials then compile these local 
statistics at the national level. In theory, every owner needs an administrative authorisation to be 
allowed to build and then register a new canoe.  This programme seeks to track the exact number of 
canoes in Senegal in order to limit the number of fishing permits and canoes. These limitations aim 
to reduce the fishing efforts by regulating the sector and access to resources. Indirectly, these 
limitations would also enable better control of fishermen’s mobility as this system enables state 
agents to identify and localise the fishermen when they control the boats: fishermen are supposed 
to report their arrivals and departures to local administrative representatives.  
 Nevertheless, in addition to institutional slowness, fishermen’s traditional beliefs, 
reluctance, distrust and lack of comprehension have been great obstacles to this programme’s 
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implementation. Once registered, local state agents paint the registration number on the boat and 
insert a small chip into the boat hull that contains information about the boat’s dimensions, date of 
construction, registration number, ownership and home port.  However, my informant explains that 
fishermen often refuse to let the agents do so. Although the chip inserted in the frame of the boat 
only gives information about the characteristics of the canoe, fishermen think it allows the 
administration to localise them everywhere permanently and trace their routes at a distance: 
 They [the fishers] think that if there is an infringement, if they are illegal, if they go to 
protected areas, even if they flee, surveillance agents will give their position. They 
think the chip gives their localisation. Besides, they think that this registration system 
enables the state to identify them, to make them pay taxes. They are not aware of the 
programme’s goals. If they understood that the programme aims to manage fisheries 
and resources, they wouldn’t reject it. But they consider that if the initiative comes 
from the administration, they must distrust it.82  
 
 This behaviour shows how essential freedom of movement is for the fishermen. They do 
not understand how official programmes and measures work, and tend to assume that these 
measures will jeopardise their ability to move and fish. In addition, fishermen have their own 
identification system, using the paintings of traditional, regional and/or familial signs on their 
boats. They generally paint the name of the boat on it. They choose a name according to the family 
story, for example, and draw specific signs on the wooden frame (Photograph 13). In this way, 
fishermen recognise each other at sea according to their region of origin, family and social groups 
and so forth. By imposing the painting of a registration number on the frame of the boat, the state is 
simplifying and ignoring this traditional identification system. These procedures have generated 
distrust among fishermen, especially because they think that this registration process would have an 
impact on their mobility and would enable the state to control their movements.  
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Photograph 13: Traditional paintings on Kayar local fishing canoes,  
Kayar, July 2011, J.H. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 Fishermen and the Senegalese government are, today, facing a great dilemma. Fishermen 
want to keep being mobile and exploiting the sea. Fishermen’s mentality seems to be more 
complex than reducible to a lack of comprehension and maturity, although state agents’ 
considerations initially convey this feeling. In this chapter, statements and discourse analyses have 
shown how ambiguous fishermen’s expectations of state action are. Resource scarcity and 
competition undeniably generate power struggles and conflicts between fishermen and state agents. 
Paradoxically, fishermen denounce an absent state, which is responsible for a lack of resources, and 
at the same time, they reject its intervention, which nevertheless seeks the protection of the same 
resources – despite the state’s disproportionately lax attitude towards international industrial 
fishers. Participatory policies seem appropriate but only to the extent that state agents would 
coherently apply the law and regulate both industrial and small-scale fisheries in a fair and rational 
way. 
 Power struggles between state and non-state actors socially construct the Senegalese 
Atlantic, which makes the meaning of the ocean, the functions of state agents and the expectations 
of fishermen more confused. I have shown how fishermen have exercised a form of power over 
maritime spaces through their mobility. Spreading their movement across the Senegalese waters 
has constituted a powerful means to escape state domination as the government’s control has 
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expanded. Mobility has been something more than a response to state intervention and has 
embodied a powerful way for the fishermen to express their inherent dynamism. Mobility carries 
power because it has enabled the fishermen to pragmatically elude state domination and 
strategically divert and overcome the measures originally intended to limit their movement.  
 Fishermen’s mobility reflects their ability to appropriate new techniques and develop their 
activities, knowledge and experience of the sea. Day after day, the Senegalese maritime space 
consequently takes on new outlines: starting as a resource-rich, free-access space, it was first a 
space of freedom and growth, and was then changed into a limited and competed-for space where 
fishermen’s trajectories have become more strategic. These mobility strategies at the Senegalese 
level and fishermen’s interactions with state agents are valuable for the comprehension of longer 
mobility patterns and international border experiences. Fishermen have used similar strategies – 
that is, diverting the rules and taking advantage of the state system’s weaknesses – for their long-
distance maritime journeys. Rather than being an obstacle to the sector’s development and 
dynamism, their quick adaptation and non-modernised structure has eased their expansion 
throughout the Atlantic Ocean. The following chapter explores the contemporary power–
knowledge relationships produced by fishermen’s everyday activities at sea, examining how the 
traditional functions and values they have attributed to the ocean have changed over time.  
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Chapter 5 –  
Connecting Sea and Land Spaces  
Through Mobility-related Practices 
 
 
In Senegalese fishing communities, powerful families have become influential thanks to 
the use and spread of their specific knowledge, networks and mobilities. At first glance, family 
networks and hierarchies are not obvious to an outside observer. This social organisation lies in 
implicit cultural codes and is not claimed by members of the community or found in architecture 
and urban organisation. I realised that fishermen are all connected and that they are organised 
according to specific power relations.  These connections need further exploration as they shed 
light on the whole organisation of the small-scale fishing sector and mobility patterns in Senegal. It 
seems that one misses a great part of the story when interviewing fishermen individually without 
looking for these connections.  
In this chapter, I decrypt the way fishermen’s mobility operates though specific power–
knowledge relationships which connect sea and land spaces. I argue that through their mobility, 
fishermen project power onto the sea and fish resources’ local management. At the same time, this 
mobility produces essential knowledge so that the fishermen can navigate and develop productive 
fishing activities. I will show how the control over economic resources is intimately linked to 
fishermen’s maritime and territorial mobility. Being mobile and absent enables the fishermen, 
paradoxically, to manage their expenses and thus their independence better. Furthermore, when 
fishermen control their own resources and financial means, they gain greater control over their 
maritime mobility and production means. But when fishermen lack knowledge of and control over 
these expenses, their maritime mobility increasingly tends to rely on land-based wealthier and more 
powerful agents. These mechanisms participate in – and challenge – fishermen’s geographical and 
“social construction of the ocean” (Steinberg, 2001).  
I initially show how the naming of fishing places and the deployment of navigation 
knowledge reflect these power–knowledge mechanisms. Second, I look at distant control and 
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mediation of power that operate through –and give shape to – fishermen’s mobility. I analyse two 
mobility-related success stories which bring together elements of networks, power and knowledge 
in a complex way. Whatever shapes these mobility practices might take, these practices link 
together sea and land spaces. 
 
1. Constructing local marine areas in relation to social constructions on land 
Fishermen’s approaches to the sea inform us about the social construction of their maritime 
environment. For fishing communities, the ocean is, first, a space for the projection of power and 
the production of practical knowledge. These communities project power onto the sea spaces 
through the spiritual values and functions they give to the sea and through the practice of naming 
fishing places. As do most Senegalese communities, Lebou and Wolof fishermen’s communities 
mix Muslim and animist beliefs in a complex way. Fishing communities organise everyday life 
around syncretistic practices that are often performed by marabouts. Also, these traditional 
communities have kept their matrilineal culture through animist traditions. As Fatou Diome has 
shown in her novels (Diome, 2006, 2010), a gendered distribution of religious rituals makes 
women the main actors and perpetuators of animist practices, whereas men generally embody 
Muslim values. Furthermore, for traditional communities, a goddess inhabits the sea (Sall, 2007):  
Among the Lebous and Guet-Ndarians, for example, the health of marine resources 
and fishermen’s security (insurance incomes and safety at sea) depend on the will of 
the sea goddess (Leuk Daour for Lebous and Mame Coumba Bang for Guet-
Ndarians). (Sall, 2007: 160)  
Balandier and Mercier (1952) observe that for the fishermen, the sea has long been filled 
with mystic elements and feminine powers because it is source of fecundity. Thus, the traditional 
work performed in order to keep control over these “feminine” elements is often carried out by 
women. For example, before Senegal’s independence, Balandier and Mercier (1952) reported that 
women made sacrifices just before the dry season in order to ensure a fruitful fishing season. These 
beliefs still play a big part in fishermen’s daily life; they often mention the presence of spirits in the 
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sea. They protect themselves with talismans,83 sacrifices and Marabouts’ advice and blessings 
before going fishing. This spiritual projection of feminine powers onto the sea balances the 
exclusive masculine use of maritime spaces.84 Also, these beliefs shape fishermen’s mobility and 
representation of the sea and secure a fair balance between maritime and land-based activities. 
These practices are a way for the community to exercise control over their environment, although 
this control remains fairly limited by mystic marine powers. According to Sall, for the fishermen, 
the decrease in fish resources is “part of the normal trials and tribulations of nature, which depend 
on the will of the holy powers they consult from time to time” (Sall, 2007: 157).85 In addition to 
these spiritual practices, fishermen name their fishing places in a specific way.  
In Senegal, new generations of local fishermen are very familiar with the names which the 
elders gave to their traditional fishing places. These names reflect the biological evolution of 
fishing resources and inform us about the way fishermen appropriate the coastal marine 
environment. These names generally characterise the fishing places by the type of species they 
usually provide. Names refer to the quality of these fishing places, their geographical position or 
the families who first discovered them. In Kayar, Modou86 explains that elders gave some of these 
names according to the land-based elements they could see from the fishing places. For example, 
one of Kayar’s oldest fishing places is called “Thiès” because when the elders were fishing there, 
he explains, they saw a big tree which they deemed was located near the Senegalese city of Thiès. 
This type of name is a support for navigation and helps the fishermen to orientate themselves 
according to the position of the land-based elements spotted from the sea (Map 4). Other names 
such as “Mbayène”, “Palène” or “Mbenguène” were those of influential families who used to fish 
in these particular fishing places. Also, many names refer to the substantial fishing quality of the 
place: “Takalé” means “sparkling” whereas “Amul Yagal” literally means “no patience”. Because 
these places are not so popular anymore, these names are not so relevant. For example, in “Takalé” 
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fishermen used to find groupers and sea breams in abundance. Octopuses are a less profitable 
species which fishermen now find there in great quantities. New fishing places are not necessarily 
more distant than older ones, though their “creation” is a sign of the increased mobility of the 
fishermen. The less poetic names of these new places indicate their recent discovery. Called simply 
“11 kilometres” or “6 kilometres”, their names refer to the distance that separates them from the 
shore and reveal the novelty of these fishing places. Fishermen discovered these places after the use 
of GPS devices had become popularised and enabled the distance to be measured in kilometres.  
 
Map 4: Modou’s geography of Ouakam’s local fishing area, May 2014. Design: J.H. 
 
The “social construction” of this maritime space reminds us of the Foucauldian heterotopia  
(Foucault, cited in Steinberg, 2001) to the extent that the sea acts as a mirror of the land both in 
geographic and social terms. Fishermen shape the sea space by reproducing the toponymy of land-
based elements in fishing areas. They organise the marine space with reference to their territory, 
giving priority to dominant families or projecting the frame and marks of the territorial landscape 
onto the maritime space. By doing so, they reproduce social struggles and hierarchies, and 
domination as well, transforming the sea into a space of “alternate ordering” (Steinberg, 2001: 
193). Thus far, this spatial organisation has not only reflected the wealth of Kayar’s local fishing 
economy through this traditional toponymy but also the open access to fish resources which 
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traditional fishermen’s communities have relied on. This heterotopia is unstable and has become a 
space where the new generation of fishermen challenges power struggles and social domination 
(Steinberg, 2001). In fact, the increased pressure on fishing resources jeopardises the balance of the 
traditional construction of this marine environment. When fishermen cannot exploit the traditional 
fishing places because of a lack of resources, the resulting higher competition encourages them to 
find new places. 
Today, fishermen increasingly tend to keep their fishing places secret and give them 
personalised names – generally the name of a close relative they register in their GPS systems. 
They do not want to disclose their new fishing places in order to minimise competition.87 In 
Ouakam, Alioune88 reports that many fishers now hide themselves and go fishing early in the 
morning so that they can preserve their new discovery. These recent practices generate an 
individualisation of the fishing activity, which also enables greater control over the local 
environment. Names and new fishing places then belong to individuals or small groups of 
fishermen who do not wish to share their new information.  These naming practices make possible 
the appropriation and shaping of the sea space, and are an instrument for the exercise of a greater 
control over resources. Controlling knowledge – such as information about fishing places – is for 
the fishermen a way to secure resources and maintain a fair balance in the exploitation of the sea; 
and on the other hand, managing navigation techniques and technologies enables the fishermen to 
unfold their mobility and cope with greater competition and decreasing resources. This “marine 
heterotopia” is a space for the production of practical knowledge and the exercise of control for the 
fishermen through navigating and fishing practices. The construction of this space is constantly 
moving, as are fishermen’s practices. At the same time as fishermen challenge the traditional 
organisation of sea spaces through their maritime mobility practices, their increased mobility is a 
response to the economic issues their community has been facing recently. 
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 In addition to these geographical marks and naming practices, fishermen also localise their 
fishing places by measuring the depth of the sea. Ouakam’s underwater canyon is known by the 
fishers for its exceptional depth, and it attracts many fish species (Map 4). In Joal, former 
fisherman Ahmed further informs us about “the fisherman’s language”, which reflects a local and 
practical knowledge demersal fishermen usually rely on to navigate and fish: 
There is what we call the fisherman’s language, with Kao and Kel. Kao is where the 
water is not very deep and Kel is where it is very deep. There is a time, for example, if 
it’s cold, the fish tends to go to Kel, and if it’s warm, they go down to Kao to better 
breathe the oxygen, so it depends on the time period. But there are specific fish which 
we don’t find at Kel, such as, for example, the scorpion fish [...] we find it at Kel only, 
as black and yellow groupers.89  
 
When I ask Ahmed if this Kao and Kel orientation system corresponded to ‘our’ west and east, he 
replies: 
Kao is the east and Kel is the west. North is Gop and south is Tank. Gop is always the 
north and Tank is always the south. The east is Kao and Kel is the sea, in the west.90 
Although this language can be transcribed into a more universal navigation language in this 
situation, it would not always be the case – were these fishermen navigating in other places where 
the sea would lie in the east, for example; they take the depth of the sea as a geographic reference 
rather than the universal cardinal points. Nevertheless, it seems that this specific navigation 
knowledge is based on a mix of universal norms and local techniques. For example, fishermen use 
the fathom unit to measure the sea depth: 
You take the rope, you attach a weight and you let it down until it touches the bottom 
and you start measuring; it is what we call a fathom. A fathom is two metres. If you 
have ten fathoms, you have twenty metres; this is the way we measure it.91 
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 This fisherman’s language is based on a combination of practical local knowledge and 
more universal conventions. The way in which fishermen have constructed their own navigation 
knowledge has therefore been essential for the pragmatic construction of the maritime spaces they 
go to. The appropriation of maritime spaces therefore starts from the creation and appropriation of 
a pragmatic language that connects sea and land spaces. Other mobility-related practices produce 
similar connections. Distant control and mediated power enable the spread of mobility over the sea.  
 
2. Distant control and mediation of power 
 While the funding of fishing activities had traditionally come from internal and informal 
family and community networks, today fishermen increasingly tend to seek external funding from 
independent fish traders, fish factories or external contractors (Le Roux & Noël, 2007). This 
financial dimension applies to the captain-fishers who hold capital and work for a land-based boat 
owner – as do 30% of the fishermen (ISRA, 2006 and chapter 2). As these financial investments 
make fishermen more dependent on external funders, fishermen partly lose their autonomy and 
freedom of movement at sea. These dependent relationships connect land and sea spaces through 
distant control practices and mediation of power. Networks and resources play a substantial role in 
the shaping of fishermen’s mobility and are reminiscent of Latour’s and Law’s ANT theory (cited 
in Allen, 2011). Basing what he says on the analysis of the sixteenth century Portuguese navigation 
to India, Law argues that: 
long-distance control depends upon the creation of a network of passive agents (both 
human and non-human) which makes it possible for emissaries to circulate from the 
centre to the periphery in a way that maintains their durability, forcefulness and 
fidelity. (Law, 2003: 1) 
 For Senegalese fishermen’s maritime mobility, a similar system of distant control operates 
through non-human agents such as GPS systems, mobile phones and navigation techniques; sea 
currents and swell; or knowledge about the climate, the sea and the stars. Human agents take part in 
this mobility system to complete the decision-making process or for reasons relating to the 
workforce or because of financial investments: both mobile and immobile agents are involved in 
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fishermen’s mobility (Sheller & Urry, 2006). For instance, for demersal long-distance fishing, boat 
owners may hire a first captain they trust and fund most of the navigation and fishing costs without 
going on the journey. At the end of the fishing trip, the crew negotiates prices with the fish traders 
and sells the catches on the local market. In some cases, the owner/funder who is in direct contact 
with the local fish traders – when this funder is not a fish trader himself – predetermines the ports 
where crews must land as well as the price of the catches. The smaller the captain’s investments in 
the fishing costs, the more dependent he is on the land-based agents, and, consequently, the more 
restricted the trajectories he follows at sea. Rather than circulating, power is mediated through 
resources and at a distance (Allen, 2011). Networks, resources and agents form a supportive frame 
for this mediation of power.  
 Generally, agents who hold resources are former fishermen who convert themselves into 
port-based brokers. Ahmed observes that fishermen see this professional conversion as an 
achievement and consider that the less time their job requires them to spend at sea, the more 
successful their conversion is. This former fisherman who turned into fish trader took the lead of a 
national organisation – “the emergent actors” 92 – which represents Guet Ndarians’ international 
demersal fishers in six coastal villages in Senegal.  
 Ahmed used to go fishing in Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau and Guinea and progressively 
abandoned his sea activities in order to focus on the organisation he represents. This organisation 
aims to provide assistance to the fishermen when they have difficulties getting foreign fishing 
licences, for example, or when they are in trouble with Senegal’s or neighbouring countries’ 
administrations. This organisation works as a cooperative that mutualises capital, funds and 
resources in order to provide the fishermen with a reliable, organised structure in case of navigation 
accidents, for instance. Ahmed also fights for a greater autonomy for the fishermen. He first 
explains the dependent relationships binding fishermen to their funder – though he is mostly 
speaking of long-distance fishermen who use ice-box canoes and fish in Bissau-Guinea or 
Conackry: 
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If you haven’t got savings, you must look over there and ask the fish trader to lend you 
a small amount of money [...] but this is the greatest problem of the fishermen [...] 
because once the fish trader gives you money, he’s your master, and you must give it 
back to him at any cost. Now, if you are autonomous, you can freely sell your product. 
... Here, the owner is also very often the fish trader. It means that he both buys fish 
and provides the funding for it; he is at the same time fish trader/broker and funder. 
This is a problem. ... The best thing is to be autonomous. If you, you are autonomous, 
you can sell your product for the price you wish, but if you are not autonomous, you 
are obliged to follow the fish trader’s prices.93 
 
 The captain who is in debt can hardly sell his catches to someone other than his funder 
because the fish traders on the landing docks all know each other and would be aware of that 
‘unfair’ transaction. Fishermen prefer to follow the oral agreement that ties them to funders rather 
than attempting to escape funders’ control. In order to strengthen this long-distance control, land-
based boat owners generally hire a close relative from among the crew members. Assane, a Joal-
based boat owner who funds fishing expeditions to Guinea-Bissau, observes the following:  
If you have a canoe and you haven’t put one of your relatives on it, you’re screwed. 
It’s safer to do this.94 
Relationships and networks reveal all their meaningful function here as they enable a distant 
control from the land to the sea. In this way, the boat owner can oversee his crew’s activity at sea. 
When captains are not boat owners, their trajectory is thus significantly controlled from the 
beginning to the end of the journey. These unbalanced relationships shape the connections that 
exist between land and maritime spaces, as the length and direction, and the departure and arrival 
places of the sea journeys depend on the funder’s requirements. The exercise of such distant control 
has the qualities of “durability, forcefulness and fidelity”, which conditioned Portuguese navigation 
in a similar way (Law, 2003).  
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From sea to land spaces: empowering land-based activities 
 There is a divide between sea- and land-based activities which has had significant 
consequences for the organisation of the fishing sector in Senegal. Ahmed reports that this divide 
has generated an division between the many fishermen who spend most of the year at sea and their 
land-based leaders, who are often retired or former fishermen. He mentions the difficulties 
fishermen meet because of Senegal’s administration and explains why he feels that the state do not 
believe that fishermen’s representatives are credible.  
Today I am not going fishing. I have not been going to sea for one or two years. 
Because I wanted to diversify my activities, as my brothers fish and I’m a bit educated, 
I stay on land. I manage the canoes ... Also, there are those organisations, you know, 
you don’t have the time to go fishing, you become a great ‘responsible’. Professional 
organisations, meetings [...] it takes time. 
Fishermen are not involved in decision making because, I think, on one hand, there is 
negligence by the fishermen who do not organise themselves very well [...] because if 
they were well organised, with a united voice, the state would listen to them. But, if 
there are a lot of voices, a lot of dispersion, but who is the state going to listen to? The 
only organisations recognised by the state are CONIPAS, the Union of the Mareyeurs, 
Unatrams, Unagems. But the real, real actors are not listened to by the state, because 
the state doesn’t know them. Hence, the necessary creation of our organisation. 95 
 
This “negligence” explains why fishermen are weakly represented and their interests inadequately 
defended. Fishermen lack the time and energy to organise themselves properly and elect efficient 
representatives because they spend most of their time at sea. For Ahmed,  
 The fisherman doesn’t care a lot; he does not feel comfortable. If he comes, he just 
sells his fish and goes home, without thinking of tomorrow. But this is changing; 
fishermen start realising the benefits of getting organised. ... There is a problem, a 
lack of time and overall tiredness. That is why you have to [...] if you have an 
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organisation, if I don’t stay on land to control business, it will be screwed. This is 
what encouraged me to stop going to the sea.96 
 Ahmed makes a clear distinction between land- and sea-based activities. He suggests that 
defending fishermen’s interests requires full-time, land-based involvement. Fisheries’ actors need 
active land-based representatives in order to keep control over – or at least get involved in – the 
decisions made at the institutional level regarding Senegal’s marine activities. This move of 
activities from sea to land has been empowering for Ahmed. He considers himself to be an 
effective leader as his education and maritime experience legitimate his representative function:  he 
says that “as my brothers are fishing and I’m a bit educated, I stay on land, I manage the canoes”. 
With his knowledge, Ahmed has become an active agent whose function links sea-mobile actors 
and land-immobile actors. As a boat owner, his personal financial resources and capital have 
enabled him to control at a distance the maritime mobility enacted by his brothers. As an 
organisation leader, his knowledge and land-based location embody efficient resources for the 
mediation of the power of sea-based fishermen who seek to have an influence on sea-related 
decision making.  
 Ahmed’s understanding of fishermen’s habits highlights their lack of awareness of the 
management of their income and inability to plan the future. Fishermen’s difficulties in saving 
money and managing their income in the long term often lead them to seek this external financial 
assistance. Ahmed explains that this situation is changing and that fishermen are increasingly 
tending to save money and invest in houses or land tenure rather than making unstable investments 
in fishing and sea activities. His statements demonstrate that fishermen’s personal savings make 
their maritime mobilities more independent. In fact, it is fishermen’s mobility that, paradoxically, 
strengthens their ability to accumulate savings to the extent that fishermen’s absences help them 
escape their demanding dependents and better manage their income.  
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3. Mobility as a key step for success 
 Sharing is part of the solidarity system in place in Senegal, and fishermen can be 
overwhelmed by demanding dependents. Similarly, returning emigrants who are believed to have 
become rich in Europe are expected to give a share of their income to their Senegal-based family 
once back home (Diome, 2006; Fouquet, 2008). Leaving has proved to be an efficient way to 
provisionally escape this demand and better manage one’s expenses. Nguyen-Van-Chi-Bonnardel 
recognises seasonal fishing migrations as a way for the fishermen to better control the family’s 
expenses while away fishing for several months a year (1980). Seasonal migration is a long-
established means for young fishermen to escape social pressures: 
It is therefore thanks to migration that fishermen can save money and consider 
investments for personal interest: get a wife, or two or even three, build a house or 
improve living conditions (with a fridge, a TV), get gear (engine and canoe) which 
will enable them to work independently for the time of the seasons far from their 
village of origin.97 (Nguyen-Van-Chi-Bonnardel, 1980: 274) 
 By the late 1970s, when Senegalese small-scale fishing economies started to be organised 
according to expanding migration patterns, families had developed a local economy ruled by the 
alternating seasons. When fishermen were working in their fishing villages’ local waters, their 
profits used to be entirely shared within the extended family. During the rest of the year, when they 
migrated to other parts of the country’s waters, these fishermen were entitled to keep and 
individually manage their entire income (Nguyen-Van-Chi-Bonnardel, 1980: 273). Through these 
arrangements, maritime mobility has become synonymous with independence and a new way for 
the fishermen to free themselves from the traditional – and sometimes pressurised – community-
based system. The ability to save money has become a sign of progress and personal development 
in Senegal. However, despite these opportunities for the fishermen to develop their saving abilities, 
respondents of this research often mention fishermen’s lack of ability to plan the future as a major 
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issue for Senegal’s coastal communities. A Saint-Louis-based Ministry for Fisheries retired official 
discusses fishermen’s saving ability: 
Fishermen don’t manage capital. They aren’t aware of their expenses... they just know 
what they earn. They struggle against boat owners but they ignore the nature of 
investment. Fishermen’s lack education on how to manage expenses. If they have a 
good shot, all their relatives come and ask for their share. But they don’t know how 
much they originally invested. The foreigner, the migrant, is better skilled at saving. 
Fishermen sell sardines at 1,500 francs [£1,90] and can’t keep and freeze them. So, 
when the fishermen go back to fishing, they will repurchase sardines and spend 8,000 
francs [£10].98 
 In addition to what young fishermen usually owe to their family after their fishing day, it is 
very frequent for housewives, unemployed sisters and brothers or close relatives to knock at the 
worker’s door and ask him for a bit of extra money. Refusals are socially denounced; money must 
circulate and be shared and distributed. Being at sea, absent and thus away from social pressure 
brings immediate autonomy and freedom to the sailor and leads to individual accomplishment. In 
this context, successful fishermen might avoid showing ostentatious signs of their wealth in order 
to minimise the potential jealousy of community members.  
 While walking throughout traditional Senegalese fishing villages, outsiders can barely 
notice wealth and success. The same really tiny and dusty streets can lead both to the poorest house 
in the village or to the house of the (unsuspected) richest fisherman in the country. One can learn 
after two weeks of regular visits to the same place that the lady who processes fish every morning 
sitting on the floor and with limited artisanal gear, surrounded by her four children and some goats, 
is in fact one of the wives of a very wealthy and influential fisherman in the region. In Hann, every 
path seems to lead to the same old fisherman, Faye. My respondents are all connected to this man 
and spontaneously mentioned him while telling their life stories. I found out that this man is the 
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richest fisherman in Senegal and owns no less than 40 houses in the village. He was born in Mbour 
84 years ago, moved to Hann, where he started to work as a fisherman, and rapidly took the steps 
of what became a unique success story. According to my local informant, this success finds its 
roots in the fact that this old man had no family around, because he was an immigrant in this small 
village. As a foreigner, he was better able to manage his income, was freed from community 
pressure and enjoyed the distance that separated him from his home village. This distance enabled 
Faye to save the financial resources he earned from fishing and to avoid the temptation of spending 
everything in traditional celebrations and family events. His success story started from a migration 
experience, when saving money and migrating seem to go hand in hand. 
 This fisherman has had 33 children with four different wives. He trained his sons to be 
fishermen so that this new generation would manage his canoes once he retired. Faye’s sons all 
worked on their father’s boats and live in their father’s houses in the neighbourhood. They have 
had different sea mobility experiences: they have fished or still fish in Guinea-Bissau and Guinea, 
or remained in Senegalese waters, and/or had an experience of illegal or legal migration to Europe. 
Faye’s sons have hired and trained the local fishing community members, like their father did with 
the previous generation. They are linked by the knowledge and experience which their father has 
passed on to them. By training and hiring young fishermen and investing in fishing gear and 
activities, members of this family have encouraged the local fishing economy and the spread of sea 
mobility patterns. This family has strengthened an influential network throughout the village and 
has become an essential reference for fishing-related successes both on the village scale and at the 
national level. 
 The elder, Faye, welcomes me into his house in the middle of the old village. A tiny one-
metre-wide dirt street leads to his house, where part of his family – a couple of wives, his daughters 
and grandchildren – live together in the greatest simplicity. His room is on the second floor, where 
he is waiting for me very simply dressed, seated on a mattress on the floor, although there are a 
couple of couches in the room. Apart from an honorific official distinction hung on the wall, 
nothing reveals that this old man has been a fishermen’s leader on the national scale for the last 30 
years. Although he is unable to speak French and can hardly read the Latin alphabet, he is one of 
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the closest advisers of the fishery minister and the founder of the National Federation of Senegalese 
Fishermen (FENAGIE). His lifestyle of material simplicity and non-ostentatious behaviour seems 
to have been essential for his personal success. When Faye came to Hann he was an external 
member of the community. This position enabled him to save his earnings because he was not 
expected to share his income with this community: it was well understood that his first priority was 
to provide a decent livelihood to his Mbour-based family. He explains how he was welcomed by 
the Hann community 60 years ago: 
I was born in Mbour in around ... 1927. I grew up in Mbour... I didn’t go to school. I 
spent all my youth at sea, that’s why I know the sea. I came here [...] I have done more 
than 60 years in Hann. I fished in Mbour, Joal, up to Sangomar point [...] I fished 
langouste in Gambia [...] I also spent some time in Kayar, but not that much. Then I 
settled in Hann, where I got married. I was trained in Mbour, very young, and I came 
here with my knowledge and my skills at sea. I was very much appreciated by Hann’s 
inhabitants... and that is why they were welcoming towards me. Everybody wanted my 
knowledge and that is why I then stayed in Hann after that. … Here in Hann, I was 
one of the first [fishermen] to get my own canoe, to become a boat owner. At this time, 
all those who had a canoe were actually using their parents’ canoe. I was the first in 
my generation to own a canoe.99 
 When I ask him about the reasons why he succeeded and eventually became the owner 
of so many boats and houses, the main reasons he puts forward are related to a reflective and 
mature management of income and investments:  
When I was young and working, everything that I was earning, I was investing it in 
land [...] At this time, there were people who were earning more than I was. Being 
reflective is better than being lucky [...] My houses make me live; whether the sea is 
working or not... Fishermen, even those who were earning more than me, all they did 
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was partying, getting married to women and distributing banknotes everywhere. Those 
who were wasting [money], they became poor before they died100.  
 On one hand, Faye gained better control over his expenses because he was a stranger in 
Hann’s local community. He became a famous fisherman with a great financial capital in part 
because he was away from his region of origin. On the other hand, he was bringing specific 
knowledge which in turn enabled him to gain a respected position and powerful influence within 
the fishing sector in Senegal. This specific knowledge is transmitted orally and relies on navigation 
experience and fishing techniques and skills. Oral communication prevails over written and 
academic knowledge in traditional societies in Senegal and makes easier and quicker the 
circulation of information. Most of the Senegalese fishermen left school early. Therefore, oral 
communication is more efficient than written communication because traditional working 
techniques are never written down. Faye’s skills were acknowledged, first by Hann’s community 
and then at the national level when he became one of the main fisheries minister’s advisers. Faye’s 
mobility has enabled the spread of a specific knowledge, which was rare in Hann’s new, 
welcoming environment. This knowledge has provided Faye with a secure and influential position 
among his new community. In turn, this mobility has also enabled the mobile actor to achieve 
independence regarding his financial resources management. This independence has been essential 
for him to become a multiple boat and house owner and an influential actor in the Senegalese 
fishing sector. Thanks to this mobility network, the old fisherman spread his knowledge and gained 
a respected position among his community. His position, in turn, assists the growth of his influence 
among other networks.  
 
 Finally, there are some parallels between the way fishermen manages their own expenses 
and the way they manage marine fishing resources. Through Alioune’s remarks, we notice that, in 
relation to money management or the exploitation of fish species, young fishermen’s behaviour  
reflects their inability to plan the future rationally :  
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We try to educate the young fishermen and tell them the damage they are doing to fish 
resources. We have to insist and mustn’t give up because the future is also for them. 
Everything we do, me, for example [...] the little I have earned from fishing, at least I 
have a wife, children, and a house. So if we locked the sea, today, I would still have 
two bedrooms to rent and would be able to have an income... but them [the young 
fishermen] they have nothing yet ... They are the future, these young people who are 
twenty, twenty-five years old. If we speak about protecting fishing resources, it’s for 
them but they are not aware of this ... We know what brought us to this situation, it’s 
because of us, the fishermen.101 
 Alioune’s comments highlight the way in which the sustainable management of sea 
resources goes hand in hand with a necessary, firm ability to save money and invest in long-term 
plans. Like Faye, Alioune invested his earnings from fishing in immovable property, aware that sea 
resources will always be unpredictable and unstable. These narratives also show that, in theory, 
there is not such a contradiction between becoming a successful and wealthy fisherman and having 
sustainable fishing practices. In fact, the rational management of sea spaces involves reflexive 
behaviour and a rational transfer of sea-related earnings into land-based, stable enterprises.  
 
Conclusion 
 Through these narratives, I have demonstrated how resources such as knowledge of fishing 
techniques, mobility and family networks enable the exercise of power on different scales. Family 
and community networks enable the exercise of power through the mediation function of resources 
such as knowledge and mobility. Sea mobility is controlled at a distance, while maritime mobile 
actors tend to gain greater control over land activities and decision-making processes. Senegalese 
long-distance maritime mobility is organised through networks composed of both mobile and 
immobile agents whose influence varies according to their social and economic position, education 
and geographical location. Long-distance control does not only express itself through fishing 
mobility patterns. Fishermen attribute a great power to their spiritual leader, who mediates long- 
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distance control over security and success at sea through talismans and other techniques.  Networks 
between spaces, actors and resources enable the mediation of power and manifest the constitutive 
spatiality of power theorised by Allen (2011).  
 These life stories gather together the main elements of Senegalese fishermen’s mobility 
and provide the basis for further study of today’s maritime mobility patterns in Senegal. Fishermen 
reproduce these mechanisms of power knowledge at the level of international maritime border 
crossings. Through their expanding mobility, fishermen have used their knowledge in a pragmatic 
way. The analysis of their maritime mobility now moves on to explore border experiences. 
Fishermen actively take part in the creation of maritime borderlands through processes of 
appropriation of border regulation practices and the shaping of sea spaces.  
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Chapter 6 - 
Living at the Senegal–Mauritanian Border 
 
 Since the beginning of the 1980s, fishermen from the northern Senegalese border city of 
Saint-Louis have met significant difficulties at the Senegal–Mauritania maritime border. While 
local fishermen from Guet Ndar – Saint-Louis’ famous traditional fishing village – had been used 
to freely fishing in Mauritanian waters, Mauritania has questioned this traditional free access by 
strengthening border regulation practices and applying strict fish resources protection measures. 
Today, the Mauritanian authorities deliver no more than 300 fishing licences to Guet Ndarian 
pelagic fishermen per year, whereas 3,216 canoes102 circulate every day around Saint-Louis. In 
Guet Ndar, there are hundreds of other pelagic and demersal fishermen who still want to fish in the 
neighbouring waters but who do not have legal authorisation to do so. These fishermen have 
developed strategies and tactics to cross the border despite Mauritania’s access restriction policy. 
They fish illegally beyond the border, migrate permanently to Mauritania or sign temporary 
contracts with Mauritanian fish traders (Marfaing, 2005).   
 This chapter shows that these tactics reveal fishermen’s deep knowledge and appropriation 
of Mauritanian border regulation practices. I argue that rather than coping with strong border 
regulations in a passive way, fishermen have become active border performers by diverting the 
initial dividing and restricting function of the border into something more profitable to them. In 
other words, their mobility has been a substantial means for them to become familiar with 
Mauritanian border control and marine resources protection policy. Moreover, Guet Ndarian 
fishermen legitimate their cross-border illegal mobility through the romanticisation of their 
practical knowledge. Because they call themselves the “nomads of the sea”, they remind us of the 
Deleuzian metaphor (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988). Given the way fishermen strategically avoid 
border controls at sea, it is tempting to see them as maritime nomads whose mobility is used as a 
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powerful means to escape state regulation. I argue that although drawing a parallel with the 
Deleuzian metaphor would give strength and meaning to fishermen’s movements, this comparison 
would also dismiss essential practical elements of Guet Ndarians’ mobility.  
 This chapter first explores the historical dimension of Mauritania’s border restriction 
policy and the relationship between this border closure and the Senegal–Mauritania border conflict 
of 1989. I then shed light on the different border-crossing tactics of the Guet Ndarian fishers. 
Finally, I examine the way local fishers see their own mobility. I interrogate their claims to freely 
fish in Mauritania and question the nomadic nature of their movement. 
 
1. The Senegal–Mauritania maritime border from 1981 onwards 
 The geographical specificity of the Guet Ndarian fishing village and its proximity to the 
border have made the local fishermen economically dependent on their access to Mauritania’s 
waters and intensive exploitation of these neighbouring fishing grounds (Map 5). The 1989 border 
conflict between Senegal and Mauritania and Mauritania’s recent interest in developing the 
national fishing economy instigated the progressive border restriction measures aimed towards the 
Guet Ndarian fishers.  
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colourful boats (Photograph 16) occupy most of the shoreline all along the spit of land, which 
makes fishing a central activity and the sea a continuous stage for intense activity. Public 
infrastructures such as drinkable water, electricity, health, main roads or sewage facilities are 
extremely limited. The Guet Ndarian community suffers from high levels of poverty whereas its 
economy seems to be increasingly entangled in a vicious circle in which a growing number of 
fishermen compete over decreasing fishing resources. Land scarcity prevents the local villagers 
from alleviating this economic situation with agriculture, and the lack of fishing resources in the 
nearby Senegalese maritime grounds do not attract the local fishermen as much as the Mauritanian 
waters. Guet Ndarian fishermen have always fished in Mauritanian waters as the border is located 
only three kilometres away, in the north of the village. Whether territorial or maritime, the border 
has marked Guet Ndarian minds and the village’s life mainly turns in its direction. 
 
  
Photograph 14: Streets of Guet Ndar,  
Saint-Louis, July 2012, J.H. 
 
Photograph 15: Getting ready for a fishing trip,  
Saint-Louis, July 2012, J.H. 
 
 
Photograph 16: The many colourful boats on the spit of land,  
Saint-Louis, July 2012, J.H. 
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 The Senegalese media often report troubles occurring at the maritime border between 
Senegal and Mauritania. These troubles are getting more serious and always involve Senegalese 
fishermen getting caught by Mauritanian coast guards because of their illegal fishing activities in 
Mauritania’s waters. As fishermen like to say, the border is so close that it is difficult for them to 
realise when and where they cross it. The first decisive event revealing the tensions at the border 
occurred in 1997, when a conflict between Guet Ndarian fishermen and Mauritanian coast guards 
caused one death and several injuries among the fishermen (O. Diop, 2004). Although these 
conflicts at the maritime border reflect a specific local context, these troubles are related to the 
long-standing tensions between local Mauritanian and Senegalese populations, which resulted in an 
international border conflict in 1989.  
Long-standing tensions at the Mauritania–Senegal border and the 1989 conflict  
 The Mauritania–Senegal border area has been shaped by land-based movements of 
populations between the two sides of the Senegal River since the pre-colonial period (Santoir, 
1990). Local conflicts and tensions have marked the relationships between Fulani and Maures 
ethnic groups, which have long cohabited in the region. At the end of the nineteenth century, the 
relative peace brought by the settlement of French colonists encouraged the move of a number of 
Fulani peasants up to north of the Senegal River (Santoir, 1990). Willing to keep control of the 
ambitions of the Maures – who were mainly settled in the north – towards southern territories, the 
French encouraged a geographical and ethnical division and aimed to sedentarise Fulani farmers at 
the southern side of the Senegal River (Santoir, 1990). According to Santoir, through this ethnic 
governance, the French colonial power acknowledged the domination of the Maures on the 
northern side of the river. Despite this local governance, Maures and Fulani peasants still continued 
migrating to and from each side of the river. The cohabitation between these two different ethnic 
groups happened with a varying degree of peacefulness until the end of the 1980s. In 1973 and 
1985, serious drought increased these migration patterns (Santoir, 1990), encouraging flows of 
Fulani peasants to move to the northern – thus Mauritanian – side of the river. From the mid-1980s, 
tensions arose in a context of drought, great pressure on land, pasture- and land-use-related 
125 
 
conflicts, political instability in Mauritania and import bans on Senegalese agricultural products in 
Mauritania (Stewart, 1989). These tensions were not only felt at the local level of the border; they 
spread among Mauritanian communities settled in Senegal and among Senegalese communities in 
Mauritania (Stewart, 1989).  
 On the 9 April 1989, two Senegalese (Fulani) peasants were killed during riots in the 
Senegalese border town of Diawara. This decisive event launched a series of repressive acts of 
violence upon Mauritanian immigrants in Senegal on the one hand, and Senegalese immigrants and 
Wolof communities in Mauritania on the other hand. The conflict spread on a national scale and led 
to an ethnic “purification”, generating the expulsion of 170,000 Maures from Senegal to Mauritania 
and 70,000 Senegalese from Mauritania to Senegal (OECD, 2010). Senegal argued for the 
redrawing of the border further north than the current border, legitimating its view of the supposed 
ambiguity of the original 1933 drawing of the border that divided – and still divides – the Senegal 
River into two parts  (O. Diop, 2004; Stewart, 1989). Despite attempts at negotiation and the 
intervention of other African countries and Europe, diplomatic relations between Senegal and 
Mauritania were interrupted for around two years from August 1989. Although a large-scale war 
was avoided, these violent events traumatised both Mauritanian and Senegalese populations. These 
tensions undoubtedly affected the cross-border maritime movement of the Guet Ndarian coastal 
fishing communities.  
Mauritania’s access restriction measures aimed at Senegalese artisanal fishers 
 Marfaing shows how the Senegalese fishermen progressively lose the lead they had been 
taking over the Mauritanian fishing economy until 1989. They have become simple migrant 
workers obliged to avoid and challenge border controls since then (Marfaing, 2005). In and around 
Ndiago, which is a village located next to Mauritania’s southern border, the Wolof population had 
spread independently from political and juridical constraints until 1989. Also, Mauritanian waters 
had been poorly exploited by its nationals until that same period. The Imraguen were – and still are 
– the only Mauritanian ethnic group who specialise in small-scale fishing, with a very small 
proportion of catches (1% in 2004, Marfaing, 2005), making the Wolof fishermen (originally 
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Senegalese) the leaders of Mauritania’s fishing economy. Therefore, until the events in 1989, most 
of the fishermen fishing in Mauritanian waters in the border area were either Senegalese from 
Saint-Louis or from the village of Ndiago (Marfaing, 2005). After 1990, the Mauritanians became 
the biggest group of fishermen exploiting these grounds  (H. Diop & Thiam, 1991). Indeed, most of 
the Wolof population, including fishermen, had been deported back to Senegal in 1989, and Saint-
Louis-based fishermen had then seen their movement limited by the border closure. In parallel to 
the 1989-conflict-related decline of the Wolof population in Mauritania and the restricted access of 
Saint-Louis-based fishermen to Mauritanian waters, Mauritania started developing a growing 
interest in the national fishing economy through the exploitation and preservation of its fishing 
grounds. 
 Through the declaration of the development policy for the fishing sector in 1987, 
Mauritania recognised the great potential of its national waters in terms of fishing exploitation and 
started developing its maritime activities.  Later, through a sector policy letter in 1994, the 
Mauritanian government started encouraging private industrial fishing companies, developed its 
own national fishing fleet and launched the building of fishing infrastructures in Nouakchott in 
1996 (Governement of Islamic Republic of Mauritania, 2013; Marfaing, 2005). In this context, 
Mauritania has increased economic agreements with foreign countries and fishing companies for 
the exploitation of its fishing grounds in exchange for financial backing from the signatories 
(Catanzano & Rey Valette, 2002). In parallel to these developments, Mauritania sought better 
control and regulation of the national fishing resources and started establishing restrictions for 
access to its waters by implementing a fishing licence system, directed at Senegalese nationals, in 
2001.  
 The 1983 maritime convention signed by Senegal and Mauritania is the first decisive step 
for the management of maritime resources and small-scale fishing in the borderland (Convention, 
1983; Marfaing, 2005; Ouled Touileb & Hadj Sidi, 2009). This convention establishes the rules for 
the fishing activities of both countries in the territorial waters at each side of the border. It aims to 
ease cooperation and optimise the exploitation of natural resources in the area. This legal 
framework requires the Senegalese and Mauritanian fishermen to hold the valid authorisations that 
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are usually required by their respective countries in order to fish in the neighbouring country’s 
waters. The fishermen who temporarily settle in camps must seek approval of the planning of their 
fishing activities from the authorities of the country whose waters they aim to fish in.  Although 
this agreement has a limited scope and only aims to implement a bilateral juridical framework, it 
demonstrates Mauritania’s emergent interest in the potential of its maritime environment and 
constitutes the premise of the further fishing licence system which the country launched in 2001.  
 Although diplomatic relations between Senegal and Mauritania had improved, tensions 
were still felt at the maritime border in 2001. Marfaing argues that further negotiations between the 
two states regarding the management of fishing resources truly started after a Senegalese fisherman 
was killed by a Mauritanian border agent while he was trying to flee back to his national waters in 
2001 (Marfaing, 2005). Mauritanian agents circulate at the border, and have a right to pursue 
people, which allows them to follow the fishermen beyond the border and arrest them in 
Senegalese waters when necessary. On the 25 February 2001, Senegal and Mauritania signed a 
yearly renewable convention in Nouakchott that stipulates that 300 pelagic licences can be sold to 
Senegalese fishermen, thanks to which they are allowed to fish for a maximum of 40,000 tonnes of 
exclusively pelagic species, except mullet, per year (Application Protocole, 2008; Martín, 2010).  
The cost of these licences varies from €115 euros to €228 – depending on the size of the boat – and 
they are sold to the Guet Ndarian fishermen through the fishery services of Saint-Louis 
(Application Protocole, 2008). The protocols signed by Senegal and Mauritania after this are ruled 
by this 2001 convention. Each year since then, new protocols have amended the original regulation, 
and it seems that access to Mauritanian waters and resources has become more restrictive. These 
measures were enforced through the application protocol signed on the 26 March 2008 by the two 
states: in addition to what is stipulated in the 2001 regulation, fishermen must also land 15% of 
their catches in Mauritania before heading back to Saint-Louis’ fishing wharf (Application 
Protocole, 2008). The fishermen who are entitled to buy a Mauritanian fishing licence must hold 
regular Senegalese fishing permits. As the last protocols stipulated that fishermen had to land and 
sell a part of their catches in Mauritania, they therefore organised themselves and take turns in 
fulfilling this obligation – except when they infringe the protocol.  
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Conflicts and arrests of fishermen at the border 
 Conflicts and arrests of fishermen at the Mauritanian border involve both pelagic and 
demersal fishermen operating illegally in Mauritania. The former either do not respect the clauses 
of the bilateral agreements or fish outside authorised fishing times, whereas the latter do not hold 
licences at all as the Mauritanian authorities do not sell demersal fishing licences. 
 The renewal of pelagic licences is conditional on their requirements being respected by 
Saint-Louis fishermen. For example, fishermen’s disrespectful behaviour towards some clauses of 
the agreement led the Mauritanian government to suspend these licences for a month in April 
2011.104 After these licences had expired in August 2011, in December some Guet Ndarian 
fishermen who were still fishing in Mauritanian waters had been subjected to stronger penalties 
such as the seizing of catches, gear and fuel, and some of the boat captains were sent to 
Mauritanian jails. Mauritanian border patrols seized 15 boats in the surrounding areas of Ndiago 
that month. Once back in Senegal, the fishermen organised themselves and assaulted the 
Mauritanian border agents at sea in order to get their gear back.105 As a response to the at-sea 
assault, the Mauritanian patrols fired on the fishermen, injuring 5 of them and arresting 23 
others.106 At the same time, the Saint-Louis fishing community was oppressing the Senegalese 
administration to negotiate new agreements with the Mauritanian authorities and release the 
fishermen and fishing gear.107 In January 2012, the Mauritanian coast guards fired on 4 Guet 
Ndarian fishermen who were fleeing back to Senegalese waters, although they were about to get 
arrested because they were fishing illegally in Mauritania.108 Licences were eventually renewed 
until August 2012.  After that, fishermen had to wait until June 2013 to get new licences and be 
allowed to fish again in Mauritanian waters. This 2013 protocol is stricter than the previous one. 
The fishermen must pass back and forth past the Mauritanian land-based checkpoint of Ndiago in 
order to make their route visible to the Mauritanian border agents. Furthermore, the fishing period 
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now extends from early June to August, while it could have lasted from 6 to 9 months in the 
previous agreements. In addition, the fishing area is reduced and covers the fishing grounds from 
Ndiago to the south of Nouakchott.109  
 Purse seine boats represent only a small proportion of the entire small-scale fishing fleet of 
Saint-Louis. The issues raised by the pelagic licences are therefore only a visible part of this whole 
border problem. The invisible part of the problem is that most of the rest of this local fleet mainly 
target demersal species and fish illegally in Mauritania. In spite of the fact that the Mauritanian 
government restricted the licences for fishing for pelagic species, this major local fleet is 
potentially willing to fish in Mauritania. From June 2009 to December 2011, the Saint-Louis 
fishery services reported that 128 Senegalese fishing boats had been seized and were still detained 
by the Mauritanian authorities (SRPS - CSSC, 2011). This report stated that only 16 boats were 
purse seine boats belonging to fishermen who had been arrested while fishing without licences, 
whereas the other 108 boats were either net and line small fishing canoes or ice-box fishing boats. 
These statistics do not reflect the everyday illegal movements of hundreds of demersal fishermen at 
the border. They only reflect the disproportion existing between purse seine and small fishing 
canoes’ activities: the latter are far more numerous and work extensively beyond the border. The 
election of President Macky Sall in March 2012 has had positive effects on these ongoing tensions. 
The president obtained from the Mauritanian authorities the release of 150 canoes and 180 engines 
which Mauritanian border patrols had been seizing from Senegalese fishermen who had been 
fishing illegally since 2008.110 Finally, these conflicts reveal the strategies fishermen have 
developed to win the game. In-depth narratives inform us about the way these distinct strategies 
operate. 
 
2. Strategic adaptation scenarios: challenging the border 
 When they do not hold pelagic species fishing licences, fishermen use different routes to 
cross the Senegal–Mauritania border. The narratives of Guet Ndarian fishermen have revealed 
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three main strategies111 which involve risky long-distance maritime journeys off Mauritanian 
coasts, temporary migration to Mauritanian camps and everyday illegal movements of small 
demersal canoes. Through their everyday cross-border mobility, fishermen give meanings and 
functions to borders, sometimes in an unexpected way, and become active producers of borders. 
Fishermen develop what De Certeau calls “tactics” in response to border control strategies (Adey, 
2010; De Certeau, 1984). Guet Ndarians challenge border control practices by spreading and using 
their own mobility in a pragmatic way that reveals a process of re-appropriation, a strategic use of 
the sea space and a deep knowledge of Mauritanian agents’ mobility. Moreover, for Rumford it is 
essential to “see like a border” rather than “seeing like a state” (2011; 2006) – reframing Scott’s 
famous title. Rumford discusses four arguments. First, one must adjust one’s “geographical” point 
of view while considering borders. Second, a scholar should not reduce borders to their state 
functions but should rather consider other border work, uses and effects:  
Borders are not necessarily always working in the service of the state. When seeing 
like a state one is committed to seeing borders as lines of securitized defense. Borders 
do not always conform to this model. In a desire to shore up what may be perceived as 
the ineffectual borders of the nation-state border-workers may engage in local 
bordering activity designed to enhance status or regulate mobility. (Rumford in 
Johnson et al., 2011: 68) 
 
 Borders can generate unexpected effects and, instead of stopping mobility, they might in 
fact unwillingly encourage it. Rather than limiting the mobility of the fishers, Mauritanian border 
regulation has pushed the fishermen to take detours and become increasingly mobile in order to 
avoid controls. The third argument raised by Rumford puts forward the possibility that these non-
institutional actors can become active “border producers” and take advantage of the border 
                                                     
111
 In 2012, I was invited to stay in Gokhou Mbati, the northern village on the spit of land, with the family 
of Abdoulaye, a retired fisherman who works as a fish trader in Dakar and whom I previously interviewed 
there. Abdoulaye moved to Dakar a couple of years ago and settled with his second wife, while Fatou, the 
first wife, remained in his family house in Saint-Louis, with her mother and sisters-in-law. Her sons and 
nephews came back and forth from their fishing trips while she was looking after the youngest children 
during the day 
131 
 
situation. In this sense, the empowering impact of organising or benefiting from border crossings 
will also be considered here. Guet Ndarians develop particular skills and knowledge while 
organising illegal maritime border crossings of which they can financially and socially take 
advantage. These advantages result in gaining better knowledge and control of marine resources 
and of their own mobility. Finally, for Rumford, “‘Seeing like a border’ leads to the discovery that 
some borders are designed not to be seen” (in Johnson et al., 2011: 68). 
 The invisible dimension of the border especially applies in the context of maritime 
borderlands where geographical and territorial border markers are particularly weak. As a result, 
this invisibility becomes an advantage for the everyday crossers as moving border practices adjust 
to the unstable marine environment in an unpredictable way. Fishermen not only play with the 
invisibility of the borderline at sea but also develop invisible border-crossing tactics to avoid 
potential controls.  
 
Risky long sea journeys off Mauritania  
 Fishermen choose the strategies used to reach Mauritanian waters depending on their 
fishing techniques and habits. One of them consists of organising a long and risky sea journey and 
reaching international waters as far away as possible from border patrols. This strategy implies 
spending at least 10 days at sea in rough conditions and risky navigation in high seas. Fishermen 
generally use 20-metre-long wooden boats, 2 engines, navigation instruments such as GPS devices, 
a depth sounder and a compass, and they also have enough food supplies and water for the entire 
crew. Large crews of around 13 to 15 fishermen leave Saint-Louis with stocks of ice and fuel so 
that they can afford to remain for long periods of time at sea (similar to long fishing journeys to 
Guinea-Bissau). These fishermen line fish and target high-value demersal species which they sell 
on the Senegalese market. They circumvent the border area over hundreds of kilometres and then 
head north. Two young crew members about to embark in an ice-box boat who are used to fishing 
illegally off Mauritanian coasts explain how they avoid these controls: 
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 We navigate 200 kilometres heading to the west and 500 kilometres to the north, 
almost up to the Moroccan border, next to Nouhadibou. It’s a 48-hour journey. Then 
we spend 4 days fishing. We don’t have licences. Mauritania only gives licences to net 
fishermen. ... If we had the possibility of getting licences, we would buy them, because 
our journey would be shorter. Instead of navigating 200 kilometres to the west, we’d 
only do 20 kilometres, without any trouble. ... If we get caught by Mauritanian patrols, 
they seize fishing gear, like fuel, engines and they keep it. They’ll keep the captain as 
well and will say that it’s a kind of “theft”, that it’s theft. They keep him in jail for 
around one month or two, I don’t think it’s normal.112 
 
 Circumventing the border area is expensive in terms of fuel, gear and food supplies. The 
farther fishermen go, the less likely they are to get arrested. Fishing-canoe owners can spend 
£1,300 in fuel and £400 in supplies for a 10-day journey, and the canoe generally costs £13,000. In 
relation to their investment, fishermen also consider the risks of getting caught or having their gear 
seized. The young fishers report that the captain’s arrest causes trouble for his crew, who remain 
unemployed until the captain is released. These crew members consider Mauritanian penalties to be 
abnormal and claim that they are willing to pay licences and fish legally, were Mauritania to sell 
them demersal licences. What is not normal for them is the fact that it is impossible to get legal 
licences. For them, this impossibility gives legitimacy to their illegal fishing trips because, 
whatever the law says, it seems that they would go fishing in Mauritanian waters anyway. It was 
revealing in this interview that these two young fishermen almost never mention Senegalese border 
patrols and state agents. Management of fishing mostly remains a Mauritanian issue: 
The Senegalese marine [...] I can’t see it. But for me [...] in the case of the licences [...] 
the state must take its precautions. When we are asked to show a licence, we must give 
money. The two states must do the negotiation. Speaking about the [Senegalese] 
marine [...] some do that: they [the Mauritanian agents] ask you to come and fish in 
their area for two days. You will pay each day between 100,000 francs [£125,000] and 
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50,000 francs [£62,500] but beyond these two days, if you stay more than two days, 
they will catch you. ... It’s like business, a manner of doing business. There are people 
[coast guards] who look after this area, over there, around Ndiago, almost 20 
kilometres up to the north, they do this [the Mauritanian guards]. 113 
 For these fishermen, the alternative to their long-distance fishing trips off Mauritania 
would be to agree to pay bribes for two days of illegal – but peaceful – fishing in Mauritanian 
waters. Nevertheless, for them, the longer and riskier 48-hour sea trip to the west is a safer 
solution in terms of arrests, although the initial investment is more important than for the other 
solution, which is the negotiation of bribes that are part of the initial investment. The Senegalese 
state remains quiet on the contested bribing practices of the Mauritanian agents, attempting to 
keep diplomatic relations with Mauritanian authorities in a favourable condition.  What is striking 
is the impunity of these crew members’ discourse. It would be legitimate for them to ask the 
Senegalese government to prevent Mauritanian agents from asking local fishermen to pay bribes, 
although these same fishermen are fishing illegally. These fishermen do not question the illegal 
nature of their mobility practices; rather, they complain about the way these “illegitimate” border 
regulation practices have pushed them to become illegal fishers. 
 In 2012, a Guet Ndarian informant reported that at least 11 ice-box canoes were regularly 
following this long-distance fishing trip strategy. In this case, border practices have a strong effect 
on fishermen’s mobility. This strategy requires mental and physical strength as well as great 
navigation skills, but it is financially profitable and provides better opportunities for individual 
enrichment.  
 
Contracts with Mauritanian fish traders 
 Secondly, some fishermen are legally hired by Mauritanian “businessmen” – as the Guet 
Ndarians call them – who hold valid Mauritanian fishing licences. These Mauritanian fish traders 
own private licences they buy from the Mauritanian government and use the Senegalese workforce 
and its reputed knowledge to fish in Mauritanian waters. They recruit in Saint-Louis. These 
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licences enable small crews of demersal fishermen to cross the border legally with their own 
fishing gear and reach one of the isolated camps along the coastline in Mauritania. Hired fishermen 
spend one or two months there, depending on the season and the availability of fish species. They 
fish in Mauritanian waters and sell the fish to the Mauritanian fish traders. Around 100 fishermen 
regularly live in each of these camps. Senegalese fishermen mention 3 of the 7 camps reported 
from the south to the north of Mauritania (Bakhayokho et al., 1988). These camps have names such 
as “PK 28, 65 or 105” – which refer to the distance that separates them from Nouakchott114 – and 
lie somewhere between the desert and the sea. The Senegalese fishermen who temporary live in 
these camps do nothing but work, eat and sleep during the time of their contract. They are 
dependent on their employers, who determine the prices of their catches and who keep a monopoly 
over the sales. Access to these camps is often restricted by their geographical isolation, which 
makes the fish traders the only potential buyers around. As a consequence, fishermen generally sell 
them the fish at a lower price than they would in Senegal. 
 Ibou is a middle-aged fisherman who has been working for the Mauritanian fish traders 
since 1981. I met him in his Guet Ndar-based family house. Although he lives in a remote area of 
Saint-Louis with his wife and children, he spends most of his time in Guet Ndar when not at sea, 
which enables him to maintain a strong link with his geographical and social roots in Guet Ndar. 
He describes the strategies he has been developing to face the decline of fishing resources in 
Senegalese waters. He started fishing in 1971, and became the owner of his first boat in 1981. 
Today, he owns three line-fishing boats and navigates up to the south of Nouakchott on a regular 
basis. According to him, Mauritanian fish traders keep full control of these camps: 
Each month, I pay 260,000 francs to the Mauritanian authorities; it’s a licence but 
they don’t sell them directly to the fishermen [...] They control everything, via the 
Mauritanian marine who comes and controls the camp. I have already had troubles 
with the Mauritanian marine. They often come at sea; they find you, they look at the 
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fish you caught and say that you were not allowed to catch this fish [...] when we get 
the net out we are not sure whether we can or cannot catch the fish. So, you pay, 
despite your licence, and if you don’t pay, they take you with them and force you to 
pay a huge amount of money. But if you give money, they let you leave … I don’t like 
this life in the camps. But I have no choice. You go fishing, you come back, have a rest 
and do exactly the same the day after. ... We are obliged to live this life there; under 
the tents, you have no information, no right to get out, no right to speak with whom 
you want.115 
 The Mauritanian camp “organisers” bring rations of bread, rice, biscuits and water every 
day to the crews and leave with the daily catches. Ibou complains that apart from playing cards and 
drinking tea, the hundreds of fishermen living in these camps do not have any other entertainment. 
Guet Ndarian fishermen are often tied by debt to the fish traders. If they have no funding for their 
fishing activities at the beginning of the fishing season, they might have to ask for a loan, so the fish 
trader will then take his money back at the moment of buying catches from his fisherman-employee. 
Indebted fishermen are obliged to work for him as long as money is due (Marfaing, 2005). 
Nevertheless, this austere way of life does not prevent the fishermen from keeping contact with 
their Senegal-based families. When I ask Ibou how easily he can call his family when he is the 
camps, he reports the following, with a very natural and familiar way of referring to the camps: 
Yes it’s easy. Camp 65, you speak as you want. 93, it’s not good, the quality is not 
good. 28 neither. But, 65, there are antennas [for mobile phones] everywhere over 
there.116 
 Like other migrant workers who spend time abroad, away from their community of origin, 
these fishermen are a masculine workforce that has left the family behind, keeping in touch through 
communication technologies and doing nothing but working and expecting, on the last day of their 
contract, to go back home. To compensate for this constrained mobility, Ibou does not hesitate to 
infringe the law as well as break the agreement that ties him to the fish traders. In fact, despite this 
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legal framework which migrant Guet Ndarians benefit from for their fishing activities in 
Mauritanian waters, they easily circumvent it. Although they are not legally allowed to sell the fish 
in Senegal, fishermen might go back to Saint-Louis with some of their catches in their canoe and try 
to avoid border patrols. Ibou gives a precise account of his cross-border mobility tactics: 
Here [in Senegal], on a good day, I can sell up to 250,000 or 300,000 francs [£300– 
£360]. A fishing day sold here is worth 3 fishing days sold in Mauritania. So, 
sometimes, of course, I come back to Senegal if I have fished in Mauritania, of course. 
... I have a licence, the border is very close, so if the marine guards [want to] arrest 
me, I can still go back to Nouakchott in the camps. If not, in the night, you pass, the 
border is very close [...] If I get caught, they take my fish catches, my boat, my engine, 
everything. But this has never happened.117 
 Ibou takes advantage of the geographical position and economic role of the border. 
Although he is legally hired in Mauritania, he clearly states how valuable it is to cross the border 
illegally and go back to Senegal to sell his fish instead. Here, the border was at first an obstacle that 
forced him to leave his household for several months each time he signed a contract, but it has 
since become a way to give more value to his daily work. The risks of getting caught are lower than 
when using the first strategy. Crews always have the possibility of turning back and heading to 
their camps if the marine approaches once they are very close to the Senegalese border and about to 
cross it illegally and go home. Again, it is difficult to provide a precise assessment of these 
movements. According to Ibou’s statement, if each of the three camps regularly hosts 100 fishers, 
then it can easily be assumed that at least 300 Senegalese fishermen follow this strategy. Like the 
first strategy of distant fishing off Mauritania, these cross-border migration movements remain 
minor. The less-organised, illegal cross-border movements which other Guet Ndarians undertake 
everyday are more frequent and are observable from the beach. 
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Gambling at the border every day 
 In the third scenario – the most common one – fishermen simply cross the maritime border 
by night on board small fishing canoes, hoping to escape coast guards. They do not even seek to get 
proper licences and just spend the night fishing on the other side of the border, coming back early 
the next morning. A locally active fisherman leader introduced me to Pape, a retired fisherman 
willing to share his experience of the border. Pape walks me to the northern fishing wharf of 
Gokhou Mbati, next to the Mauritanian borderline. From our viewpoint on the beach, we can 
observe dozens of boats casting off in the sunset, as well as dozens of immobile lines of small 
fishing boats offshore, waiting for nightfall before discretely approaching the Mauritanian border 
(Photograph 17). He explains that hundreds of fishermen cross the border every night and come 
back early in the morning to sell the Mauritanian fish at Saint-Louis’ market.  
 
Photograph 17: Guet Ndarian fishers who have just left the spit of land and are waiting  
for the sunset before heading to Mauritania, Saint-Louis, July 2012, J.H. 
 
 Pape has been fishing for the last 30 years. He explains the various techniques he has been 
developing to avoid border patrols. Pape confirms the two fishermen’s statements above, saying 
that fishermen can pay bribes of around £40 to be left in peace for 3 days by the border patrols they 
have been negotiating with. They are still arrested when “the supervisor of the border agents comes 
and controls”, he says. When I ask him what his techniques are to avoid getting caught, he 
explains: 
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I’m clever, I’m very clever. Me ... as a great fisherman ... if you are not a great 
fisherman like me [...] I know at what time you are on patrol, where you go out. I tried 
not to cross during patrolling times. Ndiago border patrols, they are on patrol one 
day, at the most, and over less than 50 square kilometres. A patrol boat never goes 
beyond 50 square kilometres. I know the limits of each camp control, I know what 
area they control. To catch me, you would have to spend two days at sea.... Two 
navigation days, [because] beyond two navigation days, I know a bit less about the 
patrol times.118 
 Pape is very familiar with the location of every Mauritanian checkpoint. As with many 
fishermen who take the risk of crossing the border illegally, he has adjusted his mobility 
according to the specific knowledge he has acquired over time: 
There is a dangerous point [...]18 kilometres away [...] It’s Ndiago [...] the checkpoint 
[...] the Mauritanian guards [he points it on the map]. We’re heading further west [...] 
We navigate 15 kilometres to the west [...] at night, not during the day. From Ndiago 
till Sam [...] there is another border checkpoint [...] there is another border patrol 
there [...] So we stay offshore. Sometimes we used to go fishing there until we saw 
border patrols starting pursuing us. 119 
 
 When fishermen started using GPS devices, they could navigate away from the coastline 
by night to maximise their chance of not getting caught. Without GPS, they need to follow the 
coastline and take note of landmarks to orientate themselves. These new navigation technologies 
have enabled them to better escape controls as they now feel more comfortable navigating 
offshore. Once they reach latitudes they want to fish in, they head back in the direction of the 
coast, where fishing grounds are less deep and where rocks host valuable fish species. These 
strategies are very risky as fishermen turn their light off, navigate at night, in high seas and on 
board small fishing boats which are not appropriate for high-seas navigation. Like most of the 
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fishermen on the spit of land, Pape is very proud of being a fisherman and a great sailor. He puts 
forward his knowledge of the sea and his experience to explain how he can escape border 
controls. His geography of the sea is clearly constructed according to his knowledge of 
controlled areas and patrol schedules.  
 These three strategies bring to the fore the ambiguous functions of borders. Borders are 
spaces of value, extraction and control, and are spaces of expertise and knowledge. They both 
unify and divide, and have an opening and closing function (James Anderson & O’Dowd, 1999): 
They are at once gateways and barriers to the “outside world”, protective and 
imprisoning, areas of opportunity and/or insecurity, zones of contact and/or conflict, 
of cooperation and/or competition, of ambivalent identities and/or the aggressive 
assertion of difference. (James Anderson & O’Dowd, 1999: 595)  
 The Senegal–Mauritania border becomes an “area of conflict” for the fishermen who are 
arrested when they attempt to cross it illegally. By circumventing the closing function of the 
Mauritania–Senegal border, fishermen have changed the border into an “area of contact” and 
“opportunity”. Moreover, fishermen’s experiences demonstrate the ambiguous limits of the 
Mauritania–Senegal border. The borderline is certainly a geographical frame around which 
border patrols and fishermen organise and legitimate their mobility. However, this border area is 
better understood as 
 frontiers, territorial zones of varying width which stretch across and away from 
borders, within which people negotiate a variety of behaviours and meanings 
associated with their membership in nations and states (Martinez 1994; Prescott 1987; 
Herzog 1990 cited in Wilson & Hastings, 1998: 9). 
 
 The shape of this maritime borderland results from the relationships linking or opposing 
borders agents – whether they are state or non-state actors. Opportunities for negotiation provide 
flexibility for the application of border regulation practices – through bribes – which makes 
every border crosser a potential producer of a border. The moving nature of the maritime 
borderland makes more complex the drawing of an objective borderline. When, why and how 
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fishermen are arrested often remains obscure for the fishermen. In the Saint-Louis fishery 
services’ report, for 51 of the 128 arrests fishermen are unable to explain the reasons why they 
were arrested. The other 77 knew they had been arrested because they were fishing illegally 
(SRPS - CSSC, 2011). One cannot affirm whether the fishermen pretend not to be aware of the 
current regulations or whether they were truly fishing in Senegalese waters and thus unfairly 
arrested by Mauritanian agents. What is more certain is that fishermen are fully aware of the 
border location at sea, as their narratives have proved. In fact, it seems that both the fishermen 
and the Mauritanian border patrols take advantage of the maritime nature of this borderland and 
the resulting lack of external control and transparency. Beyond these strategies and tactics lie 
fishermen’s strong claims to fish in Mauritanian waters. Their determination to continue 
crossing the border illegally results from these specific claims and a strong local fishing identity. 
 
3. When knowledge and experience justify illegal practices: romanticising mobility 
 One could be tempted to give the mobility of the Senegalese fishermen the value of a 
nomadic movement that avoids the sedentarising ambitions of the state authorities. Since the Guet 
Ndarian fishermen call themselves “the nomads of the sea”, a Deleuzian approach seems attractive. 
Contemporary mobility-related research stresses the way mobility has started taking a positive 
value (Adey, 2010; Cresswell, 2006; Sheller & Urry, 2006). Deleuze and Guattari’s nomadic 
metaphor contributes to this valorisation of mobility by making mobile subjects idealised actors 
who resist state agents. Guet Ndarian fishers do celebrate mobility as a way of life, a meaningful 
strategy to avoid border patrols and look for fish catches, and, more indirectly, as a powerful means 
to gain autonomy and free oneself from community pressure. Their own romanticisation 
undoubtedly gives legitimacy to their illegal cross-border movement. I first investigate their claims 
and then discuss the application of the Deleuzian metaphor in this context. Although the metaphor 
is useful in the sense that it gives meaning and power to fishermen’s mobility, its application 
entails dismissing the high risks fishermen are exposed to when circumventing border patrols.  
 Fishermen fish in Mauritania not only because – as they often repeat – they have no other 
option as Senegalese waters have been emptied, but also and mostly because they claim some kind 
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of moral and historical sovereignty over these neighbouring waters. They have acquired a specific 
practical knowledge of these areas over time, which they consider has been jeopardised by the 
political events of 1989. Furthermore, fishermen from Saint-Louis romanticise their own mobility 
and local identity. This romanticisation gives strength to their discourse and legitimacy to their 
movement.  
 In an interview I conducted in March 2012 in Saint-Louis, a national leader of the CNPS – 
one of the leading professional organisations of Senegalese fishermen – summarises in his own 
words the changes which have affected fishermen’s movement at the border: 
I can say that populations from Mauritania and Saint-Louis were parents, and still, 
they are still parents. If you go to Nouackchott, you will see my family there and 
Mauritanian people have family here as well. Once upon a time, there was no 
interdiction over the two areas. So, we did some research in Mauritanian waters 
because, at this time, everybody knows that Mauritanian people didn’t want to be 
fishermen. They didn’t like the fish. So, us Guet Ndarian, we did all the research, and 
we are those who showed them all the rich fishing places. ...  
 
There was peace, we were going back and forth, and there was no difficulty. One day, 
in 1989, there was a conflict between Senegal and Mauritania, and this is when we 
started having trouble. The merchants who were living here in Senegal, they left for 
Nouakchott, and the Senegalese who were fishing in Nouakchott came back here; they 
were repatriated. ....  
 
The Mauritanians started getting interested in fishing [...] at this time, they were hiring 
Senegalese: when a Senegalese fisher left there, he was given four Mauritanians so 
that could teach them how to fish ... and when they started to know how to properly 
fish, how they are supposed to do it, they started imposing the law forbidding access to 
their waters [...] and this is normal. So, they started doing this, and as we were not 
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used to fishing in Senegalese waters, we started having trouble with the coast guards... 
we can say from 1992 on [...] until today.120  
 
 This narrative gives an account of how knowledge was transmitted from Senegalese 
fishermen to Mauritanians through teaching practices. For this leader, this knowledge transfer 
enabled the Mauritanians to recover sovereignty over the sea space and progressively regulate the 
mobility of the Guet Ndarians. Later on, this leader claims that Guet Ndarians should fully benefit 
from their “customary law” and be exempted from this “illegitimate” border regulation: 
Our ancestors [...] they were those who found the rocks, the fishing places of 
Mauritania. So, at least, if we look at the law, we have a customary right. This is it [...] 
One day, they say, “No, you cannot even enter into Mauritanian waters”. We know 
that Mauritania is a republic, like Senegal; we know that [...] but also, we have 
customary rights, at least, because if someone makes progress to find fishing places 
[...] since [...] let’s say [...] before the creation of Mauritania and Senegal, before 
independence or even much before, we deserve this right. Then, the other reason [...] 
between Mauritania and Saint-Louis, we are not only neighbours, we are family. ... 
We need licences to go on fishing, like what they are doing with European boats. ... 
Whereas they speak about pelagic fish, whereas what we want are licences for 
demersal species [...] We want Mauritania to know that they should be selling licences 
to us [...] what Guinea-Bissau, Guinea Conackry and Sierra Leone do, why 
Mauritania doesn’t do it?121 
 
 Although this leader acknowledges the existing regulations, he places fishermen’s practical 
knowledge above the legal norms and gives it legitimacy so that it justifies the cross-border 
mobility of him and his compatriots. The law he is referring to and that gives them a “customary 
right” is the fishermen’s traditional regulation. This customary law he is referring to reveals 
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power–knowledge relationships: their practical knowledge enables an appropriation of the border 
to occur. This viewpoint was shared by many of the fishermen I interviewed in Guet Ndar during 
this field session. For example, one of them – who is nicknamed “Rapat” in reference to his 
repatriation experience – confirms the leader’s statement: 
I was repatriated in 1989 during the conflict. I had spent a lot of time in Mauritania. I 
had been going there back and forth since 1969. After the conflict, I was deported, and 
once in Saint-Louis, we were called “Rapat”: Mauritanians didn’t know the sea. We 
were the first to show them. Without us, Mauritania wouldn’t know that the sea is 
interesting. Thanks to us, they became the first fishermen.122  
 Because fishermen developed their skills there, because, as they say, they showed the 
Mauritanian people the value of their fishing grounds, they claim a “right” to freely go there. These 
statements give more complexity to the general assertions which are usually put forward regarding 
this border issue. Indeed, the fishermen do not ignore the norms; they acknowledge the existence of 
the border and its location. Rather, they question the legitimacy of its drawing. Also, Guet Ndarian 
fishers base their relationships to these foreign spaces more on the social and family links that tie 
them to the Mauritanian people than on external political constraints, which Guet Ndarians give 
less value to. The Guet Ndarian CNPS leader goes on with his explanations, and justifies 
fishermen’s illegal practices with reference to their reputed professional experience: 
I can say [...] It’s the university of small-scale fishery, here in Saint-Louis. Any 
fisherman we can see [...] which we call a fisherman [...] he passed through Saint-
Louis [...] But we knew nothing else; apart from fishing, we had no other experience. If 
we go fishing, you look at the sea and see it is not rich, but we have our experience, 
our own techniques to get fish even though there is nothing; it’s a gift of God. The 
others can’t do this; if you go on with your interviews, you will see that the other 
fishermen all had a field. Their ancestors were not fishermen, they were cultivators. 
When you go further south, each fisherman can show you his field. If the sea isn’t 
working, they go and cultivate their land. ... 
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We don’t have this means, and we want it because if we had land, we wouldn’t go on 
putting 5 million francs in Mauritanian waters and losing them when we get caught. 
They take 5 million; it is not a small amount of money.  So the experience we have, we 
use it, and this is why people say we don’t respect the fishing rules. Yes, we do respect 
them, because if we didn’t respect the fishing rules, we would be those who would die 
[...] us [...] those who know nothing apart from fishing [...] So, the importance of 
preserving the fishing resource, we should do this. But yes, we have our experience to 
get the fish; it’s a gift God gave us – this is it. For example, a pupil from primary 
school can’t teach a student of the university or high school, it’s impossible.123  
 
 These lines show the relationships between several human and non-human elements which 
legitimate fishermen’s movements at sea. This leader’s discourse mixes practical knowledge and 
experience, financial resources, God, fish species, the sea, Guet Ndarian fishermen and the other 
Senegalese fishermen and the fishing rules. Indeed, because Guet Ndarian fishermen had no land 
they could exploit, they turned most of their activities towards the sea. This made them develop a 
specific experience and practical knowledge which the other fishermen – who were used to 
alternating their activities between sea and land spaces – did not develop. The God whom the leader 
is referring to has made them become highly skilled fishermen precisely because they originally 
lacked land spaces and had to exploit the sea. Consequently, they started to manage sea spaces 
much better than anyone else and have developed some abilities which enable them to cope with 
resource scarcity. Thanks to the fishing techniques this leader is referring to, Guet Ndarians have 
been able to find fish even in times of crisis. Also, according to him, Guet Ndarian fishermen do 
respect the rules and are unfairly accused of not doing so. In his opinion, fishermen have their own 
way of managing the sea and its resources and they do acknowledge Mauritanian rules, fully 
agreeing with the need to preserve the environment. Therefore, questioning their ability to follow 
the rules means questioning their experience and knowledge of the sea – and this leader seemed 
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very sensitive on this point. However, state rules have less value than fishermen’s own rules, 
although both the fishermen and the Mauritanian state aim to preserve the sea; he stresses how it is 
in the interest of the fishermen to protect their environment, as their livelihoods rely on it. 
 This narrative shows how the very strong identity of the Guet Ndarian fishermen has been 
constructed upon this practical knowledge. The leader compares the fishing village with the 
“university of fishing”, which means that he is referring to a very specific and high level of 
knowledge transmission. As a consequence, the other fishermen who do not pass through Guet 
Ndar over the course of their career are not “real” fishermen. Guet Ndarian fishermen maintain their 
own reputation of being highly skilled, untouchable figures, and they construct a local myth. This 
romantisation of their mobility legitimates their lack of consideration for state rules, giving them 
immunity – at least in the eyes of God.  
 
 The mobile response of Mauritanian border patrols to the intensified mobility of the 
fishermen is reminiscent of Atkinson’s case study of nomadic Libyan populations whose mobility 
was used as a strategy against the Italian colonial power (Atkinson, 2000). In the1920s, the Italian 
colonial army adopted mobility strategies similar to those of Libyan nomads and semi-nomads in 
order to impose its control over them. Mobility itself therefore became a powerful weapon against 
which the Italian army fought by deploying comparable strategies (Atkinson, 2000). Although here, 
fishermen do not explicitly claim their resistance to border controls, their mobility strategy produces 
the same effect: a mobile response constantly adjusted to their unpredictability. Do these similarities 
with land-based nomadic populations make the Guet Ndarians authentic maritime nomads? 
Atkinson and Sharp suggest a careful use of the nomad allegory. These authors highlight that the 
nomad metaphor should be set in a situated context in order to avoid the risk of 
“romanticism”(Atkinson, 2000; Sharp, 2000). 
 
Maritime nomads? 
 For Deleuze and Guatarri, nomads progress in “smooth spaces” which are characterised by 
their absence of limits, points and lines. These smooth spaces are the opposite of “striated” spaces, 
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which are based on defined networks and routes whose fixity delimits and structures continuous 
movements (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 382). Because of its unpredictability, the movement 
produced by nomads represents a threat and has to be subjected to state control. Throughout 
Deleuze and Guattari’s Treatise on Nomadology, the nomad is conceived of as a “war machine”. 
The action of “striating” spaces can be illustrated by the way states organise, denaturalise and 
structure territories in order to spread their domination and control spaces. The nomad challenges 
states’ spatial control by being in a continuous movement that leaves no tracks on spaces. The 
nomad progresses at a different speed and time and has a different way of moving which the states 
attempt to freeze by erecting “fortresses” that would “kill” the nomad movement, the nomad 
himself and his speed, and would annihilate at the same time the threat he represents (1988: 386). 
Where are these smooth spaces? Deleuze and Guattari localise them as such:  
Smooth or nomad space lies between two striated spaces […] being “between” also 
means that smooth space is controlled by these two flanks, which limit it, oppose its 
development. (1988: 384)  
 Because the sea is a “smooth space par excellence” (Deleuze & Guatarri, cited in Steinberg, 
2001), the figure of the nomad progressing on maritime “smooth spaces” is comparable to the 
image of the Guet Ndarian moving across the maritime border.  The regulation and tracing of the 
mobility of the fishermen would then be seen as an attempt by the Mauritanian state to “striate” the 
maritime border area through control and regulation practices.  Furthermore, Deleuze and Guattari 
suggest that nomads may also control striated spaces. Fishermen’s maritime knowledge produces a 
different kind of spatial control at the borderland and therefore constitutes another form of 
“striating” action. This metaphor brings to light the differences in the conception of spaces, and in 
the juxtaposition of spaces and the production of frictions and conflicts occurring on the marine 
surface. It can also explain the inefficiency of Mauritania’s security practices aimed at controlling 
the Senegalese fishermen and the way they can exploit the flaws and loopholes of the border system 
through their unpredictable mobility.   
 Fishermen’s strong local identity makes them proudly claim that they belong to Guet Ndar. 
Although their mobility spreads on a wide, limitless maritime environment, it always moves 
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according to fixed points. Guet Ndar’s narrow village and high population density contrasts with the 
open ocean space, although it remains an essential, immobile step towards fishers’ mobility. 
Moreover, Mauritanian border agents do not seek to sedentarise Senegalese fishermen. They rather 
seek to exercise control over the sea and its resources through their mobile border practices by 
indirectly attempting to control fishermen’s mobility. Also, fishermen do not always successfully 
avoid these patrols. These risks involve serious consequences, as they might lose their boats, their 
engine or their crew members to Mauritanian agents. Needless to say, the weather conditions they 
are exposed to when navigating off the coast are further risks they must be prepared for. Stories of 
fishermen who get lost or in trouble when fishing in high seas are often reported in the Senegalese 
media. With no life jackets or radio aboard, risks undoubtedly increase. These practical elements 
nuance the nature of the “smooth” space and give the impression that the sea is a still surface which 
highly skilled nomads would manage anyway. Although fishers’ extended knowledge and courage 
is celebrated every day among their community, they are also exposed to dangers and risks.
 Despite their reputed knowledge of navigation techniques, Guet Ndarians often meet 
serious difficulties at the mouth of the Senegal River. When they are back from their fishing trips, 
they must find access to the Senegal River through its very narrow and moving mouth, paying 
attention to the strong tides and currents. They adjust their trajectory according to the moving 
sandbanks and breaking waves’ line around the mouth. Boats must get through the mouth one by 
one and navigate slowly. There are no buoys, marks or visible signs that help navigation; fishermen 
orientate themselves according to the sand dunes and water depth. Once in the Senegal River, 
fishermen navigate up to Saint-Louis’ local fishing wharf. In March 2013, 23 fishermen drowned 
when three boats collided with each other at the mouth of the Senegal River.124 Local online 
newspapers reported that in a 10-year period, around 200 fishermen have died while trying to reach 
the Senegal River’s unstable access point.125 Local fishermen explain that the Senegal River’s dam 
has generated the moving topography of the mouth. The dam traps the sediments carried by the 
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river and prevents the sedimentation of the mouth. As a consequence, sea currents and swell more 
easily erode the coastline.126  
 More generally, the 2005 census reported that over 5 years in Senegal, there were 2,622127 
serious navigation accidents involving artisanal fishers in and beyond Senegalese waters (ISRA, 
2006). These accidents involved capsizing, collision, fire on board and drowning. In most cases, 
these accidents would have been avoidable had the fishermen been following minimum safety 
practices. According to the census, only 38.8% of the long-distance fishing boats registered in the 
cities located between Dakar and Saint-Louis (la Grande Côte) had communication means on board 
(ISRA, 2006). The report is not more precise on whether these communication means included 
radios and satellite phones or mobile phones only. During my two field sessions, I did not meet any 
fisherman who had a radio on board. In high seas, mobile phones do not work and radio and 
satellite phones would be the only reliable communication means in case of difficulties. Regarding 
navigation lights, the census reports a partial use of them by the fishermen; in la Grande Côte, only 
50% of the boats had such lights on board (ISRA, 2006). The lack of consideration for safety 
practices reflects the way fishermen give significant value to their practical knowledge. However, 
the romanticisation fishermen apply to their own skills has generated tragedies at sea. Considering 
them to be maritime nomads would participate in this romanticisation and tend to minimise these 
significant empirical elements. 
 
Conclusion 
 Guet Ndarian narratives take part in the construction of an idealised identity of great 
navigators, nomads of the sea, which political borders are not able to stop. For these reasons, they 
have been able to develop several adaptation strategies to circumvent the border and take advantage 
of its geographical situation and socio-economic value. Crossing borders and challenging political 
regulation not only means increased mobility and sophisticated navigating techniques. The wide 
ocean border space has become a space of freedom, knowledge production, opportunities and 
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independence but also a space of insecurity, arrests, navigation accidents and death. Fishermen’s 
romanticisation of their movement gives a powerful, positive meaning and value to their mobility. 
It is certainly true that the statements of the fishermen can influence one’s perception and 
encourage this romanticisation. The discourses of the Guet Ndarian fishermen do not especially 
demonstrate that they openly resist the border regulation. Rather, they elude them, although this 
undoubtedly results in an increased mobility which might be indirectly apprehended as a resisting 
behaviour. They certainly contest the legitimacy of Mauritania’s border regime, but would also 
agree to respect the rules, were they adjusted to their needs.  
 The Mauritania–Senegal maritime border issue brings to light the power–knowledge 
relationships which have shaped fishermen’s mobility in a myriad of ways. Fishermen’s narratives 
have illustrated their pragmatism through the different tactics they develop at the border. 
Nevertheless, the lack of consideration for safety practices and the overestimation of their 
knowledge make us question this pragmatism. In fact, fishermen’s pragmatism seems to be more 
adjusted to border control practices than to the priority of protecting one’s life. Beyond these 
borders, fishermen acquire expertise in foreign fishing grounds. The next chapter explores the 
construction of the geography Senegalese fishermen have made of the neighbouring waters, and 
compares their practices in Mauritania, Guinean and Bissau-Guinean waters. Crossing borders has 
produced a genuine knowledge of maritime spaces.  
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 Chapter 7 - 
 Constructing Maritime Spaces Beyond Senegal 
 
 Senegalese demersal fishermen started to follow maritime routes to Guinea-Bissau and 
Guinea at the beginning of the 1980s (chapter 3). These mobility patterns increased at the end of 
that decade with the movement of some Guet Ndarian fishers who gave up their maritime activities 
beyond Mauritanian borders. Since then, several thousand fishermen have migrated by sea to these 
countries, coming back and forth from Senegalese shores without landing at any foreign wharf128. 
As in Mauritania, fishermen have had to adjust to political regulation of sea resources in these 
southern countries’ territorial waters, and they have accepted these regulation measures more easily 
than in the north, at the Mauritanian border. This chapter draws a comparison between fishermen’s 
practices in Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau and Guinea’s waters. Through this comparison, I aim to 
explore the meanings and functions fishermen give to their cross-border mobility in distinct 
economic and political backgrounds.  
 I first argue that whether in Mauritania or in Guinea-Bissau and Guinea, fishermen’s 
practices beyond borders reflect both an individualisation and a rationalisation of their mobility. 
Furthermore, access policy measures relating to fishing grounds have an impact not only on the 
trajectories of the fishermen but also on the way that these fishermen apprehend foreign maritime 
spaces. In each of these foreign spaces, fishermen develop appropriation tactics in relation to 
maritime spaces as well as illegal practices. The way fishermen legitimate these practices varies 
depending on the political and historical background of the relationships between Senegal and the 
country in whose fishing grounds the fishermen operate, and on fishermen’s own interests. Indeed, 
I will show that, for example, fishermen’s mobility discourses on their practices in Bissau-Guinean 
and Guinean maritime spaces carry a more rational and less affective dimension than when dealing 
with the Mauritanian border. This comparison further expands the argument that fishermen are not 
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marine nomads. Fishermen’s mobility progresses according to lines, fixed points and “pragmatic 
geographies” of remote areas beyond national borders. Moreover, although fishers tend to disobey 
state regulation and fish illegally in restricted areas, they are not reluctant to accept state regulation 
per se. When they perceive profitable opportunities, they prove able to accept legal frameworks and 
are willing to make significant investments to fulfil legal requirements. 
 The chapter first examines the specific aspects of Senegalese fishing mobility in southern 
waters beyond Senegal’s borders and then compares fishermen’s appropriation practices in 
Mauritania, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau. Fishermen’s appropriation of maritime spaces involves the 
creation of a practical knowledge which fishermen express through a powerful symbolic language 
that I decrypt on the basis of Michel De Certeau’s work on the “practice of everyday life” (De 
Certeau, 1984).  
 
1. Rationalising border crossings in Guinea-Bissau and Guinea 
 In Dakar, Mbour and Joal and the coastal villages of Casamance, Senegalese demersal 
fishermen prepare themselves for long fishing trips off Guinea-Bissau and Guinea all year long. 
What fishermen’s experiences show is that these maritime journeys are profitable and rational 
strategies. This rationalisation is based on experience, knowledge and navigation techniques and 
implies their ability to adjust to and respect foreign regulations. This rationalisation makes the 
fishermen modern seamen connected to land-based needs. This image contrasts with the archaic, 
nomadic nature previously claimed by the Guet Ndarian in Mauritania – although in this case, a 
similar level of rationalisation is required for the long-distance fishing-trip tactics that aim to 
circumvent the Mauritanian border (chapter 6). In most cases, preparation for the fishing journey 
first involves buying a regular licence from Guinea-Bissau’s and Guinea’s respective 
administrations that gives them the right to fish legally there. 
 
 
 
152 
 
Legal access to southern waters 
 Although the drawing of the Senegal–Guinea–Bissau border was questioned by both 
countries after the independences (Diaité, 1995), today the borderland remains a peaceful space in 
comparison with the Senegal–Mauritania area. Conflictive interests in the potential exploitation of 
maritime resources at the border divided Senegal and Guinea-Bissau and led both countries to a 
common management agreement in 1993 (Diaité, 1995). This agreement establishes the rules for a 
common regulation and exploitation of the marine resources – such as oil, gas and fish, which 
might be found between the azimuths 220° and 268° – excluding territorial waters (Bilateral 
Agreement, 1993; Bonin, Le Tixerant, & Ould Zein, 2013). This agreement does not affect the 
regulation of foreign artisanal fisheries in Guinea-Bissau since these activities are ruled from 
elsewhere. Indeed, from 1996 onwards, Senegalese fishermen’s migration to Guinea-Bissau has 
been regulated by a protocol which Senegal and Guinea-Bissau jointly signed in 1995 (Application 
Protocole, 1995). Before this agreement, the Senegalese fishermen used to go to Guinea-Bissau’s 
waters independently from any political intervention. Like Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau started to 
regulate access to its waters by imposing fishing licences on both national and foreign fishers. 
Costs for these licences are higher for foreign fishers and increased every year until 2010. In that 
year, the Guinean authorities reduced the cost of these fishing licences from XOF 1.5 million 
(£1,880) to XOF 757,500 (£948) in order to make access to these licences easier for the foreign 
fishers and thus prevent illegal fishing (Deme, Bailleux, & Ndiaye, 2012).  
 Regarding Guinea, no protocol was signed; foreign small-scale fishers therefore directly 
depend on the national fishing regulation policy and must buy similar licences to the Guinean 
nationals (Papa Gora Ndiaye & Samba Diouf, 2007). Guinea’s small-scale fishing fleet has not 
developed as much as Senegal’s. Guinea’s national maritime grounds have mostly been exploited 
by international artisanal and industrial fishers. Following the discovery of nearly virgin demersal 
stocks in Guinean waters by foreign industrial trawlers, Guinea started liberalising its fishing 
economy from 1985 onwards. Since then, the country has mainly turned towards international 
exports, developed its national artisanal fishing fleet and signed international agreements with 
industrial and artisanal fishers (Papa Gora Ndiaye & Samba Diouf, 2007). 
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 Apart from occasional conflicts between fishermen and border patrols within Guinea-
Bissau, the management of Bissau-Guinean and Guinean waters has raised no major issue since 
1995. Senegalese fishermen have regularly been seeking to buy legal licences so that they can fish 
in these foreign waters. Although they might be caught while fishing in forbidden spaces or 
catching species they are not entitled to, the Senegalese fishermen generally seek to regularise their 
activities in these waters. They buy licences from the authorities, either through Guinea-Bissau and 
Guinea-based brokers or through the Senegalese authorities. Although these licences are expensive, 
they are more accessible for the fishermen and less limited in quantity than the Mauritanian ones. 
Guinea-Bissau’s licences allow the fishermen to fish demersal species for a year, from the 1 
January to the 31 December. In 2010 and 2011, most of the Senegalese fishermen bought their 
licences through Bissau-Guinean brokers and some of them got into trouble, as although these 
licences were legal, they were originally meant to be sold to Bissau-Guinean fishermen 
exclusively.  The Bissau-Guinean brokers sold these local fishing licences at the price of foreign 
ones; consequently, the Senegalese fishermen were convinced that they were fishing legally. Many 
of these fishermen were arrested at sea by Guinea-Bissau’s border patrols, were sent to jail and had 
their catches and gear seized, and the Senegalese government attempted to negotiate with the 
authorities of Guinea-Bissau to release these fishermen.129  
 
 Fishermen also reported that the local coast guards took advantage of this recurrent issue to 
arrest fishermen despite them holding legal licences.130 Therefore, in January 2012, the Senegalese 
national fishery services started providing support to the fishermen so that they could get regular 
licences from the Bissau-Guinean authorities.131 All along the Senegalese coasts, from Dakar to 
Casamance, local state agents gathered the requests of the fishermen as well as the required 
financial funds so that they could get proper licences directly from the Bissau-Guinean authorities. 
The head of the small-scale fishery department in the Ministry for Fisheries reported that only 17 
crews had formally requested this official service since the beginning of 2012. This official stresses 
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that since it was the first time this service was provided, some crews preferred to keep hiring a 
Guinean broker. The Senegalese administrative process is reputed to be long and would make the 
fishermen lose time out of their yearly time schedule of activities.132  
 In Joal, Assane is a former fisherman who owns nine ice-box canoes and manages an 
informal company of international maritime fishermen. He negotiates legal Bissau-Guinean fishing 
licences for his crews with a reliable Bissau-Guinean broker he has been working with for a couple 
of years now. For him, as these arrangements have been proved to work, there is no reason why he 
would ask for the help of the state to get these licences. Also, he says, fishermen “have been 
waiting for two months, while the [Bissau-]Guineans don’t wait. The Senegalese state should be 
responsible for this and have an office everywhere.”133 Another fisherman reports that when crews 
are ashore, waiting for these licences, costs can be up to XOF 30,000 (£ 37.50) a day to maintain 
them: 
The only fisher who contacted the administration [to get a licence] here in Joal had to 
wait for a month and a half; the others were not that patient. You know, the ice-box 
canoes are money-consumers [...] they waste money. You can’t stay a month without 
going fishing. Because charges increase every day, every day the crew is here, you 
can spend from 20,000 to 30,000 francs [£25 to £37.50] a day. If you multiply this by 
thirty… then this doesn’t suit us, so we are in a hurry to sort out the licence issue and 
go fishing. So if the administration is ready for next year, maybe we’ll consider this, if 
it is safer this way.134  
 This narrative reflects the level of rationalisation of international mobility, which has thus 
far not been compatible with the lack of reactivity of the Senegalese administration despite recent 
efforts at support by the state. Just as it does for the Mauritanian pelagic licences, the Senegalese 
state acts as an intermediary which seeks to ease the relationships between foreign administrations 
and small-scale actors. This role, although expected by the fishermen, is still weakly adjusted to 
fishermen’s realities. These weaknesses of the Senegalese administration in providing an efficient 
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response to these long-distance fishermen reflect the lack of available and reliable quantitative data 
informing these maritime migration patterns. 
 
The quantitative assessment of demersal fishermen’s international fishing mobility 
 Assessing the precise number of fishermen who circulate between Senegalese and Bissau-
Guinean and Guinean waters remains a difficult task and brings to light contradictory and 
unrealistic results. Failler and Binet estimate that around 15,000 migrant fishermen go back and 
forth from the Senegalese coasts today (Failler & Binet, 2010: 98). The authors do not indicate the 
sources of their estimations or the direction and fishing areas of these maritime migrations. Are 
these migrants temporarily migrating and settling in foreign countries in order to fish? Are they 
international maritime migrants going back and forth to Senegal without landing in foreign 
countries? We do not know either whether this estimation includes Guet Ndarian fishers who used 
to fish in Mauritania. A 2011 FAO report more realistically estimates that around 1,500 Senegalese 
fishers regularly go fishing in the Guinea-Bissau exclusive economic zone (Weigel, Féral, & 
Cazalet, 2011). Table 4 provides details of these migration patterns. However, a 2012 report based 
on official 2009 data gathered from the Senegalese scientific institution CRODT135 contradicts 
these estimations and believes that 390 canoes go to Guinea-Bissau and Guinea with legal licences 
(Table 5). This quantity implies that around 3,120 fishermen are involved in these fishing trips – 
assuming that the minimum average number of crew members is 8. According to both reports, the 
demersal species fishermen usually target sharks, rays, red porgy, soles, sea breams, red snappers, 
groupers, barracudas, threadfins and jacks. 
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Table 4: Senegalese fishing migrations in Guinea-Bissau and Guinea, 2011 
(Source: Weigel et al., 2011: 21) 
Origin 
Quantity 
of 
canoes 
Species 
targeted 
Crew 
members 
Time of year Fishing areas 
Niominkas 
from the 
Saloum 
Delta 
130 Baracudas, 
threadfins, 
jacks 
1100 From March to 
November 
Bolama Bijagos 
Archipelago Biosphere 
Reserve 
From December 
to February 
Southern Guinea-
Bissau’s EEZ and north 
of Guinea 
Lebous 
from the 
Cape Verde 
peninsula 
and Saint-
Louis 
50 Soles, sea 
breams, red 
snappers 
and 
groupers 
300 From February 
to October 
Bolama Bijagos 
Archipelago Biosphere 
Reserve 
From 
November to 
January 
Southern Guinea-
Bissau’s EEZ and north 
of Guinea 
Casamance 20 Shark 
finning 
150 All year long Southern Bolama 
Bijagos Archipelago 
Biosphere Reserve 
TOTAL 200     
 
Table 5: Senegalese fishing migrations in Guinea-Bissau and Guinea, 2012 
 (Source: Deme et al., 2012) 
 
Area of 
origin 
Quantity of 
Canoes Species targeted 
Mbour 175 Soles, coastal demersal species 
Joal 50 Barracuda, sharks, rays 
Hann 30 Grouper, sea breams, red porgy 
Elinkine 60 Sharks and rays 
Ziguinchor 75 Soles, barracuda 
Total 390   
   
 These assessments may be biased by the fact that the place of origin of the captain, the 
place where he was interviewed for the field researches for these reports and the places where he 
embarks and lands his catches vary greatly. However, those biases do not explain such differences. 
What is certain is that several hundred canoes and their respective thousands of crew members 
regularly reach the Bissau-Guinean and Guinean waters. Nevertheless, the results I gathered from 
local field actors are closer to those in the 2012 report.136 Although according to field actors the 
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number of ice-box canoes has increased over the past few years, the total number of fishermen 
reaches nowhere near 15,000, as mentioned by Failler and Binet (Failler & Binet, 2010). 
 
Getting prepared for long fishing expeditions 
 The trajectory which fishermen take at sea depends on a combination of economic, 
political and social elements. Fishermen do not drift aimlessly at sea, looking for new fishing 
places each time they embark. Their mobility follows precise trajectories at sea adjusted to a 
limited time period. Departure places depend on the availability of ice and bait, whereas landing 
places are chosen – with the funders when the captain is in debt – according to the prices which 
catches can be sold at. The choice of the fishing route is made according to a combination of 
fishing licence requirements, relationships to state agents and regulation practices, and catches’ 
market value. As I have shown in chapter 5, when boat owners or funders are not aboard, crews 
might be tempted to land their catches in fishing wharves other than those initially agreed with their 
funders and hide part of their profits there. In this way, crews that are in debt can earn more than 
the initial share calculated at the end of the fishing expeditions and after the sale of the catches.  
 These long and exhausting sea trips are empowering in terms of financial gains and 
acquiring expertise, although their apparent under-sophistication can sometimes be surprising 
(spending two weeks at sea without landing, with a crew of 12 people, on a 20-metre-long 
motorised wooden canoe, with no room to lie down properly and very limited hygiene facilities 
promises to be a rough trip). This striking ambiguity between an apparent archaism and lack of 
development of a traditional fishing community and a genuine dynamism and rationalisation of the 
fishing activity is visible at the local level of Hann’s fishing wharf. Hann is a very crowded (and 
attractive) fishing wharf due to the proximity of ice factories, fish-processing factories, Dakar’s 
central market and an international airport. It lies next to the fishing village of Hann, which is 
barely paved and is where the community slowly organises everyday life. In contrast, the wharf is 
very strongly connected to the rest of the world as thousands of tonnes of fish caught by traditional 
fishermen outside Senegal’s EEZ are landed here every day (Photograph 18). Once back from their 
two-week fishing expeditions, fishermen hire local workers to hand carry (or rather “head carry” – 
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Photograph 19) the ice-boxes full of expensive fish species from the shore up to the wharf. The 
local fishing wharf’s employees then take the temperature of the frozen fish and boxes are sent to 
the nearby conditioning factory and destined for export to Europe and Asia. There is a striking 
contrast between this apparent simplicity and lack of proper infrastructure of the fishing wharf and 
the international destiny of the valuable fish.  
       
Photograph 18: Negotiating prices in Hann  
wharf’s international section, June 2011, J.H. 
 
Photograph 19: Landing catches in Hann,  
June 2011, J.H. 
 
  In Hann, I was introduced to long-distance fishermen by a local CRODT agent in charge 
of surveying the local fishing activity. Twice a week, with his small team, he interviews returning 
captains about their catches (species, weight), fishing places, routes, equipment and time spent at 
sea. This agent had been working with the fishers for more than 10 years. I took advantage of his 
position and followed him a couple of times on the beach. Usually at this time of the day, fishers 
are very busy and under pressure as they are negotiating the price of their catches. In Hann, 
fishermen who are back from a fishing trip to Guinea-Bissau know they can sell their catches at a 
good price as the local market is equipped to export products to inland Senegalese areas, as well as 
to West Africa, Europe and Asia. There, they can also prepare for their next voyage by stocking up 
on petrol, ice, food and other equipment.  
 These maritime expeditions are based on a rational calculation of the costs and profitability 
relationship that they involve. No matter how long and costly these fishing trips are, as long as they 
generate at least as much profit as needed to get the original investment reimbursed, fishermen 
consider these expeditions to be profitable. Assane started fishing abroad in 1983, leaving for a 
couple of days at first and then for up to 15 days, with ice on board to keep the fish fresh. In Joal, 
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he saved what he had been earning from fishing and progressively invested in fishing gear. He 
became one of the empowered land-based actors I described in chapter 5. He progressively gave up 
his sea activity to dedicate his time to the management of his fishing activities from land. Assane 
hires more than 120 people and provides the entire funding for these fishing trips (licences, fuel, 
gear and ice and so forth). The scale of this informal company implies that this former fisherman 
holds capital of at least XOF 20 million (£25,000) at the beginning of each working year. With this 
amount of money, he can provide funding for the yearly licences and expenses for the 15-day 
fishing expeditions of 9 crews, as each crew needs about XOF 1.5 million (£1,880) for expenses. 
This 20 million does not include the value of the fishing gear. For example, a 20-metre-long 
wooden canoe is generally worth XOF 10 million (£12,000). This former fisherman is leading a 
very profitable company; he has been able to buy new gear and houses each year despite the 
significant costs implied by this activity. Although fishing expedition costs have increased, Assane 
keeps investing in these trips. 
 Fishermen sometimes work in pairs (navigating with two canoes) during these expeditions 
and take turns in case there is a problem at sea. These methods also allow them to transfer their 
catches from one canoe to the other and commute between the remote fishing place and the landing 
area in Senegal so that they can sell the fish at a good price – although the fish is kept frozen in ice-
boxes, the faster they sell it, the better the price they will get for it. Unless they are obliged to do 
so, during their expedition they never land at the country whose waters they are fishing in. In 
Guinea, the licence is slightly less expensive, with a cost of around XOF 200,000 (£250). However, 
reaching the Guinean fishing places involves higher fuel costs and navigation times and 
consequently less time spent fishing. As a result of these circular movements, the fishing 
expeditions never last more than 15 days as this is the maximum time for which the fish can be 
kept fresh.  
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Illegal fishing activities: anticipating risks 
 Although migrant fishermen generally seek to be in a compliant situation when fishing in 
southern countries, they might be tempted to circumvent the law. As in Mauritania, similar 
practices of illegal fishing – by the fishers – and abusive controls – from local border agents – 
occur in Guinea-Bissau and Guinea. Fishermen might catch species other than those they are 
entitled to (shark finning) or make incursions into protected and restricted areas. Whereas 
fishermen tend to legitimate these illegal practices by their claim on Mauritanian marine grounds, 
in Guinea-Bissau and Guinea, they instead justify their illegal incursions by citing their need to 
make the fishing trip profitable with regards to the initial investment. Fishermen include the risk of 
getting caught in the calculation of the fishing expedition’s profitability. When they assume they 
hold a valid licence (but have very likely been sold invalid licences by their unreliable brokers), 
they are still exposed to possible gear and fuel seizure by border agents. One of the Hann fishermen 
reports: 
There are problems with controls and surveillance. With the licence [...] [In Guinea], 
sometimes they come to tire you out because you are a stranger. We are obliged to 
give 200,000 or 300,000 francs [£260 or £400] They do this to scare us; it often 
occurs.
137
 
 Since they are at sea in a foreign country, fishermen do not have a lot of breathing space 
for negotiation. All these interactions occur at sea and are thus hidden from social controls. 
Fishermen and maritime control agents are isolated on this marginal space, which gives the 
fishermen few opportunities to resist the agents’ pressure. Although Senegalese fishers know a few 
words of Guinean Creole, they cannot express themselves very well in this language, which makes 
the negotiation even more difficult. When the fishermen do not respect regulations, the repression 
is stronger and fishermen risk fines which are worth the same price as the licence. This is explained 
by Assane: 
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Once, we had a licence that expired on the 31st of December; on the first [of January] 
they [the Bissau-Guinean coast guards] found us there [...] without forgiveness, and 
merciless, four canoes! I paid 750,000 francs [£940] for each canoe in addition to the 
licences [...] and I lost all the expenses I had made, I had spent 1.5 million [£1,880] for 
each canoe. There is no relationship with the coast guards, they just do their job. If 
they find you but you’re regular, there is no problem. But if they find you with 
problems [in an irregular situation] they take you; there is no explanation; there are 
shootings. ...  
Yes, there are shootings. If you’re being silly, they take you; they don’t forgive... when 
you fish in forbidden areas. ... There, where there are parks, there are buoys, we don’t 
approach the parks, and even if they find you out of the area but you’re not in good 
standing, atcha! If you start explaining yourself, you’re getting in trouble; they don’t 
forgive. Sometimes, they take your fuel [...] You know in Guinea-Bissau, it’s a huge 
issue to find fuel [...] they oblige you to give them fuel, 2, 3 or 4 fuel containers even if 
you’re regular. Because most of the Bissau-Guinean coast guards on patrol, they just 
come randomly to get you in trouble. But generally, that is what pushed us to do the 
ice-box canoes, increase our fishing capacity, invest a lot to go 10 to 12 days at sea, 
sometimes even 15 days, and sometimes you don’t bring back enough. Before, even if 
you spent 8 days in Guinea-Bissau, you could find lots of fish, but now it is a huge 
issue; you can spend 15 days there and to earn the 1,5 million francs that you spent, 
it’s a huge issue.138 
 Assane’s statement is ambiguous. He first explains that as long as fishermen respect 
Bissau-Guinean fishing rules, they can navigate and fish peacefully and not worry about possible 
arrests. However, he later mentions that coast guards might seize fuel despite the fishermen holding 
valid licences. This ambiguity can be explained by the fact that although fishermen do respect local 
fishing regulation, they do so only partly. Bissau-Guinean coast guards might always be able to 
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find some weaknesses regarding the fishermen’s documents or practices which fishermen might not 
– or pretend not – to be aware of. What is also remarkable in Assane’s discourse is the way he 
emphasises the impossibility of the fishermen “explaining” themselves to the coast guards in order 
to lower the penalty. Guards’ reactions are non-negotiable, unlike in Mauritania, where we saw that 
border patrol agents often negotiate bribes with the Guet Ndarians. This lack of flexibility from the 
Bissau-Guinean coast guards makes their relationship to the fishermen less emotional and more 
professional. Finally, there is a direct relationship between the increase in and severity of these 
controls and fishermen’s movements. As a consequence, crews have to spend more time at sea to 
find fishing areas where they will be allowed to fish.  Although fishermen are certainly exposed to 
abusive practices from maritime patrols, they confess that they sometimes go fishing illegally in 
protected areas. They legitimate these illegal incursions by the fact that because they sometimes 
have not caught enough fish, they need to make their investment profitable and are thus “obliged” 
to fish illegally. Ousmane reports that: 
When there is nothing, I have a look around and I go fishing in the parks [...] I know 
this is illegal. What would you do? We have to take risks, when you spend 3 million.139 
 Hann-based boat owner and captain fisherman Ousmane explains that, during his various 
fishing trips, he was caught several times and had to pay huge amounts of fines because he was 
fishing illegally in national parks. These arrests and fines have a weak deterrent effect, since 
Ousmane and his crew continue these illegal practices. A protected marine area was created around 
a couple of southern islands of the Bijagos Archipelago within a wider biosphere reserve (Weigel 
et al., 2011). The surroundings of these protected areas have become very attractive to foreign 
fishers. These wide maritime spaces tempt the fishermen, who see opportunities to fill their canoe 
and avoid going back to Senegal empty-handed. These illegal incursions have been deadly for 
shark species because of the intensive and devastating practice of shark finning (Weigel et al., 
2011).  
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 Despite recurrent negative statements referring to the decline in fisheries and the 
profitability of such fishing expeditions – including Assane’s, the businessman – these rational 
fishing strategies appear to be very lucrative. Through these maritime movements, fishermen have 
created specific geographies of maritime spaces in Mauritanian and Guinean and Bissau-Guinean 
waters which reflect their distinct practices in these respective fishing areas. 
 
2. Producing knowledge beyond borders: pragmatic geographies 
 For their navigation beyond Senegal’s borders, fishermen have created seascapes both at 
the Mauritania–Senegal borderland and in southern waters. Rather than simply being an A-to-B 
journey depending on the movement of the fish resource, fishermen’s mobility is also constantly 
adjusted to their representation of the border and to their relationship to state control agents. In the 
narratives of their respective border experiences, distinct conceptions of the border come up. The 
following lines present a comparative approach exploring how fishermen construct spaces beyond 
borders in Mauritania and beyond Senegal’s southern borders. Whereas in Mauritania, the border 
issue is highly controversial and remains a very sensitive topic for local Guet Ndarians, the borders 
of Guinea-Bissau and Guinea seem to represent simple administrative processes requiring financial 
investments for the fishermen. As a consequence, fishermen socially construct the spaces lying 
beyond these borders accordingly. These genuine maritime geographies result from an 
appropriation of the remote maritime places and strengthen the legitimacy of the fishermen to 
exploit fishing grounds and transgress existing orders. The practices of the fishermen are 
comparable to those of De Certeau’s walkers through the city. Fishermen develop “tactics” and 
appropriate the maritime spaces by creating names – as they have been doing in Kayar and Ouakam 
(chapter 5). The creation of names results from a practical calculation in which profitability is 
achieved and from which a projection into the future is feasible. In other words, as soon as a 
fisherman finds a resource-rich place where his profitability needs are met, he gives it a name and 
records its location in his GPS device. This action necessarily implies a projection into a future 
journey and a mental construction of the local maritime space.  
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 Although in Mauritania and Guinea-Bissau and Guinea, fishermen develop similar 
strategies to avoid controls, using their GPS and know-how, discourses on the location of borders 
and their political regulation greatly vary. On one hand, the way in which fishermen have socially 
constructed the maritime spaces lying beyond the border reflects the specific power–knowledge 
relations I described in chapter 6. On the other hand, the geography of the border near to where the 
fishermen operate in southern waters appears to be merely pragmatic and the result of the 
rationalisation of their movement. Again, this does not mean that fishermen in Mauritanian waters 
are not pragmatic and do not rationalise their mobility. What this comparative focus shows is that 
the discourses vary whereas the practices remain the same. The responses of fishermen to the way 
they identify the border at sea vary, interestingly, depending on whether they speak about 
Mauritanian or southern borders.  
 
Apprehending borders 
 Fishermen’s representations are produced by their mobility practices and discourses. 
Whereas in the north fishermen draw the border as a contestable, invasive and unclear limit, 
southern borders remain for them simple geographic coordinates that have closing and delimiting 
functions. In southern waters, border agents and maritime coast guards seem to represent a similar 
function from the perspective of the fishermen. Border agents are not clearly named, and 
throughout fishermen’s interviews we are not sure who fishermen are speaking about. These agents 
are globally identified as state control actors whose function is to materialise borders and restricted 
areas and to control and arrest, and sometimes to abuse, their authority. They are perceived by the 
fishermen as limit markers between forbidden and open spaces. Aware of potential controls, 
fishermen move according to the existing risk of being caught. 
 In Wolof, there is no word to properly name the border that divides two countries. People 
use the French word “frontière” when referring to this kind of border. I have been asking many 
fishermen about how they would speak of the border in Wolof without using the French word. The 
common Wolof word I was given was Digg. The word Digg designates a dividing line between two 
territories, two neighbours or two farm fields. Of course, fishermen are aware of the existence of 
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international borders, but they might be moving in the sea according to their own cultural 
perception of the border – thus, it is a dividing line regardless of whether it divides countries or 
forbidden and open fishing areas, etc. This is even more possible at sea, where nothing is fixed, 
where everything is in perpetual movement and where limits are barely materialised. Moreover, 
when fishermen fish in Guinean and Bissau-Guinean waters, what matters is not the crossing of the 
border itself but rather the spaces beyond the border they wish to access. 
 Fishermen’s discourses reveal how they identify international borders when they navigate 
in Guinea-Bissau and Guinea. They mostly reply that the maritime agents on patrol give them 
information on where they can and cannot fish and on the location of international borders. 
Fishermen also use their GPS to complete this information. These maritime limits are assimilated 
into the right to fish regardless of whether fishermen speak of international borders or simply of 
protected areas. These limits become meaningful and necessary for the fishermen to locate their 
position, from their point of view as long as they enable them to determine where they are allowed 
to fish. Fishermen are worried about fishing illegally, but it seems that this is more related to the 
amount of the fines they would have to pay than to illegality itself. Mohamed reports that: 
It is not easy to know where the border is. But there are always people on patrol with 
their boats to tell you, “Here it’s forbidden to fish.” For example, they warn you when 
there are parks or where there are borders and that it’s forbidden to fish there. ... In 
Senegal, there is no problem. It goes well; they only ask you if you have a fishing 
authorisation and a life jacket.140 
 The intense use of GPS devices allows the creation of a unique geography of maritime 
spaces and international borders. Some of the fishermen seem to have a very accurate knowledge of 
the geographical coordinates of borders at sea. They quote from memory the geographic latitude 
coordinates of each country they usually cross. They use these coordinates as key numbers to 
identify their fishing places and routes. Among many examples, I retained the following statement: 
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We can know where borders are with the GPS. Senegal is between the 14th and 15th 
latitude [north]. ... Gambia is from 13° 51’. … Guinea starts at 11° 10’ and 10° 16’ 
and then Conackry is from 9° 32’. There are also protected areas where it is 
impossible to fish. For example, at 10° 07’ and 10° 16’, fishing is forbidden. If they 
find you, they catch you.141 
 
 With these key numbers, fishermen draw mental lines through the sea, and these lines 
determine their trajectories. When one locates these latitude coordinates on geo-referenced 
maps, they indicate that when fishermen cross international borders, they remain within 
territorial waters. The way in which fishermen refer to these coordinates shows an explicit 
appropriation of borders. Like the pedestrian who uses “proper names” to orientate and 
organise his way throughout the city (De Certeau, 1984), fishermen appropriate these key 
numbers in such a familiar way that they give these coordinates the function of names whose 
meaning becomes original, subjective and specific to their own way of moving. These 
maritime borders which were originally numbers have become names through the familiar 
and repetitive narratives of the fishermen.  The discourses around these borderlines are 
neither contesting an existing order nor full of resentment, and appear to be as neutral as 
geographical coordinates can be. It seems that no manifest vexation has been strong enough 
for the fishermen to contest the existing borders and influence their mental construction of 
these southern borderlands. Therefore, by retaining geographical coordinates, fishermen seem 
to empty their discourse around borders and maritime limits of political connotations. These 
coordinates only seem to carry a practical function of navigation and orientation at sea. 
 The representation of the Mauritanian borderland is slightly more complex and reflects the 
complex local history (chapter 6). The mental maps drawn with the local Guet Ndarian fishers 
show a distinct perception of the border (Map 6). Their narratives around the drawing of the border 
are richer than for the southern borderlands. Fishermen are intimately involved in the description of 
the borderline; they describe the border with emotion and a sense of personal commitment. In Guet 
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Ndar, Abdoulaye, a local leader who was a former fisherman and who now leads local projects in 
collaboration with the local authorities, first explains that: 
 You see, here, the line on the river, it’s the border. From here [he shows how the 
border follows the shape of the Senegal River’s mouth], it is completely broken and it 
is the same in the ocean. There is a need for a buffer zone without jurisdiction and 
which shouldn’t be either Senegalese or Mauritanian. Hence the border needs to be 
made visible with beacons so that we know where it lies. Or put beacons here [...] and 
there [...] [he points to two imagined lines on each side of the borderland] and let 
there be a buffer zone in between.142 
 
 When he points out the imaginary line which designates the border, he adds to his 
gesture a meaningful comment: “It is completely broken.” He is referring to the diagonal 
direction which the borderline takes at sea. For him, the borderline unequally shares the 
ocean space as it encroaches upon Senegal’s EEZ in favour of Mauritania (Map 6). This 
representation is highly influenced by the perception of the recurrent struggles putting the 
Guet Ndarian fishermen in opposition to the Mauritanian authorities. This leader claims that 
he wants the necessary physical materialisation of the border to help fishermen orientate at 
sea. Nevertheless, his discourse shows that in fact he knows very well where the border really 
lies, but hopes that its materialisation would take into account his contestation.  
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Map 6: Fishermen’s mental representations of the Senegal–Mauritania border, 
 May 2014. Design: J.H. 
 
Ousmane, A purse seine fisherman I interviewed the same day in Guet Ndar reports the 
following:  
According to what I heard, the border is vertical, and lies from north-east to south-
west... It lies before we get there around the mouth, at the level of the hospital which is 
above. For example, when we leave Sal Sal, we go on straight away like this [...] [west 
direction] a little bit, not even 800 metres, and then we take that direction [he shows a 
south-west direction]. You see this hospital there, there is a fishing place which is 
called “the hospital rocks”... in general we used to take our marks there [...] Before, 
we used to take landmarks such as the water tower to locate the border but it has 
disappeared.143  
 
 In fact, the official maritime border is straight, but in the mental exercise I proposed to 
them, they draw a line which is exaggeratedly diagonal. This drawing reflects their perception of 
the border and the way they emotionally apprehend it. When Ousmane said, “According to what I 
heard, the border is vertical,” as well as the way he describes how he used to orientate with 
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landmarks, he exemplifies the way the border starts to exist through repeated practices and 
experience. The outlines of the border progressively take shape with the repeated experiences local 
fishermen make out of it. The border is therefore first apprehended in a practical way rather than 
theoretically.  
 
Creating geographies beyond borderlines 
 Fishermen’s geography does not stop at the borderline. As they are used to fishing in 
foreign waters, they produce practical geographies beyond borders through the discovery of fishing 
places and the related creation of names. In both situations, they appropriate maritime spaces in 
different ways, according to their relationship to these spaces. In Mauritania, fishermen use both 
old and new names to refer to the fishing places, whereas in Guinea-Bissau and Guinea, the recent 
discovery of the fishing places is not shared among the fishermen. The names therefore vary from 
one fisherman to the other. Fishermen have proceeded similarly to the Kayar and Ouakam 
communities with the naming of their fishing areas and places, in Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau and 
Guinea. In those cases, these Wolof names certainly reflect a process of appropriation of the ocean 
beyond political boundaries. In Mauritania, the use of such names gives legitimacy to fishermen’s 
practices. In Guinea-Bissau and Guinea, these names are more reflective of the individualist 
practices I also noticed in Ouakam and Kayar (chapter 5).  
 De Certeau describes the action of people walking in the street as a resisting behaviour 
based on an intimate and personal appropriation of the city. Throughout the city, walking becomes 
a way for the pedestrians to avoid the “urbanistic systematicity”. The walker unfolds his/her 
trajectories around places which he/she appropriates through his/her subjective re-use of “proper 
names”. These proper names participate in the creation of a “poetic geography” as “they make 
habitable or believable the place that they clothe with a word (by emptying themselves of their 
classifying power, they acquire that of ‘permitting’ something else)” (De Certeau, 1984: 106). At 
sea, it seems that fishermen proceed similarly, although the surface of the sea is constantly renewed 
by the everlasting movement of the water. Fishermen either appropriate an existing toponymy of 
the maritime spaces they go to (in Mauritania, with the traditional names of fishing places) or 
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create new names (Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau and Guinea) which work as essential keys to the 
mental appropriation of their destination places. Fishermen acknowledge that the political 
“partition” (De Certeau, 1984: 26) of the sea by sovereign states remains. Fishermen wholly 
integrate this “partition” into their intimate geography of the sea space; what they do is develop 
“tactics” (as understood by De Certeau) to elude them. The names created carry the powerful 
function of getting around these “systematic” bordering lines and practices and generating a “poetic 
geography” of these remote spaces.  
  
 Guet Ndarian fishers’ responses to their usual fishing places vary depending on whether 
they use purse seine or hand-line, drift or dormant net techniques. Pelagic fishermen have a more 
distinct representation of the sea space than demersal fishers. Because pelagic fishers move 
according to the movement of fish shoals, they do not orientate themselves around fixed fishing 
places but rather take the marks of wider and potentially rich fishing areas. On a mental map, a 
pelagic fisher symbolises his boat and the fish shoals not as points but as two lines. This 
representation is distinct from the drawings of Guet Ndarian demersal fishers. Because these fishers 
target deep-water, rock-dwelling demersal fish species, they move according to fixed points. Pape 
(see chapter 6) gives the names of the – demersal – fishing places where he used to go hand-line 
fishing: 
Each area, from here up to Nouhadibou and close to the Moroccan border, each area 
has a name [...] it’s a mark. You look at the land to take landmarks. If you want to fish 
in Beul, you go up to Beul and then you take the direction of the areas where you want 
to fish, without seeing the coastline. But if you want to go to Beul without GPS, you 
take marks with the land. ... Takhale means “gathering” and Toundou Dalbi is a “pile 
of sand”. Thiolep is the “corner” [...] There is Madame Siou [...] It’s in Mauritania. 
In Saint-Louis it’s Diatara, at the border between Senegal on one hand and 
Mauritania on the other.... There, it’s Keur Rasal, and Madame Siou is there [he 
points on the map]. You can see tefess bi [the beach] from Madame Siou. It’s a big 
rock, a very wide one [...] Every rock, the elders [...] they gave a name which was 
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close to them. There is Salépère; it’s the third site [...] same distance [...] When you 
are out of Takhale, you go to Toundou Dalbi then Salépère, same distance between 
each fishing place, from 38 to 60 kilometres. Then it’s another area; it’s Beul Khasan, 
from 78 or 79 kilometres.144  
 
 Pape describes a south–north movement from Guet Ndar to the north of Mauritania and 
points out places which are more or less distant from the shore. Although he does not know the 
meaning of each of these names, he knows how to reach them, how long the journey will take and 
what kind of fish species he can find there. He goes on to say: 
In Diatara, there is a place [...] we say “keur soeur y”. There is a place where sisters 
live; it means “the sisters’ house” [...] It is called this because when you’re up there, 
you can see the building of “keur soeurs y”, so in Wolof we give this name. On the 
Mauritanian side, it is called “Kane”; it means that there are bigger rocks than in 
“Keur soeur y”. It means that there are more fish than in the other rocks. It is a Wolof 
name. Each rock has its name. There is Kane, Kekhou ndao bi, etc. [...] Everybody 
knows these fishing places, either the ice-box fishing line, dormant nets, etc.145 
 
 The Diatara area covers both sides of the border and is divided into two sub-areas, one 
Senegalese and one Mauritanian. Demersal fishermen all know this place, as it is only 10 
kilometres up to the north-west and hosts a number of deep-water fish species. According to Pape, 
on the Mauritanian side of the rock more valuable fish species dwell than on the Senegalese side. 
This narrative demonstrates a genuine hierarchy of fishing places with specific internal 
subdivisions revealing the geographical location and resource quality. The way Pape describes his 
route and mental representation of the Mauritanian sea space is again reminiscent of, interestingly, 
De Certeau’s analysis of spatial practices (Map 7). Basing his work on a study of Linde and Labov 
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on the way New York walkers apprehend the city, De Certeau mentions two styles of describing 
spaces:  
[...] description oscillates between the terms of an alternative: either seeing (the 
knowledge of an order of places) or going (spatializing actions). Either it presents a 
tableau (“there are ...”), or it organizes movements (“you enter, you go across, you turn 
...”). (De Certeau, 1984: 119) 
Pape’s way of describing the sea spaces according to his own “spatializing actions” indicates that 
he belongs to the second category of narrators. Pape invites his interlocutor to follow actively his 
narrative thread to learn about his own geography. The knowledge provided by this narrative is 
distinct from the language of maps. De Certeau adds: 
[...] The question ultimately concerns the basis of the everyday narrations, the relation 
between the itinerary (a discursive series of operations) and the map (a plane 
projection totalizing observations), that is, between two symbolic and anthropological 
languages of space. Two poles of experience. It seems that in passing from “ordinary” 
culture to scientific discourse, one passes from one pole to the other. (De Certeau, 
1984 : 120) 
 Although Pape does not wander in New York streets but rather in a natural and hostile 
environment in a foreign country, his everyday practice of the maritime space in Mauritania is 
comparable to the narrations of De Certeau’s New Yorkers. Pape gives meticulous details on his 
route and traces his movement in a specific spatial chronology. More generally, Guet Ndarian 
fishermen do not construct a “totalising” geography of the maritime spaces as a scientific map 
would do. Rather, they base their geography on a perpetual movement resulting from repeated 
experiences and the will to discover new routes and places. In other words, their representations of 
maritime spaces are constantly renewed and the limits of their practised spaces are challenged 
every day. This geography is not based on a scientific apprehension of spaces as it is rather 
pragmatic. Some places in the ocean have more values than others, and this hierarchy is not 
definitive as it is adjusted to fishermen’s changing needs and desires or to the local economy. 
Therefore, the unity and scientific neutrality of the map is not used as a knowledge resource by the 
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fishermen but rather remains external to their own geographical constructions. Fishermen were 
generally not comfortable with mental maps and drawing exercises, as I asked them to “pass” from 
one “symbolic language” to another (as De Certeau would call it) and to “totalise” their practical 
knowledge into one single objective plan. They obviously needed time to adjust their representation 
to the map I presented. I had to guide them and indicate where the coastline was represented on the 
map or where we were actually located at the time of the interview. Given the local background of 
the Senegal–Mauritania border, these names have a strong value and a meaningful function for the 
Guet Ndarian fishermen. These naming practices both reflect Guet Ndarian ancient traditional 
cross-border mobility habits and support these fishermen in legitimating their access to these 
neighbouring waters. These names reflect the specific knowledge of marine grounds which local 
Guet Ndarian have claimed and mentally represented. 
 Map 7:
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abandoned the traditional fishing places of the elders and instead goes to places he thinks he is the 
only one to know about: 
Here, Diatara, you have seen, it’s a Kher [Wolof name for “rock” – it designates the 
fishing place], but, well, it doesn’t work. Diatara, it’s a Kher, the elders use to call it 
this. It’s a very old name. It is located in Mauritania. It doesn’t work very well now. 
The elders used to fish there for Thiof [Wolof name for grouper] and other species. ... 
So now I go to Babacar and Fatou. Babacar is a friend of mine.146 
 “Babacar” and “Fatou” are two names he gave to fishing places he discovered. This 
naming process is not systematic; he explains that for the other “Kher” he goes to, he just uses the 
geographical coordinates he registered in his GPS device. He also claims that he is the only one to 
know them and would not share them with close relatives or extended family. For Ousmane, the 
West African coasts have been entirely discovered by the Senegalese fishermen and “from here 
[Hann] to Conakry, [he] know[s] the names of every fishing place”. Ousmane mentions the fishing 
place “Diarama”, which lies on the route to the south, and he explains the meaning of this name: 
Diarama, it’s a saleng [in Wolof], a boat cemetery. Diarama means “thank you” [in 
Peul]. They called it “Diarama” because each time they go there, and find lots of fish, 
they say “Diarama”.147 
 
 Finally, in Guinean and Bissau-Guinean waters, there are not such elders’ names for the 
fishing places. So it seems that the farther they go, the more individualised the appropriation of the 
sea space is. This is especially true in southern waters. The Joal-based fishermen’s leader explains 
that, as for borders, the geographical coordinates have taken the function of names for these new 
remote fishing places: 
There are GPS positions [...] I mean, instead of thinking in terms of fishing places, fish 
habitat, etc., there are only positions. I say, for example, I want to go to 10, or 20 
degrees, these are positions. Then you can chose a name, you register a position and 
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put Juliette or Ahmed or Fatou. If you have a friend and you really want him to get 
some fish, you can give him the position, but this is very rare [...] sometimes you can 
even have the same father, but not sharing a good position [...] this is very rare.148 
 
Conclusion  
 In conclusion, fishermen have produced a specific knowledge using their language and 
their own geographical and cultural references to appropriate and “colonise” foreign spaces. This 
pragmatic language involves specific navigation techniques and words, a genuine representation of 
borders and the limits of forbidden spaces, and the creation of specific names for fishing places. 
Whether in Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau or Guinea, Senegalese fishers organise the sea space and 
rationalise their mobility according to their economic needs and opportunities, marine resources 
and environmental constraints, personal interests, and historical claims or administrative 
requirements. In Mauritania, the naming practices have strengthened fishermen’s feeling of 
belonging and legitimated their illegal fishing trips to forbidden spaces. Because they have named 
these places, they consider they have some right to exploit them independently of the foreign 
legislation.  
 The geography of Mauritanian spaces slightly varies from fishermen’s social construction 
of southern waters. In Mauritania, this appropriation is older, and carries a heavy historical weight. 
Names are more ancient and fishermen tend to represent the border with emotion and personal 
involvement, leading them to romanticise their mobility. On the scale of the fishermen, there is not 
such a history with Guinean and Bissau-Guinean authorities. I have shown that the neutral 
dimension of fishermen’s mobility in these waters is noticeable in the way fishermen represent 
borders and maritime limits within these countries. Fishing expeditions in southern waters are more 
reflective of individualistic practices based on a rational organisation of mobility. Foreign marine 
spaces are spaces for power struggles about claims over the exploitation of fish resources, personal 
enrichment, self-achievement and acquiring skills, and for local and practical knowledge 
production. Whether fishermen unfold their mobility as a contesting tactic towards Mauritanian 
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fishing regulation or in order to make their investments profitable, they rely on their practical 
knowledge and at the same time produce knowledge. Whatever meaning their mobility takes, 
fishermen use this knowledge for the exercise of power and the control of sea space. 
 Through these maritime mobility patterns, fishermen have developed significant expertise 
relating to the sea and navigation techniques. This expertise has been a means of support that 
encouraged the increase of boat migration to Europe from Senegal in the mid-2000s. Fishermen 
have played a significant role in the organisation of such journeys. This mobility pattern has given 
the ocean the meaning of a bordering space giving access to Europe – in other words, to self-
achievement, professional opportunities and independence, which West African maritime mobility 
had so far been providing through multiple migration patterns.  
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 Chapter 8 - 
 Risky Sea Crossings: 
 Irregular149 Migration to the Canary Islands 
 
 
 Between 2001 and 2010, more than 90,000 illegal migrants departed from West Africa and 
reached the coasts of the Canary Islands (Ministerio del Interior, 2011) after a perilous sea journey 
across the Atlantic and with the hope of a better life in Europe. The West African maritime route to 
Europe became the main path to Spain not long after the 2005 events of Ceuta and Melilla, when 
an “assault” of irregular migrants to the fences surrounding the enclaves was strongly repressed by 
the Moroccan and Spanish authorities (Carling, 2007b; De Haas, 2007). These events led to the 
organisation of new departure routes further south, first from Western Sahara and Mauritania, and 
then from Senegal, from where Senegalese fishermen started to undertake these journeys. The 
Senegalese fishermen involved in these journeys were either the long-distance fishermen who had 
spread their fishing routes all over the ocean and could use their navigation skills for these 
maritime crossings or the local small-scale fishermen who saw in these migration journeys a 
strategy to cope with the decrease in fish resources in their local waters. 
 In this chapter, I argue that through this maritime mobility pattern, fishermen have given a 
new meaning to the sea. The ocean itself has become a border space, a gate giving access to a 
better life or – more dramatically – to death. The dangers and risks involved in this maritime 
crossing have given to the mobility of the fishermen an emotional dimension and the values of 
bravery and devotion to their community. The choice of crossing the sea has embodied fishermen’s 
strong commitment towards their families. The border function that fishermen give to the ocean 
contrasts with the conception of borders that is reflected through European migration policy. As a 
response to increasing migration flows to Europe, European states spread their border control 
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practices beyond their respective national waters through externalisation and cooperation measures 
with third countries. These distinct uses of the sea bring to light paradoxical responses to the 
question of what borders really are and where they truly lie, either for the fishers or for 
policymakers.  
 This chapter first examines the connections between this maritime migration route to 
Europe from Senegal and the regional background of migration patterns in West Africa, bringing to 
the fore the multiple scales implied by the study of this mobility trend. Second, the chapter explores 
these maritime crossings from the perspectives of the fishermen. Finally, I shed light on the 
disillusion of the many fishers who failed to reach Europe and/or were deported back to Senegal. 
Because fishermen were emotionally and physically involved in these maritime crossings, their 
failure and disillusion made them powerless and vulnerable once they were back in their 
community.  
 One has to bear in mind that although fishermen were the main protagonists of these 
journeys, they were not the only passengers on these boats. Fishermen represented around 38.2% of 
the participants (Mbow & Bodian, 2008). Malian, Nigerian, Ghanaian and Guinean migrants 
reached the Senegalese coasts as well and joined the Senegalese would-be migrants in these 
adventures. Needless to say, for the non-fishermen Senegalese migrants, but also for the foreign 
migrants who passed by Senegal, local scale factors driving their own migration projects had other 
specificities, which this study does not cover. For the purpose of this thesis, I strictly focus on the 
experiences of the Senegalese fishermen.  
   
1. Local crisis within a global background 
 When they aim to reach Europe, West African migrants have followed changing routes 
since the end of the 1990s. They have crossed many deserts, seas and towns in Sub-Saharan Africa 
and followed trajectories which were always adjusted to account for police controls and existing 
opportunities and infrastructures. When these routes led the willing migrants to Senegal, fishermen 
seized the opportunity and started organising and taking part in maritime journeys to the Canary 
Islands.  
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Complex migration routes to Europe 
 The opportunities for legal migration to Europe have considerably reduced since the 1990s, 
which has encouraged Sub-Saharan migrants to follow alternative paths. West African migrants 
started to take irregular migration routes to reach Europe when European visa procedures were 
strengthened in the 1990s (Carling, 2007b; De Haas, 2008). The creation of passages to Europe 
adjusted to Europe’s border controls at a global level and occurred at a local level by the quick 
reactions of local actors who temporarily become smugglers. Carling’s article from 2007 addresses 
a precise description of the different migration routes leading Sub-Saharan migrants to Europe 
from West Africa. From their countries of origin, migrants mainly head to Agadez in Niger or Gao 
in Mali, from where they go to Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria or Libya (2007b). The journeys of the 
migrants are not smooth and uninterrupted adventures, and it can take months or even years before 
they reach a final destination. They usually settle for a while in transit in North African cities such 
as Kouffra in Libya or Tamanrasset in Algeria in order to capitalise enough resources and wait for 
an opportunity to reach Europe (Bredeloup & Pliez, 2005). In many cases they set off in boats and 
attempt to cross the sea to reach either the island of Lampedusa, Malta, in the Mediterranean Sea, 
southern Spain and the Balearic Islands, or the Canary Islands. Carling shows how the strait of 
Gibraltar had long attracted African migrants since the 1960s as this is where the distance which 
separates the African continent and Europe is the shortest, although strong sea currents and intense 
ship traffic make this crossing extremely risky. Carling reports the many maritime routes around 
the strait which smugglers took in order to avoid Spanish border agents and reach the other side of 
the strait (Carling, 2007b). The number of migrants who crossed the strait increased at the 
beginning of the 1990s in parallel with the strengthening of Spanish migration policy and border 
controls.  
 During that same period, migrants started to enter the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, where 
they could apply for asylum or attempt to get transferred to mainland Europe (Carling, 2007b: 24). 
As a result of the growing number of irregular migrants attempting to get into the enclaves, borders 
were reinforced with fences and extensive controls. While many Sub-Saharan migrants attempted 
to get into the enclaves by climbing the surrounding fences, many got shot or arrested and were 
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deported by the local authorities. One of these “assaults” was extensively covered by the 
international media in 2005, and it seems that this had a deterrent effect on the prospective 
migrants, whose smugglers soon started to look for less controlled routes (De Haas, 2007; 
Dünnwald, 2011; Pian, 2006). 
 In parallel to these routes, migrants started leaving West Africa from Morocco and Western 
Sahara, aiming to reach the Spanish archipelago of the Canary Islands in the mid-1990s. While 
arrivals increased, the Spanish authorities responded by using stronger and more sophisticated 
controls in the form of the new system, SIVE (Sistema Integrado de Vigilancia Exterior). This 
technological surveillance system which the Spanish government put in place in 1999 aims to 
detect illegal maritime movements into Spanish waters (Carling & Hernández-Carretero, 2011; 
Carling, 2007a). Radar first covered the main coastal areas of southern Spain and were then 
deployed around the Canary Islands. Migrants reaching the Canary Islands by sea – and who were 
sometimes successfully intercepted by the SIVE radar – had arrived either on board small wooden 
boats or had hidden themselves within large cargo ships (Carling, 2007b). At the beginning of the 
2000s, the routes to Europe got longer as they started further south, from the surrounding area of 
Nouadhibou in Mauritania, where dozens of migrants embarked in small boats which local 
fishermen drove to the Spanish archipelago over three days. Until the beginning of 2006, 
Nouadhibou was known by Sub-Saharan migrants as a transit city where they were expecting 
opportunities for departures to arise. Choplin and Lombard describe how the Mauritanian city has 
progressively lost its transit function as a consequence of the strengthening of border controls off 
Mauritanian coasts (2008). It became almost impossible for the smugglers to leave the Mauritanian 
coasts without being intercepted. Therefore, thousands of migrants temporarily settled in 
Nouadhibou, expecting that a maritime journey was now unlikely, and progressively took part in 
the local economy of the city.  
 As a result, the sea journeys started further south, from Saint-Louis in Senegal, then from 
Kayar, Dakar peninsula, Mbour, Joal, Casamance and, finally, Guinea-Bissau (Nyamnjoh, 2010). 
In 2006 alone, a total of 31,678 irregular migrants reached the Canary Islands (Ministerio del 
Interior, 2013). They were either deported back to their country of origin or transferred to mainland 
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Spain – depending on the ongoing repatriation agreements with sending countries at the time and 
the personal situation of the migrant. Most of the migrants arrived that year in the archipelago. The 
flows progressively decreased after a series of policy measures – including externalised border 
controls and Spain’s Plan Africa – succeeded in deterring the migrants from undertaking the 
journeys (Carling & Hernández-Carretero, 2011). Indeed, the Spanish authorities reported 9,181 
migrant arrivals in 2008 (Ministerio del Interior, 2009) and only 173 in 2012 (Ministerio del 
Interior, 2013). The joint efforts of European member states made possible the prevention of 
migration flows, although they first had the effect of pushing the smugglers to consider longer and 
riskier routes to avoid controls. 
 
The externalisation of European border controls 
 Migration trajectories and Europe’s border controls and migration policies are 
interdependent. For Abdelmayek Sayad, immigration and emigration are two sides of the same coin 
(2004). In this sense, West African migration patterns to Europe are shaped by European policies, 
and vice versa. Migration policy measures were operated through the externalisation of Europe’s 
border controls and the multiplication of bilateral agreements between sending and receiving 
countries. As research has shown, the constant adaptation of migration movements was generated 
by the externalisation and reinforcement of such border controls (Audebert and Robin, 2009; 
Lalhou, 2006; Whitol de Wenden, 2002; Bredeloup and Pliez, 2005; Haas, 2006). The Treaty of 
Amsterdam of 1999 transferred migration management to the European level. This transfer has 
enabled member states to count on an intergovernmental framework that protects their national 
borders and ensures their internal security. Member states now commonly spread their police force 
outside their own borders and externalise their border control by seeking support from 
neighbouring states in order to anticipate migratory movements.  
 On the European scale, management of migration issues and protection of borders seem to 
go hand in hand. This translated into the creation of the European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union – 
more commonly known as Frontex. Frontex is a “depoliticised” external body which aims to 
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support member states for the protection of their external borders (Carrera, 2007). These European 
measures reinforce Spain’s Plan Africa, which is a wide policy programme that largely focuses on 
the prevention of irregular West African migration patterns (Manzenado, Guzmán, & Azkona, 
2011). Operations such as Hera I, II and III were developed from 2006 onwards in order to 
strengthen Spain’s border controls capacities. While for Hera I the support mainly consisted of the 
consultancy of experts from member states and sending countries, Hera II and III also involved 
bilateral agreements and technical cooperation with sending countries (Carrera, 2007: 22). Through 
this cooperation, European member states such as Portugal, Italy and Spain supplied 2 helicopters, 
2 ships and around 10 patrol boats to Mauritania, Senegal, the Gambia and Cape Verde.150 This 
cooperation mainly helped Senegal and Mauritania to prevent boats’ irregular departures from their 
shores. These countries both took part in the surveillance of their coastal waters and legitimated the 
presence of European patrols in their national waters so that the coast guards could direct the 
intercepted boats back to their countries of origin (Dünnwald, 2011: 6). This externalisation 
process has relieved European countries of their responsibility to take irregular migrants in. By 
giving third countries the responsibility of assisting Europe in the management of irregular 
migration flows, these agreements participate in the externalisation of European borders (Audebert 
and Robin, 2009; Vaughan-Williams, 2009).  
 The efforts deployed to struggle against West African migration flows reflect the way in 
which European member states have based their respective national migration policies on the 
perception of immigrants as threats. For instance, Frontex’s operations developed according to 
“risk analyses and threats assessments” (Carrera, 2007: 14). In this sense, the strengthening of 
migration controls seems to be the direct result of the construction of fears, threats and danger 
(Bigo, 2000; Hartmann, Subramaniam, & Zerner, 2005) from which society and the population 
must be isolated and secured. The construction of fears translates into immigration being depicted 
as a security threat in Western countries over the last few decades (Bigo, Carrera, Guild, & Walker, 
2008; Hartmann et al., 2005; Van Houtum et al., 2005). As Bigo puts it, the figure of the migrant 
has been turned into a socially created threat to society: “we need to understand the social 
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construction of fears. And why they are now converging on the figure of the migrant, as the key 
point inside a continuum of threats” (2000 : 174). 
 These powerful fears are deeply rooted within society and have given border controls the 
functions of dividing individuals into categories and qualifying flows of populations according to 
their origins. To contemporaneous scholars of borders, it seems that the traditional understanding 
of a border as a territorial limit whose main referent object is space is not accurate and cannot 
reflect the contemporary complexity of European borders (Bigo, 2000; Vaughan-Williams, 2008; 
Walker, 2000). Borders are, rather, characterised by their biological dividing function that operates 
through certain kinds of territorialised materialisation. Therefore, the externalisation of European 
border controls reflects this shift in the meaning and locations of European borders that has been 
questioned in the literature (Vaughan-Williams, 2008, Bigo, 2000: 185). 
 These considerations distance themselves strikingly from the perspectives and experiences 
gathered on the field among Senegalese fishermen. While on one hand, European policymakers and 
media assimilate migration to danger, fears, threat and the “invasion” (De Haas, 2007), on the other 
hand, from the migrants’ points of view, the journey to Europe appears as a positive – though risky 
– perspective that will make a better life tangible.  
 
Discussing the origins of boat migration from Senegal to Europe 
 Maritime migration from Senegal to Europe is a local phenomenon which greatly involves 
the fishermen and responds to a national, regional and global background. Sea migration to the 
Canary Islands became an interesting opportunity for the fishermen, as, on one hand, the 
organisation of the journey appeared to be much more profitable than fishing and, on the other 
hand, for the successful migrants, it would provide long-term job opportunities in Europe 
(Nyamnjoh, 2010). There is a debate on the way boat migration started in Senegal. Sall and 
Morand situate the first departures from Senegal in 2002 and argue that it was first smugglers – and 
not artisanal fishers – who proposed that migrants cross the ocean from Saint-Louis beaches, in the 
extreme north of Senegal, as a result of the strengthening of sea controls in Morocco and 
Mauritania (Sall & Morand, 2008). However, narratives gathered in the field instead involve 
185 
 
fishermen as the first instigators of these routes, as they were already using their wooden canoes to 
reach remote places, navigating in a well-known environment for days and relying on traditional 
skills. Moreover, Sall and Morand find the origin of the maritime migration from Senegal to 
Europe in the dynamism of the fishing sector rather than in its decline. For them, this dynamism is 
reflected through the exponential growth of the fishing sector since the 1950s (chapter 4). The 
authors argue that the Senegalese economy therefore turned towards the sea, which made coastal 
areas a step towards temporary settlement and short-term enrichment, before migrating to Europe 
(Sall & Morand, 2008). International fishing migrations, the use of new technologies and the 
development of navigation skills are other signs of this dynamism. This dynamism constituted a 
favourable background for boat migration to the Canary Islands, allowing highly qualified captains 
to sail boats throughout the Atlantic. Sall and Morand’s hypothesis contradicts Nyamnjoh’s 
argument, which emphasises the sectoral crisis and lack of resources as the main factors 
responsible for Senegalese fishermen’s migration to Europe. Nyamnjoh also suggests that these 
migration routes are the expression of a growing revolt of the fishing communities, expressing 
anger both against the weak involvement of the government in artisanal fishing and against the 
archaism of their traditional community system  (Nyamnjoh, 2010: 50). 
 Nevertheless, because different kinds of fishermen were involved in boat migration from 
Senegal to Spain, neither of these arguments are mutually exclusive. The role fishermen took in the 
development of the migration routes to the Canary Islands greatly varied according to their socio-
economic position. The organisation of boat migration benefited from the dynamism of the fishing 
sector through the involvement of highly skilled fishermen. Most of them had been navigating 
throughout West Africa for years and had been able to quickly adjust their activities according to 
the evolution of the fishing sector. Their familiarity with the maritime environment enabled them to 
consider these long sea trips and gave them a major role in the development of the West African 
irregular migration routes to the Canary Islands.  By contrast, the local fishermen who embarked in 
these boats and paid for the trips were suffering from a lack of perspective and resources. They 
mainly took part in these journeys in order to compensate for the decline in the profits earned from 
fishing activities. These willing migrants were daily fish workers, net fishers or local-scale line-
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fishers who were suffering from the fishing crisis on an everyday basis and were unable to earn a 
decent living from fishing. In other words, the highly skilled captains who were sailing the boats 
were reminiscent of the figure of the “sailor-fishermen” identified by Cormier-Salem (1995), 
whereas the “peasant-fishermen” would fill a great part of these boats, being less active than the 
captains. Though the socio-economic conditions differed for each of these actors, both categories 
of fishers shared the similar objectives of settling in Europe, finding a job and sending remittances 
to their families.  
 As an example, Ousmane is a young Dakar-born boat owner and captain fisherman who 
has been organising fishing expeditions to Guinea and Guinea-Bissau since 2001 (chapter 7). In 
2006, following the example of his 4 brothers, he recruited 75 people and hired 4 captains to assist 
him in navigating to the Canary Islands. Apart from the captains, the migrants on board all paid 
him XOF 400,000 (£500). They went up to Morocco, but as they were fleeing a violent storm, the 
crew decided to come back to Senegalese waters, where they were arrested by the Senegalese navy 
and tried in Senegal for having smuggled migrants. Ousmane and his crew received a conditional 
sentence of 2 years. Ousmane claims that before organising this trip, he was satisfied with his 
financial situation, attesting that he was able to save up to XOF 11 million  (£13,760) a year thanks 
to what he was earning from fishing. Though he was in a comfortable financial situation at that 
time, he decided to organise that journey mainly because, he said, “We saw that everybody was 
leaving so we decided to leave as well.”151 He wanted to follow his 4 brothers who had left for 
Europe by boat and was convinced that “in Europe you could easily make a living there”.  
Ousmane embodies this category of fishermen who took advantage of their socio-economic 
position to organise a migration journey to the Canary Islands very well. He had the skills and the 
experience of navigation, gear and capital such that he could safely invest in these trips. He seized 
an opportunity and provided a “service” to the prospective migrants. De Haas suggests that instead 
of seeing the organisers of irregular migration as smugglers trafficking human beings, we should 
instead focus on the “high level of interdependence between migrants and smugglers” and better 
understand this process as a service provided by the smugglers rather than as trafficking (De Haas, 
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2007: 25). The local Senegalese fishermen turned into smugglers for a limited period of time and 
responded to the high demands of prospective Sub-Saharan migrants willing to reach Europe. The 
growing demand for Senegalese fishermen and local would-be migrants to embark in those boats 
generated a rational organisation of the trips. The experiences of the returned migrants tell us about 
their strategies and tactics to circumvent police patrols’ controls and on the rational dimension of 
boat migration. 
 
2. Meaningful adventures 
 Boat migration from Senegal to Spain involved a complex combination of rational and less 
rational elements. The “marine culture” (Sall, 2007) of the fishermen has influenced the 
organisation of boat migration. This marine culture involves great expertise concerning the sea, the 
ability to manage sea-mobility-related financial investments and long-standing habits of 
circumventing state regulation practices at sea. Thus, the organisation of boat migration relied on 
this knowledge or marine culture.  Overall, fishermen are flexible; they have proved that they can 
adjust their habits to changing marine environments and constraints. Furthermore, the obsession of 
many local fishers about migrating to Europe was a driving force for the conveyors organising such 
trips. The fishermen were emotionally involved in their migration project and invested all their 
expectations in these sea crossings.   
 
Boat migration and lucrative businesses 
 In Senegalese fishing villages, boat migration progressively emerged as a sophisticated 
local economy based on potentially lucrative investments and on a strict hierarchy of land and sea-
based actors fulfilling specific tasks. The conveyors of the journeys were former or active 
fishermen, land-based boat owners and/or fish traders, though they did not always take part in the 
journeys, like Ousmane. Conveyors hired what Nyamnjoh calls “middlemen” (2010: 36) to assist 
them in recruiting prospective migrants. These middlemen were generally local fishermen willing 
to migrate as well. They were exempted from paying for their seat and took part in specific tasks 
aboard. Conveyors either provided one of their own boats and engines – either an ice-box or a 
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purse seine canoe – or constructed a purpose-built boat. On average, a hundred passengers 
embarked in one of these large canoes. As for long-distance fishing trips, the conveyors had to deal 
with logistics and hire crew members. Despite the significant logistics-related expenses (on average 
XOF 12 million – £15,000), conveyors generally made significant net profits, which Nyamnjoh 
estimated at around XOF 40 million (£50,000) for an extreme sea journey involving 170 
passengers (Nyamnjoh, 2010: 36).  Migrants paid around XOF 400,000 (£500) to XOF 
800,000 (£1,000) to get a “seat” on board and food and water for around seven days of navigation 
from the Senegalese coasts – depending on the departure point. Although the fishermen made their 
own decision to leave, they were greatly encouraged by their relatives and the ongoing excitement 
about these new migration opportunities. Family members, friends, boat owners or the fisherman 
himself paid for the journey. 
 Most of the time, the organisation of these sea crossings involved important family 
businesses relying on community networks and oral communication. In Hann, Idrissa’s family 
includes a returned migrant, a retired migrant fisherman, a fisherman who organised irregular sea 
journeys to Spain, and three emigrated fishermen living in Spain and their respective Dakar-based 
wives. Those three emigrated fishermen are the brothers of Idrissa and, before leaving, they used to 
navigate in distant waters. They went to Europe by sea in 2006: 
My three brothers left, before me, in 2006. They left with different pirogues. It’s been 
a while ... The elder one was with my dad; they used to fish in Guinea, Mauritania and 
so forth, and the other one used to fish around Mbour and Joal. One of my elder 
brothers was with a boat owner. He was the one who set the prices, but he didn’t 
finance it [...] this was the job of the boat owner. When they left, my two elder brothers 
didn’t pay for anything, except that one of them gave an engine to the boat owner. The 
other brother sent more than ten pirogues and earned a lot of money with this. But he 
has never left. He was looking for captains, crew members [...] He used to be an ice-
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box fisherman; he is Guet Ndarian. He’s forty years old. He works in Dakar, has got 
three wives, one in Saint-Louis and the other around here.152  
 The economic position of Idrissa’s father and elder brother provided an ideal situation for 
them to invest in the boat migration business. The whole family’s organisation has long been based 
on international maritime mobility, and Idrissa naturally refers to his father’s successful 
background in fishing: 
Each weekend, he [his father] used to have contracts with white people. He had a lot 
of white friends. He used to earn lots of money with fishing. As soon as he got money, 
he got four or five ice-box canoes, and lots of small fishing boat; he had six to seven 
small fishing boats.153 
 Idrissa’s father bought a pirogue with the aim of organising a migration journey to Europe, 
but he eventually changed his mind about doing it: “It was very likely that he would get a lot of 
people but he said that money is not the most important thing,” Idrissa says. It seems that when 
these journeys were organised by wealthy actors who were external to the fishing community, they 
tended to pay less attention to the quality of the boat and engines and to the skills of the crew 
members they hired. In these cases, mobility was especially driven by the power relations at stake 
on land and organised by actors who either held capital or knowledge, or both. Fishermen’s 
narratives emphasise the connections between these empowered land-based actors and hired 
fishermen. It was said that “experienced fishermen” generally did not insist on leaving if the 
weather conditions were too risky, whereas the “less skilled” captains were often accused of 
“forcing” the trip despite storms or problems occurring on the boat. As explained by Alassane, a 
migrant- fisherman who took part in a boat trip to Europe in 2006: 
I was in Saint-Louis, and a friend of mine who had a boat ready to go to Spain asked 
me to help him. There were 70 of us on the boat and there were 10 captains, I was the 
only one from Yoff. There are people who take advantage and earn money from these 
trips despite them not knowing anything about the sea, but they take advantage, they 
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stay in Senegal and pocket the money. Those from Saint-Louis, it’s different; they 
know the sea very well. They don’t risk their life; if there is a storm they come back. 
The others force it and it is a catastrophe.154 
 Fishermen developed a series of appropriation “tactics” in relation to the maritime space 
which turned the ocean into a border space – in the sense of De Certeau’s notion (De Certeau, 
1984). As they had been doing at the Mauritanian borderland or in remote southern waters in West 
Africa (chapter 5), fishermen have been using tactics to elude border controls and find their way to 
Spain. These tactics rely on practical knowledge and involve a series of practices reflected through 
their know-how of the maritime environment and religious and “naming” practices.  
 
Appropriation tactics: risks and limits 
 On their route to the Canary Islands, fishermen circumvented European and West African 
states’ control practices that aimed to prevent or deter maritime migration flows. These strategies to 
elude controls involved greater risks, which the fishermen nevertheless considered to be 
worthwhile taking. These tactics first involved adjusting the departure point according to police 
patrols. Boats first left from Saint-Louis, on the northern coast of Senegal. Between 2004 and 2008, 
departure points progressively moved further south while controls were getting stronger. Boats left 
from Kayar, Dakar, Mbour and the Gambia and finally from Casamance. The further south the 
departure point, the longer – and thus riskier – the journey was. Rather than confronting patrols at 
sea, they avoided them and took detours, doing their best to remain invisible. Boats secretly left the 
coasts at night and crews were aware of the Senegalese police patrols’ schedules. Fishermen 
reported that conveyors sometimes had useful connections with local Senegalese policemen. 
Conveyors used to pay bribes so that they could launch the boat without getting arrested. Once off 
the coasts, crew members were following a pre-programmed route on their GPS device which the 
conveyors had previously bought from other conveyors or well-informed actors. Captains managed 
to take routes to the Canary Islands, which were far enough from the coasts so that they could stay 
invisible. They initially headed to the west, and once in international waters, they could more easily 
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escape controls and reach the Canary Islands.155 The motorised wooden canoes were not easily 
detectable by radar and satellite systems. However, when they got lost in Spanish waters, ran out of 
fuel or had a mechanical breakdown, as in the case of Mustapha, they did everything to be seen by 
border patrols so that they could be rescued. Mustapha is a fisherman from Kayar who travelled to 
Zinguinchor from the southern region of Casamance in September 2006.156 With 171 other people 
aboard, they spent 11 days at sea. When boats departed from Casamance, risks increased as they 
had to cross a far bigger distance to reach the Canary Islands than when leaving from northern 
areas of Senegal. Mustapha’s crew had a mechanical problem not far away from the archipelago 
and were found by the Spanish navy, who brought them to Hierro Island in the Canaries, where 
they spent several weeks in camps before being repatriated. 
 Another example demonstrates how the strategies developed by the captains led to 
situations that seriously affected crews and their passengers. In 2007, the International Organisation 
for Migration’s Dakar-based team took in 89 migrants whose boat had nearly sunk off Mauritania 
and who were rescued by a Spanish fishing ship. Being part of this IOM team, I conducted 
interviews among these migrants who got lost at sea and had spent 28 days drifting aimlessly after 
having departed from Casamance. The captain and crew members started to get lost in international 
waters when their GPS device broke down. They ran out of fuel after a few days of navigation but 
were able to survive with the food and water supplies that were left, although 10 of the passengers 
died during the crossing. Most of the migrants suffered from hallucinations as a result of a lack of 
quality sleep, food and drinkable water; the experience turned out to be a nightmare which 
traumatised the migrants. Only a third of the passengers were fishermen used to navigating in local 
Senegalese waters. Their navigation experience helped them to cope with the terrible conditions of 
their journeys as they were lost at sea. 
 Staying invisible has been a recurrent strategy in the deployment of illegal migration 
routes. These strategies were strengthened by the “powers” of the marabouts, who had central roles 
in the spiritual preparation for the sea trip to Europe. Some migrants stated that thanks to the many 
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talismans located in several parts of the boat, they were able to become “invisible” and escape 
police checks.157 Sophie Bava stresses the complex relation linking spirituality, migration and the 
influence of the marabout on his taalibé (disciples)’s mobility: “the marabout works as ‘a material 
and religious comprehensive insurance’ [Salem, 1981, in Bava 2003] helping his taalibé by 
providing them with Baraka, advices to live in France and blessings”158 (Bava, 2003). For the 
mystic work performed, marabouts in charge of those pirogues easily earned XOF 1 million, which 
is an appreciable share of the comprehensive budget of the trip. The marabout’s decision was the 
last step of the planning of the trip, as conveyors never launched a boat without their spiritual 
blessings. These strategies rely on fishermen’s practical knowledge and are reminiscent of their 
fishing mobility experiences in Senegal waters and beyond. The local fishermen who were not 
involved in the preparation of the journeys and only took part in the sea crossings proved to be less 
organised, although their familiarity with the sea made Europe feel closer to them. 
 
Getting familiar with the ocean and the spaces beyond the sea 
 None of the fishermen I interviewed ever attempted to apply for a visa to get legal access 
to Europe. Local fishermen generally said that they had heard how difficult it is to be issued with a 
visa and did not even consider this possibility. The proximity to the ocean and the maritime habits 
of the fishermen somehow made their choice easier. Although they would never cross the desert or 
apply for a visa, they would definitely cross the sea to reach the Canaries. For them, Spain became 
closer, and the ocean took on a new function. They sometimes tried several times to cross the sea 
and eventually gave up after several unsuccessful attempts. Indeed, going to the Canary Islands 
became an intense obsession, and nothing seemed powerful enough to deter them from leaving. 
When covering the news related to boat migration, Senegalese media often used the slang 
expression “mbeuk mi” in reference to the sheep that bumps obsessively into its fences.159 Crossing 
the sea was, too, the most affordable means of getting to Europe and the most direct route from 
West Africa. Those who were used to fishing every day at sea did not consider this adventure to be 
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frightening and perilous. When boats started to leave from Senegal, the sea journey raised great 
expectations. Europe eventually got closer, until it seemed as if it was just beyond the sea. The sea 
space suddenly provided new resources to be taken advantage of. Now that the marine grounds had 
been emptied, its surface became a meaningful path to reach Spain. In addition, the whole 
background of European border controls’ move and the resulting shift of migration routes brought 
the European doors closer to these prospective migrants. Thus, because fishermen were familiar 
with the sea, Europe became more concretely reachable.  
 There is an absolute contrast between the rationality of the organisation of the trips by the 
conveyors and the immediacy and unpreparedness of the willing migrants’ decisions to cross the 
sea. That particular behaviour is related to the changing function of the sea and the maritime habits 
of the fishers. Fishermen seemed to take the decision to leave for Spain as if they were deciding to 
leave for a fishing trip. Two striking examples of returned migrants help understand this point. 
First, there is Mohamed, a young fisherman and nearly professional football player who attempted 
to leave in 2007. What he was expecting from the journey’s conveyor was a signal, a phone call 
which would inform him that the crew was ready to leave as soon as possible. He received that 
phone call while he was at his football training. He immediately reached the crew on the beach 
without letting anyone around him know that he was about to leave. He was only wearing his 
training clothes, as he had not even passed by his house.  Idrissa told another astonishing story. 
When he took his decision to leave, he was studying at home. All of a sudden, he made all 
necessary preparations to leave his village and cross the ocean when he heard the rumour that a 
boat was about to leave: 
It was the 28th of October 2006; I remember it very well. It was on a Sunday. I had an 
assignment in geography; I was studying something about the inequalities in 
development. All my older brothers had left, all my friends; all had left by sea and 
gone to the Canary Islands. I didn’t pay anything, I forced my way. The pirogue was 
over there [he points towards the sea, next to the shore]. They were trying to put 
everything in place. We got told; we ran over and reached them. They said, “No, it’s 
an ice-box canoe, we’re going to work,” and we said, “Well, we’re going to work as 
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well,” and we imposed ourselves on them. They eventually accepted us on board the 
boat because they didn’t want us to denounce them. ... The same night, there were 
almost 80 people aboard. ... I had no more hope; our right to education had been 
mortgaged; I no longer knew what to do. I wanted to leave to go abroad, but 
unfortunately I failed.160 
 The people who were preparing the boat for a journey to the Canary Islands first pretended 
that they were about to go for a fishing expedition. Idrissa knew this was not true and threatened 
that he would call the police if they did not take him and his friends aboard. The argument he put to 
them is very symbolic: “We’re going to work as well” implies that no matter whether they were 
leaving to go fishing or to go to Europe, embarking in these boats remains synonymous with work.  
 These two stories reflect how Europe became a close place which could be reachable like 
any local fishing place. In both cases, the migrants talked about how rough the journey was, how 
cold and uncomfortable it was and how afraid they were in the boat. They did not expect these 
huge waves and violent storms to shake the boat in such an impressive way. They did not expect 
either that spending seven days with nearly a hundred people – many of whom were not used to 
navigating at all – would be so long and rough. They were clearly underprepared for such journeys, 
although they knew the sea because they had been fishermen for a while. But because they heard 
that some relatives had succeeded in this adventure, they attempted it as well.  This unpreparedness 
of the local migrants is clearly distinct from the rational dimension of the organisation of the whole 
journey. These narratives demonstrate that fishermen were investing more than their personal or 
family savings in these adventures. Their sudden decision and unpreparedness reflect a strong 
physical and emotional commitment that seems to give them enough strength to cross the ocean. It 
is their obsession and personal involvement that gave the ocean the meaning of being a wide border 
space to cross. 
 Finally, the appropriation of the oceanic border space is revealed through specific language 
practices as well. The phenomenon of irregular migration was often phrased as “Barça or Barsakh” 
meaning “Barcelona or the Beyond” (see Bouilly 2008). This expression combines the spiritual and 
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cultural value of the migration journey and converts the ocean either into a pathway to Europe –
better nicknamed as Barça, in reference to the football club of Barcelona– or, more tragically, to 
the Beyond. There is a strong symbolism in this expression, as, in three words, Senegalese people 
had powerfully summarised the sea journey to Europe. These words can be interpreted in many 
different ways. Barça is not simply Barcelona. This expression crystallises the many hopes of a 
number of prospective migrants who had in mind the successful expatriation of Senegalese football 
players to Europe. It reflects as well a process of appropriation of the Spanish city through oral 
language practices. Similarly, Madrid was naturally nicknamed “Real” or “Real Madrid”, as in 
Idrissa’s comments on his brother’s emigration: 
Two of them live together, and the other one lives elsewhere. One is in Barcelona, and 
the others are in Real Madrid.161 
 This naming practice is reminiscent of the way fishermen have been giving personalised 
names to their fishing places throughout the ocean. These nicknames seem to be a way to bring 
these distant spaces closer and make them more familiar to the prospective migrants. With this 
journey, there were two possibilities. Reaching Barça – meaning succeeding in Spain at least as 
well as the soccer players – or dying. Death would be either concrete, and involve drowning into 
the sea, or more symbolic, in that migrants would fail or not even attempt to leave Senegal. This 
“social death” was formulated by De Latour in a study on Ivorian migrants whose migration 
projects failed (E. De Latour, 2003: 188). The alternative, “Barsakh”, adds a spiritual value to the 
journey and participated in its mystification and romanticisation. This spiritual dimension helped 
the migrants to get mentally prepared for an acceptable death as well – although their death would 
not depend on them but rather on their destiny and God’s choice. 
 With these migration routes to Europe, mobility strategies relied on the combination of 
spirituality, knowledge and experience at sea. Migrants were empowered by the prayers, advice and 
mystic objects provided by their spiritual leaders. Once they eventually reached the Spanish coasts, 
they felt they had succeeded and had survived the maritime experience. They did not expect to be 
repatriated straight away to Senegal. 
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Disillusioning returning experiences  
 When they reached the Canary coastline after having spent one week at sea, migrants all 
felt relieved. Instead of trying to hide themselves and looking for a convenient place to secretly 
land, they openly looked for assistance.  They were expecting to eat and sleep and had the feeling 
that the worst was over. They became visible due to the media coverage. When they arrived in 
Spanish waters, migrants were taken in either by the local authorities or by the Spanish Red Cross. 
However, after some identification processes and official procedures, the Spanish authorities sent 
them to detention camps, where their case would be sorted out within the next 40 days. After 
agreements had been signed between Senegal and Spain in September 2006, Senegalese nationals 
were systematically repatriated. Nevertheless, although they were aware of their likely repatriation, 
they believed there was still a chance to be accepted in Europe – that their fate would decide for 
them.  
 Once in the Canary Islands’ camps, migrants found themselves in a temporary closed space 
where they had suddenly been imprisoned after having first been received as victims. In camps, 
they reported they “were treated like slaves” or “dogs”.162 Most respondents stated that after almost 
40 days in camps, they still did not know whether they would be released in Spain or sent back to 
Senegal. They occasionally found out that they were being deported back to Senegal, only once 
they were boarding the plane, handcuffed and surrounded by two policemen; or, in the worst case, 
while landing in Dakar. Mustapha reports: 
We stayed in the camps until the 18th of October, two days before our repatriation. 
We were not allowed to get out. The 19th, very early, they took us out of the cell; there 
were 100 people in the cells. They made us line up. My brother was in the opposite 
cell. I wanted to be with him but I was behind in the row. They tied our hands with 
nylon thread. We were brought to the airport and two rows of policemen were facing 
the stairs. There, I knew. If we were separated, I knew we were leaving. We were 
divided into two groups: one for Malaga and the other for Madrid, but just before we 
left, we heard we were going back home. Each of us got into the plane with a 
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policeman. After 20 minutes of flight, they cut our thread. Before we arrived, the 
captain announced we were about to land in Saint-Louis. Then each of us received 50 
euros from the Spanish government.163  
 The camp plays the role of a border, as this is where the regulation process has stopped 
migrants’ mobility. According to Simon Turner’s analysis of a refugee camp in north-western 
Tanzania, “apart from being a place of ‘no longer’, the camp is also a place of ‘not yet’” (Turner, 
2005: 333).This space is “suspended” and holds the migrants for a determined period of time after 
a rough sea trip and before a reachable life in Europe. Their imminent repatriation to Senegal is 
kept secret until the last moment by the authorities in order to maintain order and security and 
avoid protests. The camp embodies here an external surveillance structure in which information 
and movements are carefully controlled.  A border, as a producer of space, “can be understood as a 
permanent state of exception” (Salter, 2006: 169). Migrants’ lack of awareness of migration rules 
makes them vulnerable and exposes them to possible abuses within the strictly organised camp 
structure. Their criminalisation gives the authorities of the camp a legitimacy to exercise power in 
the name of security. Being criminals for having transgressed the law, the migrants represent a 
threat to security. Keeping them uninformed in order to minimise the threat they represent becomes 
a legitimate strategy that justifies these practices. 
 When Senegal signed readmission agreements with Spain in 2006, other West African 
countries had still not accepted the repatriation of their citizens who had illegally migrated to the 
Canary Islands. Senegalese migrants therefore did not understand why they were sent back to 
Senegal whereas migrants of other nationalities could eventually go to Spain. Moussa, a returned 
migrant I met in Kayar in 2011, explained that they were told by the Spanish police:  
During these 40 days, you can be free and go to the Spanish territory. But if during 
these 40 days, your president, your government, needs you, you will return to 
Senegal.164 [In fact, to be more exact, it is not “during” forty days, but rather ‘after’.] 
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They identify their repatriation as a decision that came from the Senegalese state. This 
interpretation was reinforced by the presence of Senegalese policemen who were sent to the Canary 
Islands in order to identify their compatriots in case they pretended they were not Senegalese.
 While migrants had crossed the sea and felt relieved to safely reach the Spanish shore, they 
faced the disillusion of their arrest and suddenly lost all control of their personal situation, future 
and expectations. Their repatriation was perceived by many of them as a failure, which was 
morally and physically “too hard to handle”.165 They felt dispossessed of their own future and 
betrayed by their own government, and could hardly imagine how they would be able to face their 
family, who counted on them. What is striking in fishermen’s narratives is the way they apprehend 
the Senegalese state’s practices with their own feelings and emotions. Their personal interpretation 
translates into a lack of comprehension and a distance towards Senegal state’s decisions. 
 Once back, most of the migrants had no choice other than going back to fishing. 
Moustapha had to contract debts and borrow fishing gear from his uncle to go back to sea in Kayar. 
He benefited from navigation training in Saint-Louis through an international NGO programme. 
Generally, returnees often complained of being ashamed of being deported back to Senegal. They 
were not ashamed of having crossed the border illegally but rather of having failed their migration 
projects and of having been unable to satisfy their family’s expectation and financial investment. 
At the beginning, this migration strategy was perceived as a last chance to go to Europe and the 
courage of the would-be migrants was greatly celebrated. They were brave would-be migrants, 
willing to sacrifice themselves for their family. Being a returnee in Senegal was perceived as a 
shameful moral failure which migrants could hardly stand, rather than as a condemnable act in that 
they had broken the law. Some of them became seriously depressed and traumatised by these 
forced returns and were sometimes unable to speak for months. Anaik Pian stresses how the 
repatriation of the Senegalese migrants was often perceived as a “rupture” in their life and their 
migration projects (Pian, 2006: 88). Returned migrants had been both psychologically and 
physically marked and needed time to rebuild themselves (Pian, 2006). 
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 Returned migrants created organisations in the most affected parts of the country and tried 
to form a national network. In the fishing village of Kayar, almost 500 migrants registered with the 
local organisation. When he came back from the Canary Islands, Moussa did not want to go back to 
fishing and decided to take part in the local returnee organisation. He proposed creating alternative 
projects of selling cosmetics in his village. Returnee organisations embody migrant fishermen’s 
European border experiences and give temporary social recognition and psychological support. The 
inability of the Senegalese government to propose alternatives after these massive repatriation 
movements encouraged the returned migrants to create these independent organisations (Marx, 
2008). The status of migrants has changed as these organisations give them the visibility and 
legitimacy they had lost during the repatriation process or camp experiences. They are also a 
response to the weak state response they had been confronted with on their arrival. In July 2006, 
with the aim of settling a young rural population and preventing irregular migration, the Senegalese 
government launched the agriculture development programme “REVA plan”166 (IPAR, 2006). 
Senegalese fishing villages were the places most affected by irregular migration to Europe. In the 
surroundings of Dakar, the villages of Thiaroye, Hann and Yoff suffered the loss of several 
hundred fishers who attempted to reach the Canary Islands by sea. By fostering the development of 
agriculture as a response to these maritime movements, which mainly involved fishermen, the 
Senegalese government was greatly criticised for its lack of pragmatism by the fishing 
communities. Respondents ironically reframe the name of the REVA plan as “c’est du rêve” 
(literally, “it’s a dream”).  
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has highlighted the power–knowledge relations at stake in the organisation of 
irregular migration from Senegal to Europe. A few put trust in the reputed knowledge of others, 
others held capital and invested in boat migration, and some individuals used their practical 
knowledge to avoid controls. These movements involved either vulnerable or empowered actors, 
experienced but illiterate fishers, and unskilled and poor prospective migrants. The narratives of the 
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fishermen have demonstrated how they gave the ocean space the function of a border space giving 
access to Europe. On the routes of fishermen, the ocean had at first taken on the meaning of a 
frontier through their constant efforts to push spatial limits away and access more resources. When 
fishermen decided to convert themselves into conveyors and use their boats in order to carry 
African migrants to the Canary Islands, the ocean itself had been changed into a wide border space 
giving access to Europe. Fishermen have shaped this changing geography of the ocean by using 
similar strategies, appropriation practices and tactics to those that they had been developing over 
time throughout their maritime mobility in Senegal and beyond borders. This genuine geography of 
the sea entails both a rational and an emotional apprehension of the ocean and challenges the 
border practices of European and West African states. Through maritime military operations, the 
sea has been used as a bordering surface on which the states involved in migration prevention could 
exercise their sovereignty and unfold border practices, while for the fishermen, the ocean was 
playing the role of a gateway to Europe.  
 The way the migration experience has empowered the fishermen among their community 
by giving much more significance to their absence is further explored in chapter 9. I will show how 
the commitment of these individuals to their community is paradoxically balanced by their own 
perspectives of self-emancipation provided by this mobility. This last chapter introduces a 
reflection on the gendered construction of fishermen’s spaces and mobility and explores the 
tensions at stake between the intimate and limited place of the household and the spaces lying 
behind the open oceanic space.  
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Chapter 9 
Places in Tension:  
Meaningful Absences and Gendered Mobilities 
 
  
 The absences of the mobile fishermen have affected the organisation of their land-based 
community. In the case of long-distance fishing migration in West Africa, fishermen spend most of 
the year at sea with regular returns home, while for the many fishermen who settled in Europe for 
several years, in the best cases they sporadically come back to Senegal for holidays – when they 
obtain legal status, at least. In any case, fishermen increasingly tend to be absent from their 
community. Their longer absence, either at sea or in Europe, has taken the value of courage and 
become synonymous with hard work and remittances for the land-based women. Far from being 
weakened by this absence, the role fishermen have played among their family has become crucial. 
Men’s long absences have had an impact on the mobility of their wives, daughters and mothers, 
whose everyday experience of spaces and places has taken new shapes and values. Leaving has 
therefore been assimilated to a greater autonomy and a possibility for self-affirmation and 
emancipation: the distance and absence generated by the migration paradoxically enabled the 
fishermen to recover control over their life and community. This chapter explores the tensions 
between the narrow, intimate place of fishermen’s households and the external spaces to which the 
household is connected. These external spaces are the ocean and the places to which it gives access. 
Although their respective geographical natures oppose the household and these external spaces, 
both types of space interact together and influence and reflect each other. These external spaces, 
which are mostly known and practised by men, are as central as the intimate “feminine” home. 
 Senegalese fishermen’s families construct their intimacy on ambiguous power–knowledge 
relations. Each actor, whether mobile or immobile, has control over its own field of information 
and one sphere hardly interacts with the others. It seems that whether on the unlimited ocean space 
and beyond or in the narrow household place, the actors involved in male mobility negotiate their 
freedom of movement according to their own skills, possibilities and socio-cultural limits. As with 
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De Certeau’s walkers, women and men develop specific tactics to appropriate a superior order, 
which is embodied here by the oppressive community system and the traditional gendered 
distribution of social functions and geographic frames. I argue that individuals, both males and 
females, negotiate practices of emancipation and self-accomplishment by circumventing or 
adjusting to this traditional structure. For men, this translates into mobility and absence, whereas 
women seek to mediate power through male mobility. 
 This chapter first explores the gendered construction of spaces around which male and 
female members of fishermen’s communities progress every day. I then examine the tensions 
existing between these spaces from the perspective of fishermen’s households and through the 
narratives of the household-based actors who are affected by the mobility of others. Finally, the 
chapter deciphers the relationship between polygamy and mobility. While male mobility certainly 
encourages polygamy and strengthens gendered social constructions, it also provides the fishermen 
with the means to escape the tensions generated by polygamy practices. 
 
1. Gendered geographies 
 The organisation of spaces develops according to the gendered division of social functions 
in Senegalese fishing societies. Male mobility has strengthened these existing geographical and 
socially gendered constructions. These constructions progress in tension between a traditional 
community system and the perspectives of self-emancipation and individualisation made 
achievable through male mobility. The way fishermen move is influenced by the nature of the 
space on which they move, and this is similar for women. The traditional gendered understanding 
of mobility has long opposed a supposedly powerful masculine mobility and a powerless feminine 
immobility (Cresswell & Uteng, 1994).  Both men and women have developed distinct ways of 
exercising power through this mobility. Fishermen’s narratives bring to light these specific aspects 
and corroborate Cresswell and Uteng’s argument:  
How people move (where, how fast, how often etc.) is demonstrably gendered and 
continues to reproduce gendered power hierarchies. The meanings given to mobility 
through narrative, discourse and representation have also been clearly differentiated by 
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gender. Similarly, narratives of mobility and immobility play a central role in the 
constitution of gender as a social and cultural construct. Finally, mobilities are 
experienced and practiced differently. (Cresswell & Uteng, 1994: 2) 
 
 The discourses of the mobile and immobile actors – both men and women – on mobility 
bring to light the connections between the different places and spaces at stake in the migration 
experience – the household, the ocean and the remote foreign places. These narratives reveal the 
gendered construction of mobility practices as well as the power struggles which shape the 
relationships between these distinct actors. Although men are the exclusive mobile actors, the 
actions of both women and men make mobility possible. Women financially or morally supported 
male maritime migration to Europe, and long-distance fishing migration might operate on board 
boats belonging to women. Although a traditional gendered dichotomy between spaces in Senegal 
has long been marked, female immobility and confinement at home or to their immediate 
environment is not necessarily a mark of powerlessness. Women keep control over the intimate and 
closed places. 
 While males are dedicated to hard work and securing livelihoods for their families, women 
generally stay home and look after the children, although in some cases they are dedicated to fish- 
processing tasks at the local market. Few women turn into fish traders and boat owners 
(Photograph 20). Nevertheless, in any case women’s work does not necessarily involve a high 
degree of mobility – at least it is not comparable to that of men at sea. They never go to sea, which 
is a space of danger traditionally restricted to men. I observed that when fishermen are not working, 
they avoid staying at home with their wives and instead meet with friends in other places in the 
village. Unless their presence is justified, males’ place is not at home (Photograph 21).  
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Photograph 20: Women attending fishers’ landing 
 in Hann, July 2012, J.H. 
 
Photograph 21: Men’s daily meeting in Guet Ndar, 
Saint Louis, July 2012, J.H. 
 
 Men’s place is elsewhere, somewhere where they can get whatever is needed to earn a 
living. Fatou is the Saint-Louis-based wife of a long-distance fisherman who settled in Dakar with 
his second wife. Her statement reflects the socially accepted gendered division of tasks and the 
resulting physical male absence in households: 
It is better that men are absent. Men are born to work, to take care of women and 
work. It is not a problem if they are absent; it is better. If he is not here, it is good, it 
means he’s working.167  
 Male mobility is based on this gendered construction of spaces which progresses according 
to a specific tension between a visible, uncomfortable and useless presence and a meaningful, 
positive absence. Fishermen’s mobility brings to light the tension between the desired, remote 
place and their rejected sense of immobility in their Senegalese household. Fishermen do not want 
to reflect the visible image of immobile and passive unemployed people. For example, the Guet 
Ndarian leader (chapter 4) reported how he encouraged his son to leave for Spain a few years ago. 
In the same interview, he mentions three times how it was difficult for his son to “stand idly by 
with his wife and children”. 168 Moreover, for Idrissa, women’s level of expectations of men’s duty 
is high and makes men’s life hard. His narrative highlights the social pressure community members 
put on active male workers: 
You see, here, we have our realities. Women clean the house, all they must do is 
cleaning and looking after the children ... Women spend their time making themselves 
pretty [...] wouh! That’s a pity. ... “Sama djeukeur dafa sagal”. What it means in 
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French… hum, it’s very rich Wolof, I don’t know… “I hold my head high thanks to my 
husband”, that is what it means.169 
 Idrissa’s comments reveal the ambiguity of men and women’s relationships. Although the 
traditional distribution of social functions makes women dependent on men, the expected role of 
men, which is to provide a decent economic and social status for women, nearly puts them in an 
inferior position to women. Also, women’s expectations of their husband’s duties prove to be 
socially accepted, as they are even codified in Wolof. Idrissa goes on to say:  
Senegalese custom [...] Senegalese people, they spend too much money. But it 
depends, if you are a disciple like me, I’m humble and I do what I can, you see, I don’t 
need to get in debt [...] I avoid getting in trouble [...] But women, they say they want to 
show off, showing extraordinary things so that people say, “Wouhouu, the baptism 
was exceptional!” Then, the day after, you will try to find solutions to repay your 
debts. ... They don’t buy the sheep. [for traditional celebrations] We, the men, we do 
buy the sheep. They only spend their time making themselves pretty, wearing new 
clothes, new shoes; this is extraordinary! [he laughs] Sheep?  They don’t even buy 
vinegar or mustard to cook the meat! They don’t buy anything at all! We must rack 
our brain to find a sheep. And if you’re unfortunate enough to find a slightly too 
skinny sheep [...] ohhh you’re getting in serious troubles [...] “Your sheep there [...] it 
looks like a carcass!”... This is nonsense, it’s too hard.170 
 
 Being absent is crucial to men as this is not only synonymous with work but also with 
better control over the personal earnings they get from fishing or from working abroad. I have 
shown in chapter 5 that when fishermen are away, either at sea or in Europe, they can hide the 
amount of their income and free themselves from this community pressure. Migrating keeps them 
away from the community pressure, which enables them to better manage their income and 
expenses. From Spain they are still morally obliged to send remittances, though they can better 
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manage their investment. They send remittances on a monthly basis and manage their sending as a 
whole rather than sharing it in small quantities on a daily basis. They divide remittances into 
expenditure for the household, education, building extensions for the house and traditional 
ceremonies. Leaving appears to be an opportunity to make their powerlessness less visible. 
Fishermen report that when they have no money to invest in fuel and fishing gear for a fishing trip, 
they are forced to stay on land and feel judged by their family. De Latour observed a similar 
tension in the context of emigrated young urban Ivorian people: 
Leaving courageously is a saving act which pushes back general hostility, bringing a 
kind of reconciliation around the beneficial absence which takes precedence over the 
invasive presence. (E. De Latour, 2003: 178) 171 
 Here, fishermen expect their absence to be “beneficial” and to produce the effect of a 
distraction from their too visible and passive presence. What they expect from their mobility is 
strengthened by the gendered construction of their community. As men, they are supposed to be 
mobile and to use their mobility to make their family survive. The expected absence produced by a 
migration journey to Europe reproduces these social constructions. Fishermen’s families have 
pushed the young male generations to leave and escape their too visible and forced immobility. Sea 
migration to Europe became a powerful means to provide a calculated absence and relieve the 
young unemployed fishermen from their unwanted and too visible presence.  
 By avoiding being physically too visible within their community, fishermen gained 
opportunities for individual emancipation. Fouquet has shown how the young Dakar-based 
prospective migrants projected themselves into migration plans to reach social recognition 
(Fouquet, 2008). Migration gives access to new steps in the social hierarchy and is synonymous 
with social success. Fouquet stresses the way migration – as a delocalised experience – is 
considered by the young Senegalese as a powerful way to reach personal emancipation. This 
experience can be either lived or imagined; it acts as a symbolic detachment that frees young 
individuals from their traditional communal system so that they can “grow socially”(Fouquet, 
2008: 267). Although traditional West African societies consider individualistic practices to be 
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potential threats to the values of solidarity and community systems (Marie, 2007), by encouraging 
and depending on male mobility they indirectly foster the self-emancipation of their mobile 
members. Marie shows how this paradox has led to a new social compromise that enables 
individuals to become autonomous without jeopardising the community systems on which such 
traditional societies are based: 
The community solidarity remains assumed like a value and a duty, but it becomes 
conditional of a conscious win-win relationship (helping those who help, have helped 
or will be able to help) and to an arbitration based on the new needs of the couple and 
its children. (Marie, 2007:179) 172 
 For the fishing community, mobility proves to be the only socially accepted way in which 
self- accomplishment can be achieved; individual mobility is celebrated in some forms only. By 
encouraging this mobility and counting on the likely success of their sons or husbands, the women 
indirectly encourage a certain kind of personal emancipation. The community tolerates this 
emancipation only from the perspective of the benefits that this enrichment would provide in return 
to its land-based members. As a consequence, this individualisation process strengthens and 
reproduces the community system in place through the dependence relationships binding the absent 
individuals to their close and extended families. On can observe these mechanisms from the 
perspective of the households in which members are involved in international mobility. 
 
2. Observing mobility from the fishermen’s households 
 At the heart of their households, fishermen make visible the marks of wealth and success. 
Through their narratives, the land-based community members reveal the ongoing tensions that 
shape their relationship to the absent emigrants. Either the women or “failed” migrant fishermen 
negotiate their own freedom of movement according to the new social hierarchies generated by the 
expatriation of their community members. Idrissa’s household is significantly involved in 
international mobility (chapter 8) and progresses in a concrete tension between different spaces: the 
household, the sea and remote places (Europe or West African fishing places). I was introduced to 
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Idrissa by my key informant in Hann. Idrissa himself became a valuable informant as he speaks 
both French and Wolof fluently. As a spiritual leader, he made making contact with other 
community members easier. On the local scale of the household, Idrissa’s narrative exemplifies the 
tensions between the example of his successful emigrated brothers and his own immobile 
experience. Idrissa is the only one who “failed” – as he put it – and could not reach Europe. The 
way he describes each of his family members and their successful life contrasts with his own 
experience.  
 What is remarkable is the way his father and brothers greatly encouraged Idrissa’s 
maritime mobility by giving less credibility to his school activities and encouraging sea migration 
to Europe in general. Idrissa is a young fisherman whose position slightly differs from his brothers. 
He is in fragile health and he is the only family member who went to school for a long time and 
does not dedicate his entire time to fishing. Idrissa reports how he has been earning less and less 
money with the jobs he has been doing over the past years, while his three emigrated brothers 
seemed to succeed in Europe. Contrary to his brothers and father, Idrissa fishes in the waters 
surrounding his village and has never taken part in a large-scale fishing expedition. He simply line-
fishes next to the Dakar peninsula, with no GPS, on board his small motorised canoe. When not 
fishing, he works at the local fishing wharf and earns no more than XOF 15,000 a month (£18).  
 Idrissa has an extended knowledge of his brothers’ way of life in Spain, for which he gives 
precise descriptions. Like many fishermen, Idrissa constructed his migration project to Spain upon 
the narratives of his emigrated brothers and returned relatives. The equipment his brothers brought 
back to Senegal as well as the bedrooms they have been building on the upper level of the house 
have contributed to the construction of solid narratives of successful emigration experiences:  
Two of them live together, and the other one lives elsewhere. One is in Barcelona, and 
the others are in Real Madrid. All this equipment [...] they brought it, the television 
and all this [he shows the hi-fi equipment in the bedroom]. They also built three 
bedrooms. ... It’s been six years. We talk by Skype here; there is a computer there, in 
my elder brother’s bedroom; we regularly talk. They send money at the end of each 
month, for the everyday expenses, the electricity and water charges [...] well, they get 
209 
 
organised, to take charge of all this ... Because their wives are all here, and their 
children as well. They rent a house there, they get organised together, for the food, the 
cooking; they live in good conditions.173 
 Idrissa is in a permanent tension between the visible results of his brothers’ expatriation 
and his own immobility. He must also cope with the great paradox between his higher level of 
education and reduced mobility and the successful mobility of his brothers, achieved despite a 
lower level of education. These tensions are revealed in his answers when I asked him whether 
Omar – his brother who lives in Spain – could speak Spanish: 
He doesn’t use proper grammar rules [he laughs]. We were chatting together, because 
when he was back, he told me: “Well, over there in Europe, you say “buscar trabajar, 
buscar trabajar”. I said, “No, you shouldn’t say ‘buscar trabajar, buscar is an 
infinitive verb’ you understand? Then he told me, “No, you don’t know anything, you 
know nothing.” So, it’s “yo busco un trabajo”, I’m sure [...] But he doesn’t know how 
to read, this is for sure; he can’t read. I don’t know how he does, but he makes it 
anyway [...] So, because there, the computer, it’s too easy, and there are lots of 
computers there... one of his friends might help him [...] I don’t know [...] to manage a 
little bit on his own, but no, he can’t read.174 
 Idrissa’s behaviour during the interview is ambiguous. On one hand, he seems very 
enthusiastic about talking of the life of his brothers in Spain, doing his best to stay as close to the 
truth as possible, while on the other hand I notice he is feeling nervous, impatient and slightly 
envious. This piece of conversation he reports shows very well how his own academic knowledge 
is not worthy of international maritime mobility. Although Omar is illiterate, he managed to go to 
Spain, got documented after one year and very soon started sending remittances to his family. His 
brother disagrees with Idrissa’s answers when he says, “You don’t know anything.” Although 
Idrissa learnt Spanish at school and is able to correct his elder brother, this knowledge has less 
value than the real experience, there, in Europe. Through Idrissa’s narrative, one can perceive 
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different sorts of valuable and less valuable knowledge shaping this international mobility. The 
migration experience both requires and produces knowledge. A symbolic competition based on 
these different types of knowledge seems to oppose the two brothers. Although their relationship is 
intense – Idrissa reported a number of calls every week – there are great tensions and power 
struggles between them. This is reminiscent of Mills’ reflection on power – which she bases on the 
work of Joanna Thornborrow. She acknowledges the juxtaposition of different values of power–
knowledge frames which individuals can negotiate with: 
You may be relatively low in the hierarchy within an institution, but you may be able 
to locally negotiate a more powerful position for yourself because of your skills and 
ability. This distinction between two types of power is important in being able to 
assess which positions of power are negotiable and which are not. (Mills, 2007: 50) 
  Over the course of my repeated visits, I observe how the present family members use the 
space in the house. International mobility is at the heart of Idrissa’s family story as the family 
house has been built thanks to what was earned elsewhere. The house space’s use clearly reflects 
the mobility habits of the different family members. The old respected father – a retired migrant 
fisherman – has one of the upper bedrooms, whereas Idrissa’s room is the smallest one, next to the 
kitchen, downstairs. The front door opens into a main courtyard surrounded by a couple of 
bedrooms, the kitchen and the living room. The house has two levels, which can be reached from 
the main courtyard. While men generally sit and chat together in the dark living room, women are 
dedicated to cleaning or cooking tasks in the courtyard or kitchen. Idrissa’s bedroom is a very small 
and dark place, with a mattress on the floor. Like the old father, Idrissa’s brothers’ families live 
upstairs, in comfortable bedrooms facing the sea.  
 In this house, one feels the tensions between an intense communal way of life and the 
celebration of individual mobility and success. The emigrated brothers both actively take part in the 
community life of their Senegal-based family and emancipate themselves from the community 
pressure. In this sense, migration reinforces the community system and at the same time gives more 
strength to personal achievement. Idrissa seems to be alone in this enterprise, looking for a valuable 
place between the absent successful males and the present busy women. Also, besides his unusual 
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level of education, Idrissa is a local spiritual leader and permanently wears religious clothes. I 
interpreted this strong and ostentatious religious identity as a way for him to find a legitimate and 
genuine place among his family. Beyond the house’s architecture, Idrissa’s brothers left signs of 
their successful expatriation on the walls and through the photographs they sent to their family. 
 
Meaningful pictures 
 Later on, while we are speaking with Aida – Omar’s wife – Idrissa starts discussing a 
series of photographs which Omar printed out and sent to her. Both Aida and Idrissa have a little 
explanation for each picture which Aida had gathered into a small chronological album. Idrissa 
explains his brother’s lifestyle in Europe from the pictures and describes the way he moves, works, 
eats, prays and sends money and so forth. Through these photographs and messages, Omar filters 
the information about his life in Spain. He successively pauses while he is cooking, phoning from 
the landline and eating a sandwich, sitting on the floor with a dozen other black men. We also see 
Omar either giving money to the cashier at the supermarket for the groceries or praying in the 
middle of his Western-style living room. For every detail of his daily life, there is a photograph 
with an explicit message, which Idrissa is aware of: 
My brother sends signs on the pictures [...] he wants to transmit a message each time. 
He wants to show that he keeps the link with Senegalese traditions, that he goes on 
praying and eat in the community. ... Here he wants to show that he lives in modernity, 
with the computer, the phone [...] and there, that he goes to the supermarket. ... In that 
one, he wants to show that he sends money.175 
 These twenty photographs are carefully put together into what looks like a self-
representation gathering the elements of a lifestyle Omar wishes to have. A striking photograph 
shows him at a cash machine. He is about to insert a bank note into the slot of the machine in a 
very explicit manner. Aida explains that through this picture, Omar wants to demonstrate to her 
how he sends the remittances. She states that she does not know how money is sent via the 
MoneyGram system in Spain and that she believes in the message of the picture. Through these 
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photographs, her husband overly simplifies his everyday life in Spain, converting a cash machine 
into an automatic money transfer system. These photographs reveal the way Omar manages 
information and knowledge about what is happening over there, in Spain. Sending these 
photographs have allowed him to construct a representation of a lifestyle he would like his family 
to believe he has in Europe. It doesn’t matter if he is actually illiterate; he is able to demonstrate his 
successful experience through the pictures and become someone else. These representations remind 
us of McKay’s work on the photographs taken by Filipino migrants which show 
 how people deploy photography as a technology to bring into being their desired 
future selves. By making present ghosts of the future, photographs of the self shape 
distinctive translocal subjectivities. (McKay, 2008: 381) 
 In addition, international mobility is celebrated through the pictures on the wall showing the 
emigrated brothers proudly posing in European-style clothes. In Aida’s bedroom, a picture has been 
enlarged and hung above the bed (photograph 22): Omar is posing for the picture, driving a 
motorbike. Aida confesses that she knows the motorbike does not belong to him and that he cannot 
drive a motorbike, but she likes the picture. This picture strongly suggests a successful and enviable 
migration experience. Idrissa adds: 
But I’m not a fool [...] I know very well that my brother doesn’t have a motorbike or 
that car in the picture.176 
 
Photograph 22: Aida and Omar’s bedroom, Hann, June 2012, J.H. 
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 The relationships between the household and the remote places are based on a great 
tension, which the visible signs of the successful expatriation of the brothers remind the family of 
throughout the house. Idrissa’s narrative sheds light on both the different values of knowledge and 
the social and geographic hierarchy produced by the migration experience. These representations 
participate in the construction of a male identity based on the celebration of mobility to the extent 
that the successful emigrants are able to provide decent livelihoods for their families in an 
ostentatious way. Despite his illiteracy, Omar is able to manage and filter information about his 
distant life and take great advantage of his absence. Through mobility, the absence becomes a 
valuable means to better control the household and at the same time to become emancipated from 
the weight of the community. This tension is explicit in the pictures. Omar wishes to maintain a 
strong link with his community, traditions and religion by showing how he prays and lives in the 
community. Similarly, he also demonstrates how he belongs to a modern world and emancipates 
himself as a male and an individual somewhere else. More specifically, this mobility has affected 
the lives of many women like Aida, who are waiting for their husbands or sons who are either at 
sea or have gone to Europe. 
 
Coping with male absences 
 In her not-yet-translated French novel, Celles qui attendent (Those who wait), Senegalese 
writer Fatou Diome extensively describes the life of the Senegalese wives whose husband or sons 
have gone to Europe (Diome, 2010). These women organise their everyday life around the men’s 
uncertain but very much expected return. Women bear the absence of men thanks only to the 
perspective of their expected return. Senegalese mothers sold their belongings and secretly gave 
their sons everything they had so that they could leave and, in the future, send money back to their 
community. Traditional mutualised funding systems called “tontine” gather women together: the 
women who take part in these local groups all put small amounts of money in on a regular basis. 
Once in a while, one of the women members wins part of these mutual savings by drawing lots. 
The amounts of money the mothers could gather from these funding systems helped them fund 
their sons’ journeys. Of course, the risk of their sons dying in the sea was considered, but the 
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temptation was too strong. The initial investment would be compensated for by an “easier” life and 
remittances sent from Spain. Before being able to go back to Senegal for a holiday, the successful 
emigrants first needed to obtain legal status. For the women, the expectation was huge. Women 
sometimes waited for months until they found out that their son or husband had died at sea. Others 
were still expecting an unlikely return although they have been left without news for years. 
Sometimes, men did not want to call their family until their situation in Europe was sorted out, and 
waited for long periods of time before telephoning and announcing that they had obtained legal 
status and got a proper job or, more simply, that they were coming back to Senegal for a holiday.  
 In Saint-Louis, Fatou and Amy live on the second floor of their mother-in-law’s house. 
Fatou’s husband, now in Dakar, used to be a long-distance fisherman who had been fishing 
everywhere in West African waters. He is now a fish trader and lives with his second wife in 
Dakar, sending money to Fatou on a regular basis. Fatou speaks and understands French much 
better than many fishermen’s wives in Senegal. She introduces me to Amy, who is the wife of her 
husband’s brother and who also shares a bedroom with her children in the same house. Amy’s 
husband went to Spain six years ago and only came back to Senegal for the first time after five 
years. Their mother-in-law is a famous fish trader in Senegal; she owns many boats and became a 
great leader of women fish traders. She had four sons, among whom three had gone to Europe and 
for whom she helped organise the migration projects. According to Fatou and Amy, despite her 
comfortable financial situation, she still receives money from her sons on a regular basis. 
 Fatou and Amy explain that their respective husbands call every two or three days and send 
money when necessary. Amy feels her situation has improved since her husband has been in 
Europe. When he used to fish in Guinea-Bissau, he was earning less. When she needed something, 
she could not call him since he was always at sea. Now, and since her husband got legal status in 
Europe, it is easier to reach him. He makes decisions on the phone regarding the education of the 
children and the use of the remittances he sends. Amy is proud that her husband is in Europe, 
although she does not know what he does there every day, how he lives or when he will come back. 
She finally confesses that she finds it hard to be separated from him for such a long time but that 
her complaint is discreet. What is striking in the relationships between women and men is that 
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women never ask questions of their husband. If a man leaves the house, women cannot ask him 
where he has gone and when he will come back. These questions will affect men’s freedom of 
movement. Paradoxically, women, when they are mothers (and more rarely wives), remain greatly 
respected figures. However, although they have a direct influence on the mobility of the men, they 
can hardly ask them about their life outside the household. Women therefore play an ambiguous 
role in the mobility of the men; they can both actively influence it and passively endure it. They 
embody powerful immobile agents who keep control over the household, manage the children’s 
education and support their men’s mobility. At the same time, they have no control over their 
men’s return and have to deal with their absence.  
 Fatou lives in the northern part of Guet Ndar’s spit of land, 500 metres away from the 
border with Mauritania. Economic exchanges take place on an everyday basis at the border. Sugar, 
tea and other goods are sold there by Mauritanian merchants who cross the desert and clandestinely 
make use of the border. When her sons are at sea, Fatou sends her nephew there to buy sugar and 
tea. Although she has been living in the same house for the last 20 years, she has never walked to 
the border. She does not know what the borderland looks like although it is located only half a 
kilometre away. She does not question this surprising fact as, for her, it is a man’s job to walk in 
the sand and buy things at the border. Her own mobility is reduced to the strict neighbourhood, the 
marketplace and, once in a while, the city centre – though this is really exceptional. Rather than 
interpreting this limited mobility as an imposed condition, I prefer to see it as a personal choice. 
Fatou instead makes use of the mobility of the men who live in the house to achieve her everyday 
tasks and manage her household. Through this mediated mobility, she builds her own imagined 
geography of the border space from her intimate, closed home place.  
 In Dakar, Aida saw her husband, Omar, leave in 2006. They were not yet married when he 
decided to go to Europe with his elder brothers. Once he settled in Spain, Aida insisted in arranging 
the wedding as soon as possible in Senegal. She says that now that Omar was in Europe, he 
represented a “strong value” or somehow a “guarantee”,177 and could easily be asked to marry by 
other women. She states that she had to seize this opportunity and become his official wife. Their 
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mutual families arranged the ceremony in 2007 in the village, a year before her future husband 
obtained legal status in Spain. The wedding celebration took place without Omar – men’s absence 
at their own wedding has become a common thing among Senegalese families. When he became a 
documented worker in 2008, Omar started working as a fisherman in European waters and sending 
remittances on a regular basis. Since then, he has been coming back for a month once a year. Aida 
used to work as a hairdresser in the neighbourhood, but as soon as the couple’s situation got better 
and she had a child, Omar asked her to stop working and stay at home to take care of the family. 
On average, he sends 30 euros (£24) a month to his wife. As long as he is sending her money, she 
says that she does “not have any problem with his decision”.178 In addition, Omar did not wish to 
involve his wife in the house extension works. Aida does not know anything about this enterprise 
and has not been asked to manage the money transfer. Omar’s mobility has enabled him to have 
greater control of his wife’s mobility by asking her to stop working. In addition, he could take 
advantage of the immobility of his wife and the resulting lack of knowledge of foreign places to 
create an imagined lifestyle elsewhere – as I demonstrated above with the book of photo. Despite 
Omar’s requirements, Aida does not look like a powerless agent. With the support of her family, 
she proved to be able to arrange a wedding despite the absence of her future husband – though with 
his agreement – and seems partly aware of Omar’s wish to magnify his lifestyle in Europe.  
 These narratives bring to light the specific power–knowledge relationships generated 
through men’s mobility. Being absent is normal, even at one’s own wedding ceremony. Absences 
remain synonymous with prosperity and successful mobile experiences. Visible passivity is socially 
and culturally coded in a negative way, whereas invisible activity is lived as an essential driving 
force for communities. Men and women have constructed intimacy at a distance. Men’s role in the 
family seems to be better socially accepted and constructed as technologically and economically 
mediated. These mechanisms remind us of McKay’s work on Filipino migrant families whose 
emotional exchanges have been changed by the absence of mothers and mediated through the 
sending of remittances (McKay, 2007). Furthermore, men’s information-filtering action shapes 
female imagined mobility. Aida has constructed her transnational imagined mobility through 
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Omar’s narratives and self-representation. She sees foreign spaces through her husband’s eyes, 
creating a specific imagined geography of these places. As a matter of fact, when I ask her whether 
she is thinking about joining Omar one day in Europe, she replies that he would not let her come, 
and, in fact, that she would not even consider this possibility. She is surprised by this question and 
says that she is supposed to be here, at home, in Senegal. As I sense that she is feeling 
uncomfortable with my questions, I do not push the conversation any further. She seems to take for 
granted the balanced organisation of her household between her absent husband and her 
housewifely duties and would not question this order. Finally, polygamist practices have 
encouraged male mobility to a lesser extent. These marital practices are socially accepted and are 
ambiguously linked to mobility. 
 
3. Polygamy and mobility 
 In her novel, Fatou Diome tells the story of the husband who comes back to his Senegalese 
village after several silent years of absence spent in Europe (Diome, 2010). His faithful wife had 
been waiting for him all those years and welcomes him impatiently. In Europe, he married a second 
wife, a white woman he brings back to his village and introduces to his family and first wife. 
Polygamy is usual among Senegalese men. Islam is said to allow them to marry up to four women. 
Although these practices tend to disappear in urban Senegalese societies, traditional fishing 
communities still foster it. Having four wives and ten children are a mark of prosperity and power. 
Successful men can demonstrate that they are able to feed as many mouths as they wish to. I have 
shown in chapter 5 how one of the most respected Senegalese fishers has had five wives, more than 
thirty children and as many houses. Nevertheless, respondents report that many fishermen marry 
two to three wives although they do not earn enough to provide decent livelihoods for the extended 
family. Sometimes, their wives are even obliged to live together under the same roof and “share” 
their husband every day. Women barely complain of this widespread situation. Fishermen’s 
mobility has greatly fostered this polygamy as it has enabled the fishermen to develop a “network” 
of places between which they can commute and organise their fishing activity. Polygamy wholly 
takes part in the mobility system of fishermen; “immobile” wives constitute nodes which men’s 
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mobility unifies. This polygamy also provides the fishermen with the possibility of being absent 
from the other household and therefore benefiting from the advantage of this absence. In addition, 
when a fisherman has two wives under the same roof, being mobile helps him escape the family 
pressure and tensions generated by this situation. 
 In Saint-Louis, the second wife of Amy’s husband lives in the room next to her mother-in-
law, on the first floor of the house. As for Fatou, her husband is now living in Dakar with his 
second wife. Not allowed to say anything, they must deal with this situation without complaining. 
Fatou’s fatalist statement regarding her husband’s second wedding says a lot about her emotions: 
It doesn’t matter as long as I don’t think about it. I have already seen her, his second 
wife, but I deal with it. 179 
 Fishermen from Saint-Louis’ spit of land are strongly attached to their land of origin. They 
often do their best to remain on the spit of land or at least to maintain links with family members in 
Guet Ndar. However, the extremely high population density of Guet Ndar village does not allow 
them to build new houses and territorially extend their family. Therefore, marrying a second wife 
outside the village has enabled them to build their own house without being disconnected from 
their village of origin. They land their catches in Guet Ndar, organise their fishing trips from there, 
carry on their relationship to their close family and commute between the external house where the 
new wife lives and the old familial house. In this way, polygamy enables them to maintain a link 
between the territory of origin and a more modern lifestyle away from the oppressive traditional 
pressure of Guet Ndar. Fatou’s husband settled in Dakar with his second wife but is always happy 
to prove his belonging to Guet Ndar effectively by mentioning his first wife’s presence there. 
Mobility and polygamy are connected in several complex ways. In these particular cases, one 
naturally assimilates female immobility to passivity and powerlessness in coping with the mobile 
husbands who are taking advantage of their freedom of movement. Nevertheless, women still find 
spaces of negotiation in these situations. 
 The “co-wives” negotiate a particular breathing space which enables them to cope with the 
accepted hierarchy which structures the organisation of the polygamist household. In some 
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families, the many co-wives can openly struggle together and exercise pressure on the male 
members of the household. Aziz is the first-born son of a large family – his father had four wives – 
and before migrating to Europe at the beginning of the 2000s, he was working for his father, who 
owned a couple of purse seine boats at that time. Aziz explains how he had to leave for Europe to 
escape the intense pressure the four wives were putting on him: 
There is competition [...] and jealousy between the co-wives and their children. For 
that reason, I was in trouble and had to give up my father’s gear. I was the one who 
caught the fish, brought money, and from that money we used to pay for the family 
expenses, to eat, drink, pay for the electricity, etc. I was taking the risks at sea, but 
when I came back, my father’s wives wanted to have greater responsibility over the 
catches and fishing gear. The co-wives wanted to have more fish, and to do whatever 
they liked whereas I was the one who goes to the sea, who takes the risks. They wanted 
to make the decisions for the sharing of the catches.180 
Later on, Aziz explains how his father refused to sell him one of his boats once he came back from 
his first migration trip to Europe: 
He refused because he didn’t want to be in trouble with the wives, because it’s a 
polygamous family, because he didn’t want people to say that I was favoured or that I 
had been offered the canoe.181 
 Aziz had funding for a canoe, though he was unable to find one at that time. He decided to 
leave again for Europe and take advantage of his long-term, multiple-entry visa. Although he used 
to be a recognised fisher with a decent income, he was now struggling as a street merchant in Italy 
for a couple of years and was then hired as a welder in a factory. Aziz’s personal situation sheds 
light on the power struggles he encountered when opposing the co-wives and his father. On one 
hand, he looks like an empowered agent who successfully manages to feed the extended family 
thanks to his fishing activities, while on the other hand, his mobility experience reflects his need to 
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escape the growing ambitions of his mothers-in-law and gain greater control over what he would 
earn, buy and decide on in his life.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the relationships between gender and mobility are revealed in a myriad of 
ways through fishermen’s mobility patterns in Senegal. Male mobility raises questions of power–
knowledge relations and reveals the way households are socially and geographically constructed in 
relation to external spaces and values of mobility. Seen as a whole, fishermen’s mobility 
demonstrates the ambiguity of these power relations and questions the powerlessness generally 
associated with women. My data have shown that male’s mobility greatly shapes the imagined 
mobility of women and of the land-based male members of the community. Mobility is certainly 
used as an empowering strategy for men and encouraged by the less mobile women. Nevertheless, 
women have proved to be able to negotiate with their supposedly imposed immobility. They foster 
men’s mobility, which they might use for their own personal interests, as in the case of Aida, who 
hastily arranged her wedding with her absent husband, or of Fatou, who mediates the mobility of 
the house’s males at the Mauritanian border. Mobile and immobile actors progress according to the 
many tensions between the places from where they structure their everyday life. 
 This chapter has also raised the paradoxical dependence of traditional community systems 
on the emergence of individualistic practices. Traditional societies celebrate individual enrichment 
according to the benefits that may arise from these individual mobile experiences. In fact, from the 
perspective of the Senegal-based households, one can observe that these tensions have led to many 
kinds of compromises. These compromises entail not only finding a balance between maintaining 
the traditional solidarity system and tolerating individualisation, but also between coping with the 
extreme mobility of absent husbands and finding opportunities to take advantage of this mobility – 
for the women. In other words, the less mobile community members have, like the fishermen, 
proved that they elaborate subtle means – or De Certeau’s tactics – in order to negotiate 
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possibilities of freedom, power and individual emancipation without openly resisting or 
challenging existing social orders.  
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 Chapter 10 - 
 Conclusion: Modern Seamen, Free Subjects? 
  
 This research has investigated the experiences of individuals and provided a different view 
of mobility and, to a larger extent, of West African mobility patterns. I have attempted to overcome 
the traditional push-and-pull factors that traditionally explain migration patterns. My approach has 
revealed the dynamics inherent in the organisation of a particular traditional West African 
community through the analysis of the power struggles at the heart of its mobility patterns. This 
research has challenged a too European-centrist view of West African flows which tends to keep 
West African subjects out of modern times and history, as suggested in President Sarkozy’s Dakar 
speech in 2007 (Bergson & Ngnemzué, 2008). Investigating these microphysics of power has 
revealed that there are constant negotiations of power resulting in compromises within traditional 
communities and between state actors or the fishers themselves. My results raise a discussion on 
the dichotomist representations that oppose modernity to tradition, archaism to technology and 
“powerless” actors to dominant, powerful actors. Through their mobility, the seamen produce 
“hybrid” knowledges that question these oppositions. Fishermen are resilient actors who must cope 
with more sophisticated mobility-related state control practices. Fishermen consider themselves to 
be modern seamen and are surprised not to be considered as such, as this last narrative suggests:  
The toubab [white people] sails around the world, but we want to go to Spain with our 
canoes and we are told that these are shaky boats [pirogues de fortune]! There is this 
toubab who paddles up to Guyana and people are surprised that we go to Spain with 
our engines. There is a problem!182 
 This research has not proposed to romanticise fishermen’s mobility, and in fact does the 
exact opposite, and instead looking at the fishermen as individuals, and not as a mass, inquiring 
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into subjectivities rather than globalising statistics. President Sarkozy’s provocative speech 
interestingly emphasises the dichotomies which my research has sought to nuance:  
The African tragedy is that the African is not sufficiently integrated in history. The 
African peasant […] whose ideal is to live in harmony with nature, only knows the 
ever revolving wheel of time punctuated by the unending repetition of the same 
gestures and the same words. In this mindset whereby everything always starts afresh, 
there is neither room for the human adventure nor for the idea of progress. In such a 
universe where nature reigns supreme, the African remains immobile amid an 
unchanging order in which everything seems to be predetermined. Here human beings 
never take a leap into the future. It never dawns on them that they can get out of the 
humdrum repetitiveness and forge their destiny. (Sarkozy in Bergson & Ngnemzué, 
2008) 
 President Sarkozy gave this speech on the 26 July 2007 in Dakar, shortly after he was 
elected. At that time, the images of irregular Sub-Saharan migrants landing in the Canary Islands 
had reached the French media and contributed to the construction of popular fears about 
immigration. Sarkozy made this speech in the context of the emerging debates on national identity 
in France and on the role of colonialism in Africa and an increase in irregular maritime migration 
flows from Senegal to Europe. These lines from his speech have been highly criticised for their 
racial tone, and it is not my intention to thoroughly analyse them. Bergson and Ngnemzue have 
already proposed an efficient reading of their ideological roots (2008), emphasising the way this 
speech reflects a high degree of ignorance of African realities and the pre-determinism that seems 
to characterise African people. Sarkozy’s words could be seen as an interpretation of fishermen’s 
mobility, as the “African” peasant reminds us of the Senegalese fisherman. Here, Sarkozy opposes 
the ideas of modernity, progress, mobility and individualism to the idea of an archaic, immobile 
and unchanging Africa. His speech reproduces the identity of a supposed African unity unable to 
comprehend the complexity and multiplicity of modernity and progress. The “African” is stuck in 
repetitive rhythms of life which keep him away from the emancipatory power of modernity, 
novelty and progress. Sarkozy’s condescending tone simplifies African realities, knowledges and 
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adaptations. This research has provided some key ideas with which to overcome these provocative 
simplifications by showing how the fishermen have used their mobility as a means to reach 
personal freedom, self-emancipation and independence. Because fishermen are not determined by 
their physical environment, they remain free subjects whose movements cannot be reduced to the 
repetitiveness of  nature’s cycles.  
 
Free subjects 
 I have shown that fishermen are not environmental migrants whose movements are 
constantly adjusted to natural constraints. Although these seamen apprehend their natural 
environment in a familiar way and adjust to ecological constraints, they move as free subjects. 
Through this research, I have provided convincing knowledge about the meanings, origins, limits 
and implications of fishermen’s mobility, both in West African waters and beyond, when they 
reached Spain. Immersions in the field and ethnographic data have helped apprehend the tensions 
between the mobile actors and their community. Through fishermen’s narratives, I understood that 
mobility is not a simple movement but rather a meaningful enterprise. Mobility is not reducible to 
migration as it takes the shape of local and international maritime mobilities, cross-border illegal 
movements, land-based mobility or women’s and failed migrants’ imagined mobility. I have shown 
that fishermen are not environmental migrants. Rather, their mobility carries political, economic, 
geographic and social meanings which the concept of environmental migration does not 
appropriately address.  
 I have demonstrated how the dynamism of fishermen’s maritime mobility first finds its 
roots at the national level of Senegal. The limits of Senegal’s governance have participated in the 
expansion of fishermen beyond national borders by making possible overfishing practices 
throughout Senegalese waters. Indirectly, Senegal’s governance fostered fishermen’s mobility 
ambitions. Fishermen developed their expertise relating to the sea, took advantage of mobility-
related state policy and first learnt how to circumvent or take advantage of state regulation at the 
level of Senegal’s waters. Furthermore, the socio-economic organisation of mobility has generated 
connections between sea and land spaces and has resulted in the projection of fishermen’s power 
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onto the sea and the creation of knowledge and geographies of maritime areas. By inquiring into 
fishermen’s mobility through the perspective of borders, I raised the question about the social 
construction of maritime borderlands. Fishermen actively use borders and spaces beyond borders, 
in Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau and Guinea. Whatever political and economic constraints these 
border practices put on them, fishermen always find ways and means to make their mobility 
legitimate, profitable and meaningful. I have shown that through international fishing mobility, the 
sea is a space of political struggles, dangers and confrontation – in Mauritania. Border-crossing 
strategies changed the ocean into an area of opportunities, enrichment and emancipation, 
negotiation, knowledge and expertise production. This whole maritime border geography took new 
shapes when fishermen started undertaking journeys to Spain. The crossing of the ocean made 
possible their migration perspectives in Europe. The sea then became a whole border space to be 
crossed. All these mobility practices have strengthened the gendered organisation of the spatial 
practices of fishermen’s communities. Women’s narratives have demonstrated how they take 
advantage of men’s mobility to affirm themselves even though they have no direct control over this 
masculine mobility. Like the fishers, they pragmatically develop tactics to benefit from this 
mobility without challenging existing orders. 
 This study has demonstrated that mobility provided opportunities for mobile subjects to 
affirm themselves.  Whether they are citizens, international irregular migrants, husbands, sons, 
local or national leaders, seamen or local or international fishermen, the subjects seek means and 
compromises for the affirmation of the self through their mobility. Their mobility is a means to 
circumvent institutional structures through either negotiation practices or taking detours. Through 
these practices, fishermen affirm their claim, existence, needs and knowledges. Because they are 
mobile by nature, they consider their mobility to be the only means to affirm themselves. Through 
their mobility, fishermen live and experience what their unwanted presences on land in the 
households prevent them achieving. In Mauritanian waters, they legitimate their mobility by their 
historical use and knowledge of Mauritanian grounds. Mauritanian waters have been traditional 
spaces of mobility; jeopardising this “legitimate” use means questioning fishermen’s identity as 
mobile subjects. Similarly, opportunities for maritime migration to Europe provided them with the 
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possibility of using their mobility as a means to reach self-emancipation and autonomy vis-à-vis 
their community. Their failures to reach Spain and the resulting loss of control over their mobility 
have made the fishermen question their identity as mobile subject. As a result, they got depressed 
and were deeply and emotionally affected. Because fishermen are emotionally self-invested in the 
representation of their mobility, they consider external attempts to stop and slow down their 
mobility as invasive and illegitimate practices. Their lack of distance regarding state regulation 
practices reveals this emotional investment and their emotive reactions. I have shown how 
fishermen’s complains of abusive arrests and fuel seizure in West African waters and the 
repatriation measures on the Canary Islands reflect their emotional apprehension of state practices. 
However, the rationalisation of their fishing expeditions in Guinea and Guinea-Bissau’s distant 
waters and the relatively peaceful political background of their access to these fishing places have 
provided the fishermen with more distance and less affective involvement in their mobility – as I 
have shown through their appropriation practices of naming the sea. 
 Most of the time, the mobile subjects avoid confronting the actors who embody these 
structures and institutions. In fact, confrontation constitutes the last step fishermen consider when 
the situation is too difficult to handle and makes negotiation and detours inefficient, as when Guet 
Ndarian openly confronted the Mauritanian border agents. Although by circumventing these 
institutions fishermen do not openly challenge existing orders, their mobility produces this effect 
by creating new orders and generating institutional responses adjusted to their mobility. One might 
ask why fishermen use their mobility as a pragmatic way to elude institutional pressures and 
constraints rather than openly resisting and confronting them. Precisely because fishermen feel 
confident about using their mobility, knowledge and expertise for their own interests, no other 
methods seem to be as efficient to achieve their goals. I have shown how professional organisations 
of fishers lack credibility and cohesion and can barely get the state to pay attention to their 
interests. Similarly, they have no means to revolt against the institutional structures that prevented 
them reaching Europe. The solidarity system on which their community is based is too strong for 
them to efficiently struggle against it. Fishermen are not only too weak to struggle. They pursue 
their own interests with the tactics they deploy in order to circumvent these institutional structures. 
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Fishermen satisfy their interests by becoming brave migrants willing to sacrifice their lives by 
reaching Europe for their community. They can exercise power through these tactics and become 
respected individuals. Their community is certainly demanding and oppressive, though it is 
paradoxically thanks to this oppressive solidarity system that fishermen meet their personal goals 
of self-emancipation through their mobility. Revolting against this system would jeopardise their 
opportunities of achieving the object of their revolt. Instead, taking advantage of and coping with 
these systems is a pragmatic compromise that enables the fishermen to reach their goals. 
 Inquiring into fishermen’s emotions provides further responses. This research has shown 
that in many situations, lack of trust between the mobility-related actors generates bitterness and 
vulnerabilities. To compensate for this lack of trust and give more balance to these situations, 
actors develop power–knowledge mechanisms. The Senegalese state invested in mobility-related 
practices to control fishermen’s mobility. Land-based funders and fish traders control fishers’ 
mobility at a distance. Moreover, fishermen do not trust state practices and legitimate their own 
illegal practices because of the lack of trust they have in the Senegalese state. Because fishers do 
not trust in anything other than their own mobility, they are unable to consider revolting against the 
institutional systems. Their lack of confidence strengthens the power relations between the 
mobility-related actors and the state agents, and results in more illegal practices, strategies and 
tactics. Indirectly, these mechanisms reflect and reproduce individualisation practices. I have 
shown how, in many situations, when fishermen do not trust the other fishermen, they secretly 
exploit their newly discovered fishing places. Their lack of trust of their fellow fishermen engages 
them in competition and individualist practices which the solidarity system paradoxically seeks to 
prevent. These mechanisms have given a strong value to different kinds of knowledges and control 
of such knowledges.  
 Controlling and producing knowledge are essential to these individualisation processes. 
Mobility involves different kinds of knowledges: knowledge of the sea, expertise in relation to 
mobility, and navigation and fishing techniques and practices. Mobility also involves knowledge of 
state regulations in order to maximise the benefits of taking advantage of these regulations. There is 
also the knowledge of what fishermen should invest in their fishing expeditions and the awareness 
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of economic and political constraints and requirements. Moreover, knowledge is also about what 
fishermen should let others know or keep to themselves, such as the exploitation of secret fishing 
places, illegal fishing practices or earnings and savings, or what fishermen’s Senegal-based 
relatives should know about their lifestyle abroad and what their neighbours and families should 
know about their economic and social status. Fishermen either let their community know about 
their wealth, and are exposed to the demanding community members, or make the choice of hiding 
signs of wealth and prosperity. Similarly, through their absence, fishermen let the land-based 
community know about their working activities. Their attempts to remain invisible, either to the 
eyes of their community or to coast guards at sea reflect their wish to let others know – or not – 
about their own mobility. Fishermen base their relationship to others on these “knowing” and 
“letting-know” practices. These knowledge-related practices enable them to gain control over their 
life, mobility, expectations and ambitions. In other words, fishermen affirm themselves through the 
control of what they know, claim to know and let others know. Knowing how to manage 
technologies as well as the knowledge provided by technologies are other means that support 
fishermen’s control of their social, economic, political and natural environments.  
  I have shown how engines and GPS devices first help the fishermen to explore remote 
fishing areas and navigate off shore and at a distance. With GPS, fishermen orientate themselves at 
sea, circumvent borders and restricted fishing areas and finally go to the Canary Islands. They also 
register their fishing places with the intention of coming back. Using mobile phones and Skype, 
fishermen maintain links with their land-based families and filter the information related to their 
mobility and emigration. We have seen that sometimes they can be informed about where they 
should best sell their catches and negotiate the prices of their catches before landing. Conveyors of 
boat migration to Spain organised the whole journey through their mobile phones, hiring 
middlemen and recruiting would-be migrants. Technologies reproduce and strengthen the function 
of ‘knowing’ and ‘letting-know’ practices that give shape to fishermen’s mobility. Through these 
technologies, fishermen efficiently mediate power and better control their mobility and trajectories 
at sea. Fishermen’s practical knowledge is certainly based on “mêtis” but has not always excluded 
“techne” (Scott, 1998). In many situations, fishermen have proved that they can divert the state’s 
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intentions of acting on their mobility. Their mobility tactics demonstrate that they have appropriate 
state regulation measures – such as the spread of motors – and border practices. The fact that they 
seek to buy proper fishing licences for their maritime expeditions in Guinea and Guinea-Bissau 
shows that they are willing to adjust to state requirements. Again, when these requirements do not 
prevent them from fulfilling their own interests and freely unfolding their mobility, fishermen have 
proved to pragmatically adopt them. The state’s lack of consideration for fishermen’s practical 
knowledge only reinforces and reproduces the power relations I have described.  
 
Simplifying metaphors 
 The study of fishermen’s mobility has attempted to take into account the multiple 
dimensions of maritime spaces (Peters, 2010; Steinberg, 2013). Through their mobility, fishermen 
have not only proved that they can make use of the sea as a surface upon which they unfold their 
mobility or from which they extract valuable resources; their mobility is pragmatic to the extent 
that it fully addresses the various dimensions of the sea. The way fishermen apprehend and 
progress on the ocean first involves a specific knowledge of marine-rocks grounds for demersal 
fishers or moving shoals for the pelagic fishers. Fishermen sometimes look for sea currents so that 
they can trap fish shoals. I have shown how they navigate according to the sea depth and landscape 
they can see from the sea. Their knowledge entails managing high swells, currents and rough 
conditions in high seas. This knowledge also implies being aware of when to take the decision to 
turn back to Senegal to avoid accidents. I have shown how, on both sides of the Mauritanian 
maritime border, different fish species dwell in different sea grounds and offer different 
opportunities to the fishermen. I have emphasised how maritime borders are better apprehended as 
borderlands than strictly reduced to maritime borderlines. These borderlands involve sea grounds, 
moving surfaces and fish shoals, landscapes seen from the sea and mobile actors – either fishermen 
or border agents. For the Guet Ndarians who fish in Mauritania, their mental cartography of the 
maritime borderland has indicated that they progress according to a combination of sub-marine 
references and coastline landmarks rather than to the mere surface of the sea. For the fishermen 
who went to Europe by sea, it is the entire ocean – that means the changing combination of its 
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surface, winds, waves, currents and risks of drowning – that fishermen took into account or 
experienced in their sea journeys and that constitutes the border function of the ocean. This thesis 
has sought to take into account the material complexity and fluidity of the ocean through the 
interpretation of fishermen’s narratives on their navigation experiences.  
 Finally, this thesis has questioned the limits of the use of metaphors to address mobilities 
and sea spaces, which have been explored by Steinberg and Blum in their respective works on 
oceanic spaces (Blum, 2010; Steinberg, 2013). Steinberg follows Blum’s argument that “the sea is 
not a metaphor” (2013: 156), emphasising the needs for scholars to avoid “overtheoris[ing]” (2013: 
157) the ocean space. Indeed, I have shown how these metaphors tend to crystallise representations 
of the oceanic spaces and dismiss practical realities. There is no metaphor efficient enough to 
address the meaningful mobility and maritime geography of the fishermen, their changing 
representation of the sea and adaptation to changing environments and constraints as well as the 
risks they are confronted with through their mobility. What the “marine heterotopias” and the 
representation of the fishermen as Deleuzian nomads certainly bring to the fore are the many 
mechanisms involved in fishermen’s mobility. These metaphors shed light on the ability of the 
fishermen to project power onto the sea or progress as powerful actors who avoid state practices. 
Although these metaphors undoubtedly give to their mobility meaningful functions, such 
theorisations have limits. 
  Through their crystallisation effect, the metaphors tend to romanticise the mobile subjects. 
I have instead emphasised the pragmatism of the fishermen and the resulting pragmatic 
geographies. This idea of pragmatism gives strength to the constant changes to which fishermen 
adjust. Their practices rationalise their conception of the sea space and mobility according to 
fluctuant elements and in relation to what they expect their mobility will provide them with. 
Fishermen are pragmatic to the extent that they know how to produce and control knowledge so 
that they meet their own economic and social interests. Fishermen have learnt how to make use of 
familial and social networks to make their mobility possible. As Steinberg puts it, the theorisation 
of the ocean strengthens the “binary division between land and sea” (2013: 163). Indeed, seeing the 
fishermen as nomads progressing on maritime spaces would ignore the meaningful and necessary 
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connections that their mobility establishes and on which their mobility organises between sea and 
land spaces. I have shown how fishermen’s mobility depends on and progresses according to fixed 
points and land-based actors. Moreover, I demonstrated how the idealisation of their mobility 
dismisses their practical realities and the risks they must cope with every day. Because the sea “is a 
space that is constituted by and constitutive of183 movement” (Steinberg, 2013: 165), the practice of 
such space remains unpredictable and unstable, making even the most experienced seamen forced 
to reconsider and adjust their movement to the sea in a permanent way. Theorising this movement 
therefore only results in stabilising this inherent instability. Fishermen’s pragmatism reaches its 
limits precisely when its adjustment runs up against these unpredictable events. I have shown how 
fishermen have been struggling with the changing configuration of the mouth of the Senegal River, 
or how they have faced strong storms and rough navigation conditions on their maritime route to 
Europe. Their expertise and spiritual beliefs have constituted the only supports for them to cope 
with the risks of drowning and death at sea. Theorising their mobility fails to fully address these 
risks; this is even more valid in that precisely these risks have been the basis of fishermen’s own 
idealisation of their mobility. Because coastal communities are aware of the risks involved in 
navigation, fishermen have become idealised figures in Senegal. Moreover, because fishermen 
have romanticised their mobility, they have overestimated the value of their skills and knowledge 
and have been exposed to greater risks. The disillusion relating to failed mobility is the limit of 
fishermen’s pragmatic mobility and demonstrates that mobility is not always a successful 
enterprise. 
 
Suggesting pragmatic alternatives 
 Despite the ambitions of recent participatory policies, Senegal state’s lack of pragmatism 
and ignorance of fishermen’s practical knowledge have proved to provide inefficient responses to 
manage Senegal’s fishing sector. The state might first find its legitimacy in the establishment of 
stable relationships with the actors of the fishing sector. Involving fishermen’s practical knowledge 
within participatory policies appears to be a first, essential step for the implementation of 
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successful fishing resource management programmes. Because the fishermen and the state share 
similar interests – that is, the sustainable management of marine resources – there are possibilities 
for compromises and negotiations relating to the building of stable, trusting relationships. In 
Ouakam, the local team of fishermen has proved to be sensitive to the state’s participatory policy as 
they are willing to fulfil their commitment regarding the participatory programme.  
 Lack of financial means and infrastructures remain important constraints that have 
prevented efficient participatory surveillance. These participatory surveillance structures are not to 
be questioned per se as they originally aimed to give legitimacy to the local actors. Both the 
Senegalese state and the fishermen are responsible for the management of maritime fishing 
resources. Therefore, participatory programmes appear to be coherent directions to take. But 
because these structures imply that fishermen still financially depend on the state to efficiently 
perform surveillance at sea, local actors do not fully integrate these systems. In Ouakam’s restricted 
fishing areas and Joal’s protected marine area, local fishermen often run out of fuel for patrolling 
the local areas. A participatory sailing surveillance system would appear to be a practical 
alternative. I have shown that fishermen now exclusively move on the sea with engines and 
certainly consider sailing as being archaic. However, fishermen assimilate the use of engines into 
their fishing performance. Thus, suggesting the use of sails exclusively for surveillance aims would 
not jeopardise their fishing performance, question their ability to be modern seamen or take them 
back into an archaic era. Sailing would considerably reduce costs – though such alternatives cannot 
fully exclude the use of engines – and constitute a coherent, sustainable alternative for the 
surveillance of protected marine areas. Some traditional wooden canoes are still equipped for 
sailing. Implementing such ideas entails consulting the fishing communities and their leaders and 
adjusting the participatory sailing surveillance to their needs and habits, and the marine culture. 
Also, sailing boats would be less reactive than motorised boats, and the ability to approach illegal 
fishers at sea would certainly be limited. However, patrolling on board sailing boats would initially 
have a significant deterrent effect. Moreover, fishermen recognise each other at sea thanks to the 
traditional paintings on their wooden boats. In this way, they can take advantage of the “social 
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power of surveillance”184 which the DPSP informant put forward. Such a programme requires the 
regulators to take into account fishermen’s emotional investment in their mobility and sea 
activities. Compensating for the power struggles between the fishermen and their institutions by 
building strong, trusting relationships must be considered.  
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2011 fieldwork session 
 
 
256 
 
2012 fieldwork session 
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Appendix 2 – Information on Respondents 
1/ List of respondents 
2011: 
- Eight interviews with representatives of public institutions such as Direction des pêches maritimes 
(direction of maritime fisheries), Direction de la protection et de la surveillance des pêches 
(direction of the protection and surveillance for maritime fisheries), Centre de recherche Océanique 
de Dakar Thiaroye (CRODT – centre for Oceanic Research of Dakar – Thiaroye), Institut de pêche 
et d’aquaculture (Institute for fisheries and aquaculture), Consejería de Trabajo e Inmigración 
(Embajada de España, Dakar).  
- Nine interviews with representatives of non-governmental organisations (WWF, ADEPA, REPAO, 
Collectif Pêche et Développement), professional organisations for fisheries (FENAGIE) and local 
fishery structures (Comité Local de Pêche – local committee for fisheries, Aire marine protégée - 
Marine protected area) 
- Five individual interviews with long-distance fishermen (captains) 
- Five individual interviews with returned migrant 
- Two individual interviews with local demersal fishermen 
 
2012: 
- Seven interviews with representatives of fishery-related public institutions 
- Seven interviews with representatives of NGOs and professional organisations (including five were 
fishermen leaders) 
- Three interviews with members of fishery structures (including two key informants) 
- Four interviews of fishermen’s wives (of either international fishermen or migrants living in Spain) 
- Several interviews with a local demersal fisherman who was also returned migrant and key informant 
- One group interview of local pelagic fishers (fishing trip with them) 
- One group interview with pelagic fishers used to go to Mauritania 
- Six interviews with long-distance demersal fishermen fishing in Southern West-Africa (including four 
boat owners, two crew members) 
- Six interviews with demersal fishermen fishing illegaly in Mauritanian waters (including three boat 
owners, three crew members) 
- Two interviews with fish traders (including a retired long-distance fisherman) 
- Two interviews with ice-box boat owners (retired/former fishermen) 
258 
 
- Several interviews with a pelagic-fishing boat owner who was a former pelagic fisherman, used to 
migrate legally to Italy 
- Among all these interviewees, two were returned migrants 
 
2/ Table 6 provides details about the respondents’ categories, both in 2011 (from number 1 to 29) 
and 2012 (from number 30 to 69). As shown below, one respondent could belong to several 
categories at the same time (in red), especially the retired ones (in brackets):  
 
Table 6: Respondents’ categories according to their main function, status, professional activities or 
personal migration history (below). 
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Appendix 3 – Ouakam restricted marine area 
 
 
 
